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From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)
To: (1) Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12)
(2) U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-
PII-T)
Subj: DALASP SUMMARY REPORT (NPS PROJECT REPORT)
Navy DALASP application dated February 24, 1992
Army DALASP application dated March 13, 1992
DALASP and QofA trip reports
Observations on a Recent Trip to the Former Soviet
Union
"Touring" Russia and Ukraine
Administrative section
Substantive research findings
Special section on incidents
Course outline for NS 3450
Notes for lecture on Svechin's Strategy
1. Reference (a) requested funding from the Naval Intelligence
Command (NIC-12) for my participation in the Defense Advanced
Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP) for research in Russia
and the Ukraine during July 1992. Additional applications were
submitted and four Navy officer students at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School (NPS) undertook the same research activities. Refer-
ence (b) requested funding from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-PII-T) for DALASP research by one
Army officer student at NPS. DALASP participation was approved by
these sponsors, funding was provided to NPS, and the trip was
undertaken as a joint Navy/Army faculty/student research project
under the auspices of the Dean of Research. This project report
is provided to the sponsors, and a few additional interested
government offices and parties, to complete the reporting on
activities undertaken during this research project. Prior to
release, it was reviewed by the Navy sponsor and other relevant
Navy offices.
2. Enclosure (1) contains the initial trip reports of the re-
search conducted by myself, the four Navy and one Army officers
funded by DALASP, as well as the activities of three Air Force
officers who traveled under the Air Force Quality of Analysis
(QofA) program. These are reprinted herein since not all of the
offices being provided with copies of this project report will
have received these initial trip reports.
3. In accordance with my request for DALASP funding, I agreed to
provide a more in-depth summary report of my research results in
addition to the overview trip report. Enclosure (2) contains an
overview of the research results that have been previously and
separately distributed. They form the basis of briefings that
have been provided to various parties when I have been asked to
speak about the experiences of the research activities. I did
not document the sources of my information in this brief report.
This report is reprinted herein since copies were not provided to
all offices which will receive this project report and inclusion
serves to complete this project report as a complete package.
4. Enclosure (3) is a draft of an article to appear the Naval
Intelligence Professionals Quarterly that reports on the activi-
ties of the researchers. A slightly edited version should appear
in late 1992 or early 1993.
5. Enclosure (4) contains an in-depth report of my activities,
the names and addresses of all the tour participants, and those
Russian and Ukrainian individuals with which I had contact. This
section is merely an administrative accounting of activities as
well as certain in-depth observations without substantive analy-
sis.
6. Enclosure (5) contains my raw substantive research findings
with initial analysis. The sources for all my research is either
what I was told by Russians and Ukrainians or what I observed
myself. The analysis of the information that I was provided or
what I observed is my own. During most of the trip, I did not
openly take notes when I was conversing with the Russians or
Ukrainians. I did this to facilitate open and in-depth conversa-
tions. Where I openly took written notes, this is noted. In
either case, I converted written or mental notes to notes in the
computer which we purchased and took on the trip to aid us in
writing our reports. This section is limited to a discussion of
the major seminars that were held during the trip.
7. Enclosure (6) contains in-depth reporting of what I observed
or was told by various Russian and Western individuals regarding
a series of incidents that involved our group. Virtually all of
this information is known to the Russians since they either
participated in them or were directly involved with conversations
that resulted. Unless otherwise indicated, none of this informa-
tion was held in confidence.
8. Copies of a draft project report were provided additionally
to each of the officer student researchers so that they could use
it in the preparation of their own individual reports. The offic-
er student researchers were told to not include anything in their
own reports that was covered by mine or would be covered in the
final version of this project report.
9. Each student that traveled to Russian and the Ukraine under
DALASP or QofA funding was enrolled in a special topics seminar
(NS 4079) at NPS and received graduate credit for their field re-
search. Each participated in multiple seminars held in these
countries and contributed to the preparation of all reports
issued in my name.
10. In my original DALASP application, I also indicated that I
would make major revisions to my Soviet Military Strategy course
outline based upon my research experience. Enclosure (7) provides
the addressees with a copy of the revised course outline for NS
3450, Military Strategy in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. This course was offered during the Fall Quarter, Academic
Year 1992-1993. It will again be offered during the Spring of
1993. Enclosure (8) are notes used for the teaching of a lecture
on General-Major Svechin's book Strategy in that course. These
notes were developed after considerable interaction with Russian
military facutly members during the DALASP-funded trip. They
form the basis of a forthcoming technical report and article on
the same subject.
11. The omission of the phrase Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) generally throughout this report is deliberate.
During three weeks in Russia and the Ukraine, I never once heard
any Russian or Ukranian talk about the CIS.
12. If you have any questions, please let me know at (408) 646-
2143 AVN 878-2143 or by FAX at (408) 646-2949 or AVN 878-2949.
JAMES J. TRITTEN







From: Associate Professor James Tritten (NS/Tr)
To: (1) Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs (NS)
(2) Curricular Officer, NSA/Intelligence Programs (38)
Subj : TRIP REPORT
1. This memo will report on my trip to Russia and the Ukraine
taken between Thursday July 2 and Saturday July 25, 1992, under
the auspices of the Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies
Program (DALASP) , as Navy reimbursable research. This trip report
also covers the activities of 4 Navy and 1 Army students also
funded by DALASP and 3 Air Force students funded under the Quali-
ty of Analysis (QofA) Program. The students taking part in this
trip were: LTs Mark Admiral, Dave Hanson, Jim Mcllmail, and Scott
Stanley, USN, CPT Jim Jaworski, USA, and CPTs Evie Conlon, Frank
McGuigan, and Jay Warwick, USAF. Additional substantive reports
will be prepared by all participants as required by DALASP and
QofA directives and should be consulted for a full documentation
and detailed report of all activities. My own research will be
further documented in an NPS technical report under preparation
and by revisions to my course outline for NS 3450 (Russian Mili-
tary Strategy)
.
2. The trip involved participation in an international group
tour sponsored by the Russian Military History Institute and
authorized by their Chief of their General Staff. The tour was
executed by a joint venture, ASK Tours, with LTC John Sloan, USA
(Ret.), acting as principal agent in the U.S. Participants
included academics and active and retired officers from Finland,
Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Accord-
ing to each of the tour participants themselves, virtually all of
them were currently or previously associated with various intel-
ligence services. According to the translators provided to the
tour, some of the Russian tour directors included KGB and GRU
operatives and the translators themselves (provided by the Rus-
sian military) were either GRU officers or cadets enrolled in
their version of DLL
3. As you will recall, just prior to departing on our trip, Mr.
Donald Atwood, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued instruc-
tions that reduced the amount of participation for DoD employees.




had to reduce our number by five. Group tour funds provided by
DALASP already paid by NPS are lost due to the late cancellation
and we will also be obligated to honor reimbursement for costs
incurred by the non-participants to pay for their passports,
visas, and books ordered prior to the trip. From my discussions
with DoD employees who did go on the trip, it is my understanding
that there will be additional Congressional and GAO and legal
actions taken by some of the Washington non-participants. To my
knowledge, although no one from NPS has or will participate in
complaints to the Congress to date, it is obvious that due to Mr.
Atwood ' s actions, less language and area studies research and
training was performed at a higher per capita cost than if we had
been allowed to execute our original orders.
4. The programmed portion of our trip generally involved visit-
ing military educational and research facilities, museums, and
the sites of important battles or fortifications. The site
visits were generally complemented by the participation of ex-
perts on the wars or campaigns that involved the individual
battles. This included an entire week and a half of involvement
by the faculty of the Frunze Academy, the equivalent of the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. In addition to these programmed activities, both the
students and myself were able to schedule additional activities
with military and academic groups.
5. We arrived in Russia late on Friday July 3rd. The first 4
days were spent in St. Petersburg, with 1% days of those being
spent on trips outside of the city. The Russian military admit-
ted our group to a number of closed areas that our embassy has
been trying to see for years. Among those are the naval base at
Kronstadt (soon to be the headquarters for the Baltic Fleet) and
the Museum of Artillery, Engineer, and Signal Troops. One stu-
dent made a presentation of the results of his research during
this portion of the trip during a seminar involving presentations
by both our group and Russians. In addition to these scheduled
activities, I was approached by a faculty member of the Leningrad
State University of Marine Technology and given a proposal for
joint research that needs to be evaluated by someone with the
proper credentials. I would appreciate your assistance in deter-
mining who should evaluate this proposal (attached) . At a recep-
tion held in our honor on the 4th of July, I was asked to give a
short speech. I talked about democracy and freedom. The speech
was videotaped and apparently broadcast later on regional televi-
sion to all of northwest Russia.
6. The next 2 days were spent on the road in northwest Russia
and included a very brief visit to the fortress in Narva, Esto-
nia. Since we did not realize when arranging this trip that
Narva was in Estonia, we had to obtain visas at the border.
Generally we found conditions in northwest Russia, including in
St. Petersburg, to be quite primitive and lacking in any advanced




Estonia, it appears that they are better off and eager to disas-
sociate themselves from years of rule by Moscow. An overnight
train trip was taken to Moscow.
7. We arrived in Moscow on the morning of Friday July 10th and
spent the next 5 days there with 2 of those days spent on full
day tours outside of the city. Instructors from the Frunze
Academy or the Military History Institute accompanied us on all
of our outings. One of those trips included the History of Avia-
tion Museum in Monino. Seeing actual Soviet and Russian aircraft
instead of recognition slides was most exciting to our group.
The Moscow portion of the trip was probably the most productive
and involved a series of unprogrammed presentations and seminars
arranged by me. This included visits to the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations - IMEMO (arranged by Dr.
Aleksey G. Arbatov who visited NPS late in June), the U.S.A. and
Canada Institute (where I met primarily with a researcher who
visited me in Monterey last year) , and at the Military History
Institute. I made presentations to the Department of Military-
Political Affairs (including its department head Sergey M. Rogov)
at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute and at Arbatov's Disarmament
Department at IMEMO. Students participated in the IMEMO seminar
and two additional seminars at the Military History Institute.
At the Military History Institute, we met with the commanding
general (who is also the editor in chief of the General Staff
journal Voyennaya Mysl)
,
his deputy - another general (who is
working on a project for the RAND Corporation), and I learned
that my published work was already well known by the faculty.
8. Following our departure from Moscow on the morning of Wednes-
day, July 15th, we spent the next 7 days on tour west, northwest,
north, and northeast of Moscow, staying in a series of smaller
cities and towns. Perhaps the most important site that we visit-
ed was the Armor Museum in Kubinka where we saw an entire armored
division's worth of tanks and other vehicles. In addition, I
arranged a series of special evening seminars with the different
Frunze Academy instructors who accompanied us on this portion of
the trip. Generally, each instructor was with us for 1% days.
Additionally, the students and I spent numerous hours talking to
these instructors during the long bus rides and while at each of
the sites we visited. I made another presentation at one of these
seminars. Upon completing this leg of the trip, a few of these
instructors saw us off at the train station in Moscow and one
invited me to return next summer.
9. After an overnight train trip to Kiev, we arrived in the
Ukraine on Wednesday morning, July 22nd. This portion of the
trip included a visit to the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military
Academy. I again asked for a follow-on seminar with the faculty.
When we reported at the Academy the next day, we were instead
taken to the office of the Deputy Defense Minister for the Uk-
raine, where we conducted the seminar with the participation of




this unexpected meeting, I called our embassy and tried to report
it but found the only military officer absent. I left a brief
message and promised to write with a summary of what transpired.
I also participated in a seminar with Ukrainian academics in a
private think tank. In general, we found the Ukraine to be much
better off than Russia and the Ukrainians almost hostile to their
former masters.
10. The tour continued on to the Crimea after dinner on Thurs-
day, July 23rd and we remained in Kiev overnight, departing on
the first available plane on Friday. We were unable to make a
same day connection upon our arrival in Frankfurt and continued
our journey home arriving in Monterey on Saturday evening, July
25th.
11. While on the trip, I passed out copies of the National
Military Strategy of the United States (there is no objection to
this action from J-5 officers who have cognizance over this
publication) and one of my recent and unclassified technical
reports. Due to luggage limitations, I had sent multiple advance
copies but still ran out and I will send more. The Russians and
Ukrainians appeared most eager to learn about our new regional
defense strategy and I learned that the military has little
access to Russian civilian academic publications or researchers.
They were also very interested in our views on the Persian Gulf
war, SDI/GPALS, nuclear operations, the competitive strategies
initiative, and war gaming. They were also most forthcoming
about their new military policy, doctrine, strategy, and opera-
tional art, all of which I will use in my research efforts for
the Director of Naval Intelligence.
12. In addition to meeting with the Russians and Ukrainians, I
found that the interaction with specialists from the other coun-
tries was most beneficial. I found my interaction with the
Swedes most interesting and it appears that it will lead to a
publication and invitation to visit their defense establishment.
I was also most interested in Sweden's participation in World War
II and we all benefited from seminars with the former head of
their Army. Having Bill and Harriet Scott, the authors of the
textbook on former Soviet military strategy, on the tour was most
enlightening. Post-tour interaction with Air Staff officers who
made the trip has already been beneficial.
13. During the first night that we arrived in St. Petersburg,
one of the students was robbed in his hotel room while he was in
the room. LT Scott Stanley immediately made a formal complaint
to the police. Our Air Force students felt that they were being
set up for another theft while walking on the streets. Following
another theft, this time in the halls outside of our rooms, the
thief who robbed LT Stanley was captured by our group and some
American tourists. It was obvious that there was official and
Russian tour leadership inaction to these thefts. I met with our




Force officer since it was obvious that no one could guarantee
our safety. Upon the advice of other individuals in our group who
had been to Russia before, I went to the American consulate to
discuss the lack of safety in our hotel and the city. Formal
reports were filed with the consulate by the two individuals who
were robbed and I recommended that the consulate place the hotel
"of f-limits" to visiting government personnel. The consulate
regional security officer spoke to one of our Russian tour direc-
tors and we noticed that conditions improved immensely. For
example, we took additional consulate-suggested precautions,
including the posting of a "watch" in our train car and wiring
all doors shut from the inside.
14. Prior to departing on the trip, I confirmed (in writing)
with LTC Sloan that we would be able to modify our itinerary to
meet our own DALASP/QofA training and research objectives.
During the stays in St. Petersburg and Moscow, all of us modified
the itinerary routinely and daily (see additional subseguent
detailed DALASP and QofA reports) . During the bus tour outside
of Moscow, a number of the language students decided that they
were not obtaining the necessary amount of Russian speaking
opportunities. I concurred. The Air Force officers phoned NPS
Assistant Professor Roman Laba, who was staying in Moscow and
with whom they had met, and set up an alternative visit with a
Russian family in lieu of two days of future programmed activi-
ties. Two of them then chose to leave Smolensk by train and
travel to the next town, Zagorsk, via alternative and more com-
fortable means. They would then depart Zagorsk two days hence and
go to Moscow instead of a number of smaller towns in the country.
I approved these actions and notified the Russian tour directors.
Upon our departure from Smolensk, the Russian tour director
responsible for that portion of the tour got confused about what
the students had done and were doing and objected to this change
in the itinerary. I suggested that we solve the problem and we
picked up the students at the train station and took them along
with us.
15. The train incident upset the Russian tour director more than
was warranted and I suspected that what really was happening was
that the suspected KGB/GRU intelligence operatives responsible
for monitoring the tour group were upset over the highly success-
ful non-programmed activities in which we were engaged. I was
told that there were elements of the Russian military that wanted
the tour to fail and were manipulating the schedule to be less
productive than we hoped. To complicate the matter, a Russian
tour director and suspected KGB operative (according to our GRU
cadet translators) , in the presence of Russian Colonel Viktor
Kuznetzov (advertised as a Frunze "instructor"), gave me an
explicit warning that any further modifications of the itinerary
would lead to an "incident" that would be photographed and re-
ported in the press and would not be to the liking of the U.S. or
Russian governments. He specifically warned me that the incident




told them to double all precautions and withdraw all requests for
modifications of the programmed itinerary.
16. On Saturday, July 18, 1992, an incident occurred in the
hotel restaurant in Zagorsk involving an active duty female U.S.
Army officer (LTC Diane Smith stationed in England) and an appar-
ent "drunk." During the incident, threats were made at our table
and a knife was pulled on CPT Jim Jaworski. Our Russian tour
directors and the hotel staff did virtually nothing to defuse or
handle the incident. The initial response by the militia was
totally ineffective and required reinforcement. I was told by a
U.S. Army civilian intelligence officer that the incident was
staged to reinforce the warning that had been given the day
before. I was told by other individuals that the incident only
involved a member of the mafia who had gotten drunk. CPT Jawor-
ski went to the militia station but they failed to take his
report and to the best of our knowledge the perpetrator was
released to his waiting comrades. Due to the lawlessness of the
situation and the inability of the tour to ensure our safety, I
called the Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow and requested in-
structions. He recommended that we leave the tour and leave the
country. I made such a request to the Russian tour directors and
proceeded to pack for a departure. The next day, I was told by
the tour company that it was impossible to leave the tour and we
would have to continue. I was advised by a number of the U.S.
intelligence officers accompanying the tour that they would not
like it if we left. I discussed our desires with the tour
director and suspected KGB operative and reached an understanding
with him, the overall Russian tour director for that portion of
the trip, and with LTC John Sloan, that if all incidents ended,
we would withdraw our request to leave early and we would not
request any further modifications to the programmed itinerary. In
all my interactions with the Russians involving this incident,
they all reported their actions and deferred to the directions
given by the one individual that we were told was KGB. I had no
reason to suspect that he was not KGB.
17. All incidents ended once that arrangement was made. When we
arrived in Kiev, I responded favorably to a suggestion by the
commander of the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military Academy to
continue discussions in follow-on meetings. Apparently that
suggestion was looked on with disfavor by the Russian tour direc-
tor and suspected KGB operative and he twice actively interceded
and tried to prevent the seminar. As I reported above, not only
was the seminar held, but the Ukrainian military went to great
lengths to get rid of the openly acknowledged GRU officer/trans-
lator who was in our company and shift the seminar to the Defense
Ministry. There were no further incidents.
18. In summation, our group met the training and research objec-
tives specified in our applications for DALASP and QofA funding.
Each participant had ample opportunities to refine his/her lan-




issues. I was most impressed by the abilities of our students to
act as translators and consider the DLI to be succeeding in
meeting our educational skill objectives. Although Russian
speaking skills might have been developed further with additional
variations in the itinerary, the above mentioned incidents ex-
plain why they were somewhat limited. As for research, the tour
offered opportunities that were beyond outstanding. Three of my
thesis students and two new students who have yet to pick a
thesis topic had ample opportunity to gain primary materials
while conducting field research. My own efforts will result in
major modifications in teaching military strategy and the publi-
cation of a major book-length technical report. All participants
of the tour responded favorably to my question in Frankfurt,
"would you go on the trip again knowing now what you did not know
before?" I held regular sessions with the students to discuss
the substance of what we were learning as well as the problems
that we were encountering. I also made presentations of NPS
plaques at each site that we visited. I would again go on such a
trip but would insist that some military faculty member or NPS
faculty member accompany any group of students so that a civilian
faculty member would not be placed in the positions that were
described above.
JANES J. TRITTEN
cc: NPS Code 07
DALASP and QofA sponsors
CAPT Ed Smith, OP-922
NIS Monterey
LCDR Jeff Kuipers, USDAO Moscow





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Page 12
Enclosure (1)
Leningrad State University of Marine Technology
Professor JJikolayev»s proposals for co-operation in the field
of research, industrial and educational developments.
Professor Nikolayev V.I., Doctor of Science (Technology),
Ship Energetics Faculty, Department of Ship Power Plants, Sys-
tems and Equipment, Head of the Research Laboratory of Automat-
ion Design of Complex Engineering Systems.
Sphere of scientific activities:
1. Imitational models of complete life cycles of complex engi-
neering systems (CES) for substantiation of optimal designs at
early stages of designing when incomplete or incorrect information
is available. Examples of created models: an imitational model of
a cargo vessel to determine optimal requirements to her repairabi-
lity at early stages of designing, imitational models of craft-
carriers operating with different types of underwater craft, imi-
tational modes for substantiation of optimal operational modeo
of CES.
2. Mathematical and computer tools for automated control of eco- m
logy at large industrial enterprises. O




4. Further developments: a) imitational models for optimal develop- o
ment of low-waste technologies for shipbuilding (machine-building) a
plants polluting the atmosphere; b) expert systems and knowledge m
bases in shipbuilding and ship machine-building. m
•v
5. Complex educational programmes on I3L! PC for shipbuilding uni- g
0)
versities. m
Forms of possible co-operation:
- joint conduction of research work (?.7);
Page 13 Enclosure (1)
- 2 -
- conduction of R'.¥, or creation of complex programmes to a fo-
reign partner* a order?
- development of copplex educational programmes and mathematical
models
;
- exchange of information and specialists (on the basis of mutual
business trips).
Short annotations of the Laboratory's major works are given in
Appendix 1 and 2.
Connections:
Faculty of Ship Znergetics and Automation, Leningrad State Uni-
versity of Marine Technology, 3 Lotscanskaya Street, Leningrad,
190003, USSR. Telephone: 1148021
Prof. V.I.Nikolayev, Plat 29, 18/1 Gag3rin Prospect, Leningrad,
196221, USSR. Telephone: 2641943.
Professor V.I.Xikolayev
Page 14 Enclosure (1)
APPENDIX 1
MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND CAD TOR HIGHLY EFFICIENT VESSELS AND
SHIP POWER PLANTS
The Research Laboratory of Automation Design of Complex Engineering
Systems (CES), headed by Professor Nikolayev V9I«, specializes in
creating and introducing imitational models for optimal designing
of vessels and ship power plants (SPP). CAD programmes for opti-
mal designing of ships and ship power plants are being created
that are based on imitational models and supplied with a wide
range of auxil'ary and service programmes.
Imitational simulation nowadays is a powerful engineering mathe-
matical tool that, in conditions when incomplete or incorrect in-
formation is available at early stages of design work, allows to
correlate the vessel's efficiency (in her future operation) and
characteristics of any of the ship and SPP design variants by
means of machine experiments to substantiate a best variant.
Unlike routine mathematical models, such a model using computer
reproduces the whole real time process of the ship's operation,
from her launching till the end of her service life, when the
real chance process of operation i3 simulated to reproduce all
accidental fluctuations and deviations of major operational pa-
rameters. For this, about twenty major operational parameters of
the ship and SPP are statistically processed with the data from
a few series of ship-prototypes and then introduced into the mo-
del in form of distribution laws. The simulation is performed not
for one but dozens of the ship* 3 service lives, so the computer
simultaneously simulates the operation of dozens of the same-type
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meters (which are accidental values) are processed by means of
mathematical statistics. Thus the comparing of the ship and SPP
design variants may be performed for twenty engineering economi-
cal characteristics. Such simulation can be used at early stages
of design work to determine the ship's efficiency under any (in-
cluding extreme) conditionsof the future operation. At final
stages of designing, the simulation models can help quatitatively
substantiate optimal operation modes of the ship and SPP.
At the Laboratory the following imitational models have been
created for large industrial enterprises:
- to determine optimal requirements to the repairability of cargo
vessels and their main parts at early stages of design '»7ork;
- to estimate the efficiency of design variants of a craft-car-
rier operating with several types of underwater craft, etc.
PaSe 16 Enclosure (1)
APPENDIX 2
MATHEMATICAL TOOLS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATED
CONTROL OP ECOLOGY AT AN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE
The automated control system is based on a complex of mathemati-
cal models for simulation of the interaction between harmful
wastes polluting the atmosphere (including gaseous wastes) from
hundreds of funnels and other sauces at one plant and the meteo-
rological and topographical conditions in the surrounding area.
The mathematical models use standard methods of calculations and
simulation current in the USSR, but they are added with subsys-
tems - those of imitational simulation of meteorological condit-
ions and real processes of the plant's shops and agregates opera-
tion polluting the atmosphere. The autoraetion system is supplied
with a number of service programmes and automated database. .-Vith
the help of this system all major problems of the ecology analysis
(concerning the atmospheric pollution) and the production manage-
ment may be solved on IBM PC.
i
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From: DALASP Trip Participants
To: (1) Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12)
(2) U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DAMI-PII-T)
Subj : Dalasp Trip Report
Ref: (a) DALASP applications of trip participants
(b) James Tritten's trip report dated August 6, 1992
(c) James Tritten's draft DALASP summary report dated
August 10, 1992
Encl: (1) Dalasp trip report dated 30 September 1992
1. Reference (a) requested DALASP funding for research in Russia
and Ukraine during July 1992. Results of that research were
reported in references (b) and (c) . This report is submitted as a
supplement and not as a substitute for those reports and will be
included in the final version of ,~«*~-.
cc: Dr. Robert Slater (DIA/DIC/R)
Lt Col. James D. Willis, Jr. (AF/INRF)
Navy Liaison Unit, San Franciso
Naval Investigative Service (NIS) , Monterey
Capt . Ed Smith, Director, Intelligence Division (OP-922)
LT. Scott Stanley, CINCUSNAVEUR (N-2)
Special Security Officer (NPS Code 38B)
Dr. James Tritten, Associate Professor (NPS Code Ns/Tr)
Curricular Officer, National Security Affairs and Intelligence
Programs (NPS Code 38)
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TRIP REPORT FOR DALASP
2 July - Five NPS student participants in a DALASP-funded trip to
Russia and Ukraine departed Monterey. Participants were; LT James
Mcllmail, LT David Hansen, LT Mark Admiral, LT Scott Stanley all
USN, and Cpt . James Jaworski USA.
3 July - Arrived in St. Petersburg at approximately 5:00 pm local
time. The group proceeded through customs with no problems and was
met by representatives of ASK tours. The group was then escorted
to the hotel MOSCOW and met the rest of the international
participants of the tour. The group went to assigned rooms,
unpacked, and had dinner together in the hotel dining room. Most
members retired after dinner because of the long journey. The
hotel bar was heavily patronized by foreign travellers and what can
only be described as the prostitution ring allowed and even
encouraged to operate by the hotel security personnel. Due to this
and subsequent events it seems safe to call for placing the hotel
and bar off-limits to our personnel.
Detail: Upon arrival the generally poor state of repair at the
airport was noticed. The customs personnel were far from alert and
seemed to care little for their work. The technological
backwardness of the country became immediately apparent from the
really poor baggage claiming facilities were easily overwhelmed by
the arrival of two planes at the same time. The outside of the
terminal was crawling with persons looking to sell rubles for
dollars. The airport security did not make any attempt to stop
this activity.
4 July - Early on this day at the hotel MOSCOW at approximately
5:00 am a man entered room 6020 and stole approximately 540 dollars
from Lt . Scott Stanley, USN. A police report was filed with the
hotel representative from the ministry of internal affairs. This
report did not seem to generate any increased security at the
hotel. At all meals the wait staff of the hotel would attempt to
sell many different types of souvenirs to the group as well as
exchange money at rates that turned out to be reasonable. This was
all witnessed at different times by their superiors in the hotel
but in no way discouraged. The food was of average quality and only
bottled water was served, no city water.
In the morning the group split up with half going to see the
Peter and Paul Fortress, while the other half went to the Artillery
museum. A plaque from the Naval Postgraduate School was presented
to Colonel Evgeny Nikolaievich Karchagan, the head of the museum.
Lunch was at the hotel. In the afternoon the group, went on a tour
of the Naval museum and the battleship Aurora. The guide of the
Aurora, speaking in Russian, displayed the new political
correctness. According to him, the significance of the Aurora was
due to it being an example of Russian ship-building technology.
However, virtually all the displays were related to the role that
it played in the Revolution. The displays have not kept up with
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current doctrine.
5 July - After breakfast in the hotel the whole group went on a
tour of the Hermitage museum. Security at the museum was very poor
with the exhibits in many case open to the touch of any patron.
The parade ground outside of the Hermitage and the Ministry of
Defense was populated by beggars in ragged clothes who appeared to
be Central Asian origin. The beggars included handicapped persons
as well as children. It was noted that no facilities were in
evidence at any time for the handicapped. No security personnel
were in evidence either. Lunch was at the hotel, and afterward
there was a tour of the Fortress Kronstadt with dinner there
sponsored by the Russian Naval Officers Mess. A presentation was
made to the Russian civilian and military hosts by Prof. James
Tritten on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate School.
DETAIL: Enroute to Kronstadt, observed the heart of St.
Petersburg military-industrial establishment. Buildings were
observed to be in a state of deterioration comparable to the
industrial revolution in the United States. The quality of
construction was observed to be markedly below western standards
for all buildings (commercial and private property) . The skyline
of St. Petersburg was peppered with smokestacks of various
factories. No emissions were observed from any stacks and all
factories that were passed by appeared closed and non-functioning.
It is unknown if this situation is temporary or permanent.
Access to Kronstadt military facility was controlled. A
security post was operational at entrance to the island, manned by
three to five uniformed personnel. Base buildings and grounds were
observed to be in a state of low maintenance. Restricted areas were
marked by sentries and posted signs. Significant ships observed in
port included an ice-breaker with civilian paint and markings and
the SMOLNY class training vessel PEREKOP. Both ships appeared in
a low state of maintenance (significant rust on hulls and
superstructure), with little activity observed on deck. The ships
were probably utilizing shore-power as no indication of boiler
smoke was evident. No indications of preparations to get underway
were evident. Operational status of weapons systems is unknown.
06 July - Departure to Vyborg. Trip duration was approximately 4
hours. Discussion of Russo-Finnish War used as background for




The trip from St. Petersburg to Vyborg utilized route
consisting of single two-lane road. Road was partially newly-paved
(paving crew observed working on road) , but mostly older pavement
in fair-good condition. One section of approximately 5 miles was
unpaved (hardened dirt surface) . Youth camps were observed in high
state of activity (possibly Young Pioneers and other defunct
Communist Party-run establishments). As yet, little opportunity
has been available to speak with civilian representatives of
population.
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07 July - Last evening another incident involving crime in our
hotel as an elderly American gentleman was approached and assaulted
in the hallway by a criminal who attempted to rob him. The
criminal ran away but was captured by another American tourist. LT
Stanley sat in on the presentation of statements by the Americans
involved and had the opportunity to identify the criminal as
probably the same man who had stolen LT Stanley's money from his
room two days prior. Prof. Tritten decided that he should go to
the American consulate to report the increasing crime problem.
Prof. Tritten also talked with the female USAF representative in
our group to offer her the opportunity to forego the remainder of
the trip and return to the United States early due to the crime
problem. She declined the offer.
Today CPT Jaworski and LT Mcllmail presented the main points
of their thesis which addresses the future of the Russian military.
The seminar was held at the Artillery Museum. In attendance were
most members of the American group and representatives of the
Russian military-civilian establishment.
The program began with a forty minute exchange of ideas
(general), followed by a break-up into small seminar type groups.
Navy, Artillery warfare and fortification warfare and general
military discussion were the three main topics.
LT Mcllmail addressed the group for 5-10 minutes on the future
of the Russian Navy and his presentation provoked one question from
a Taiwanese representative of our group. He was interested in
knowing LT Mcllmail 's source for a report that Russia was selling
arms to the PRC (SU-27's). LT Mcllmail stated that the sale had
been reported in the open Russian press.
A reception followed the end of the afternoon session. It was
noted at the party that the deputy director of the Artillery museum
(Colonel) and another colonel were openly critical of both Yeltsin
and Kravchuk. This was surprising in that one of them was
Ukrainian, the other one Russian, and their immediate superior is
Russian.
Cpt . Jaworski received a tour of the museum that included a
tremendously large collection of armament consisting of historical
as well as contemporary weapons. Access to the Museum archives was
allowed. This is usually never allowed, and only a handful of
Westerners have ever been granted access to it. The collection of
weapons occupies the complete top floor of the museum and contains
virtually every firearm and weapon that was ever known to man. The
collection includes most of the original prototypes of all types of
weapons, such as the AK-47 . The collections of weapons are stored
in large metal cabinets that are locked and sealed with wax. In
the opinion of Cpt. Jaworski, this was the single best collection
of weapons in the world. Additionally, there are weapons from the
royal family and other priceless artifacts, such as Catherine the
Great's personal book of castle fortifications (including detailed
diagrams)
.
08 July - Departed St. Petersburg for Pskov by bus. Observed the
seriously poor condition of the road we used. The surface, while
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nearly inadequate for civilian vehicles, would perfectly suit
tracked/half -tracked vehicles or any heavy military wheeled
transportation vehicles.
Very rural landscape with little industrial build-up.
Farmland was extensive but no notable modern farming equipment
observed. It seemed probable that horse-pulled plows and no
irrigation equipment accounted for sparsely grown crops (not
identifiable) . Basically, the whole day was spent on the bus.
Two stops were made enroute to Pskov at ancient ruins, but nothing
notable to report from these.
09 July - Previous night spent in Pskov at a less than adequate
hotel. American tourists from several high schools were also at
the same hotel and the girls complained of harassment by local
males. In the morning one group departed by bus for the Pskov
Pecherisky Monastery while the second group remained in Pskov and
toured the fortifications and churches of the city. Both groups
were happy with the tours. The portion of the group that stayed in
Pskov encountered a group of people actually working at doing
something constructive and not just involved in selling goods as in
a pure service industry or black market. The group consisted of
about 25 college students who were performing archeological digs at
the city fortress. This was the first active restorations that
have been seen, many of the earlier fortresses had scaffolding up
but no work was in progress. The students were all very-
enthusiastic and interested in their American visitors.
This same portion of the group also had the opportunity to
talk to three soldiers who were assigned to the airborne division
located in Pskov. They were quite surprised when the large group
of Americans approached them and gave them cigarettes and other
various gifts. The interesting note here is that one of the group
was clearly from one of the southern Republics, yet seemed to be
good friends with the other two. The senior soldier told Capt
.
Jaworski that he used to be a sergeant, but was absent without
permission chasing girls and lost his rank.
Departed Pskov for Novgorod in the afternoon. Upon arrival
toured the city fortifications and churches. Interesting side-note
is that there are many youngsters selling souvenirs out of bags
they carry, but the police actively patrol the tourist areas in
this city and chase the youngsters away. The youngsters ran as
soon as the police showed up - this city still doesn't tolerate
aggressive selling in some areas.
After dinner departed for Moscow by train. Per U.S. Consulate
in St. Petersburg briefings and advice of three tour guides all
group members locked themselves into their rooms with wire and a
watch was posted in the passageway, with Mace, for possible gang
threat - no problems materialized. Condition of the train was
surprisingly good as was the track. The other trains noted in
Moscow were of lower quality.
10 July - Arrival in Moscow. Train station was very busy.
Baggage was transported by ALKOR CONSULTING in an army vehicle
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supposedly purchased or rented by ALKOR. (ALKOR CONSULTING was
somehow associated with the organizers of the tour and assisted in
contacts with the military and other arrangements.) The hotel was
the Academy of Sciences Hotel - the rooms were fairly large, but
were infested with a large number of cockroaches. Some rooms had
working refrigerators, non - working TV's. All had no hot water!
Explanation was that the summer is the only season in which the
pipes in Moscow can have maintenance performed on them and they
shut off the hot water by months in different districts. Hot water
had been shut off in our district for the whole month and was not
available for the entire stay. The hotel had its own security
personnel who were of a very dubious quality indeed. Also on each
floor their was one locked heavy steel doored room from which these
security personnel were observed entering and exiting, could not
determine the use of the room. It is possible that some illegal
activity was run from this room as the security personnel were
trying to sell goods and exchange money on many occasions.
Escorted by officers/representatives of the IMH (Institute of
Military History) to Monino Aviation museum. Interesting tour with
the highlight being the actual planes of all types on open-air
display. The exhibit included many helicopters, jets, fixed wing
aircraft and various experimental models. After the museum and
dinner the group split with some attending the circus, and LT
Hansen attending a local Russian language theater performance, and
the rest remaining at the hotel.
11 July - Several different groups went in different directions.
LT. Mcllmail, LT. Stanley and Cpt . Jaworski went to the US embassy
for consultations with the Asst Naval Attache LT Jeff Kuipers, who
proved to be especially helpful for the entire period of the stay
in Moscow.
The other group toured the Kremlin, Red Square, and Lenin's
tomb. Reverence is still held for Lenin, but the line to get into
the mausoleum was only about 20 minutes long, on a warm summer day.
Also, the only leader with more than the requisite one set of
flowers upon his grave was Stalin - he obviously has a big fan club
still!
The city offers a wonderful mass transportation system with
buses, trollies and a very good subway. Travel about town is
simple and speedy with even the taxis being cheap and available.
A Communist rally near Red Square was witnessed by LT
Mcllmail, LT Stanley and several other members of the group, all
stayed well clear of the activity. The word AMERICANSKI was much
bandied about but the substance of the speeches was not
intelligible and the distance deemed safe.
12 July - The main body of the group headed for Tula and the
Weaponry museum there. This trip included the extensive
conversations that DR. Tritten and Cpt. Jaworski held with several
officers of the Frunze Academy who were escorts for the trip. Good
discussions were held with DR. Tritten in which some useful
information was obtained.
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Several other members of the group spent the day sightseeing
in Moscow led by Russian-speaking guides, with the Armory being the
highlight of the day. The displays of jewels, dress, Faberge eggs,
and carriages was very impressive.
DETAIL: There is a very great discrepancy between the official
prices for goods, and what can be obtained by talking to the
cashier, especially if the request comes from a native Russian.
One example came with an tour of the Kremlin Armory that was led by
a Russian who befriended the group. She went off to buy tickets
for the group which amounted to a few rubles (cents) per person.
Our official guide notified us later that the official price of
admission was $22.00 each. This same Russian native got Americans
into other museums and sights without paying anything at all.
Another dual standard is also obvious in those Russians who have
access to dollars, and those who do not. A new monetary reform was
instituted 1 July, which allowed Russian citizens to legally hold
"valuta", or hard currency, without explaining its source, but the
dual standard remains .
13 July -Several members of the group continued touring Moscow
sights with unofficial Russian-speaking guides. Once again, a
small Communist demonstration was noted outside the Lenin museum.
The gist of the demonstration was how brilliant Lenin was, how many
languages he could speak, how well he had done in school, etc. The
implication was that his teachings should be followed because he
was so much smarter than a normal human being. The majority of the
DALASP-sponsored officers became confident at striking out into the
city in small groups, away from the conducted tour. This has
yielded much greater benefits to those individuals, in terms of
increasing confidence in everyday situations. The afternoon was
spent at the Institute of Military History. After a general
session in which Dr. Tritten presented a plaque to the Institute,
on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate School, the scholars broke into
three working groups: The first was Medieval Military History of
Russia and the U.S.! Discussions presumably centered on the
activities of the former rather than the latter. The second was
Military History of the Great Patriotic War. Most students
attended the third session which was on the post-war period. The
Russians had not wanted to conduct this session at all, and only
grudgingly participated. Dr. Tritten presented his research on the
new national security strategy of the U.S. All the remaining time
was exhausted by other U.S. scholars, leaving no time to ask the
Russian participants any questions. This was apparently by design
of the Russian officers.
A Captain from the Military History Institute, who is the
chief historian on Stalin's family, was interested in talking to
Cpt . Jaworski . This was due to the fact that through an article
that was published in the English language journal The Journal of
Soviet Military Studies , this officer found out that Cpt.
Jaworski ' s father had spent time in the same POW camp as Stalin's
son, and knew him fairly well. A copy of this article was given by
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Cpt . Jaworski, to another member of the IMH.
ALKOR representative Vladimir Snitkovsky approached LT Admiral
during the seminar and said that he was interested in "mathematical
models to determine sufficient force levels." LT Admiral responded
that he was not knowledgeable in operations research. Snitkovsky
also stated that he had been to both Monterey, CA and the Pentagon
in the past and he would soon be visiting Washington again. LT
Admiral felt that Snitkovsky' s behavior was suspicious.
Several students spent the evening in a joint-venture
restaurant. The food and especially the service were a quantum
leap above standard Russian fare, proving that change to a service-
oriented economy is possible. LT Kuipers of the embassy offered
the most insightful observation of the evening. When it was noted
that left-hand turns are illegal in most places in Moscow,
requiring drivers to drive down the road until they can find a
place to commit a series of right-hand turns, and how inefficient
this was, he noted that full employment of the population was a
higher priority than efficiency under the old Soviet system.
Another new custom in Moscow was noted: the necessity of paying
protection money to street thugs in order to park the embassy
vehicle
.
14 July - The scheduled tour visited the Borodino battlefield, and
received some excellent instruction on the tactical and strategic
considerations and consequences of the battle. Dr. Tritten,
accompanied by LT Hansen, Cpt Jaworski, LT Mcllmail and other
students visited the Institute of Military History again. This
second meeting was arranged because the Russian participants had
not been forthcoming the day before. A quid pro quo had been
agreed to in which Dr. Tritten provided his unclassified paper on
the new U.S. strategy, with the understanding that his students
would have access to Russian thought. The meeting was with Gen.
Major Har'kov. He confirmed that Russia is using the military
reform of 1924-5 as an historical surrogate to discuss the current
reforms in the Russian military. The afternoon session for these
students was at the Institute for International Relations and
Economics (IMEMO) . The meeting there was with Vice-Admiral (ret)
Markov, and several other members of the Department of Disarmament.
Participants on the American side were Dr. Tritten, LT Hansen, LT
Mcllmail and LT Stanley. Topics discussed included the national
security strategies of Russia and the United States, and the future
force structure and mission of the armed forces.
LT Admiral visited the Borodino battlefield and museum. The
museum was impressive and included uniforms and armaments of the
Napoleonic period. The battlefield tour was highlighted by a visit
to the location of Napoleon's command post and the Raevsky battery,
which was the center of Russian resistance and a the pivotal
position of the battle. At the battery, the earthen berm which was
hurriedly constructed three days before the battle remains to this
day. It was also interesting to note the large amount of pillboxes
and other defenses which dot the landscape, having been left from
the battle of Borodino in 1941.
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15 July- Left Moscow for Smolensk, travelling by bus. On the way,
stopped at the Armor Museum at Kubinka . The group spent two hours
touring this very impressive museum, which includes more than 3 80
examples of both Soviet and foreign armor. The exhibit of foreign
armor was very comprehensive and includes such modern types as M-60
and Chieftain as well as most significant armor from the Second
World War, including the only existing example of the German super-
heavy Maus tank. The display of Soviet postwar armor was also very
complete and included many prototypes and test vehicles. They had
examples of the most modern equipment, including a T-80 MBT
(labeled as an experimental T-72) and BMP-3 AIFV, which the tour
director indicated could be armed with a 100 mm cannon in place of
the usual auto-cannon. Capt Jaworski believed that the experimental
T-72 was a T-80 tank because of the recognition factor of the
distinct gaps between the second and third, fourth and fifth, and
fifth and sixth roadwheel . At the time Capt Jaworski did not
notice whether the tank on display had a distinct oblong exhaust
outlet in the hull rear which distinguishes the T-80 from the T-64
and other modified T-72 models. Other distinguishing
characteristics were not noted, although it could be argued by
armor experts that this vehicle could be described as an
experimental T-72 that eventually led to the development of the T-
80. Several other rare vehicles were on display including the
Draken ATGM vehicle, SU-130 tank destroyer and a small turreted
tank which fires ATGMs ' through the barrel. While the museum had a
tremendous amount of exhibits, they are somewhat crudely displayed,
being placed in a row with a small plaque in front of each display.
In all, this is probably the most complete armor collection in the
world.
Lunch was at Mozhaisk and the rest of the day was spent on the
bus. Arrived in Smolensk at about 2030 and all retired after a late
dinner.
16 July- In the morning, the tour visited the Assumption Cathedral
and the Military Museum in Smolensk. A city tour of Smolensk
revealed the center of town is in better material condition than
many cities we have seen. However, walking away from the tour group
revealed that many of the streets in the residential areas are not
paved. The housing there is also quite poor, reminiscent of rural
areas. The military museum was devoted mainly to the Great
Patriotic War but also had some modern military hardware, including
a MiG-23 on static display. After lunch at the hotel, the group
proceeded to the Smolensk fortress, where two instructors from the
Frunze Academy gave a brief on the Polish siege of the city in
1609-1611. The group conducted a walk around the bastions and
ramparts of the fortress, while the Frunze officers discussed the
design of the fortress and how it reflected the technology of the
period. They followed this with a general overview of the
Polish/Lithuanian Invasion and a description of the siege of
Smolensk.
In the afternoon, the officers conducted a chart briefing of
the Napoleonic battle at the exact location where Marshal Ney's
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forces conducted their attack on the forces. The Frunze officers
very effectively combined chart briefings with a terrain walk to
make the battle easily understandable. After dinner at the hotel,
the group drove outside the city to see the route of advance of the
German panzer forces into the city on 16 July 1941, exactly 51
years before. The Frunze officers, again with the use of charts,
showed in great detail how the Russians conducted the city proper
from the German 2 9th Panzer Division. After the bus tour, Professor
Tritten agreed to talk to a LTC from the Frunze Academy on future
U.S defense policy. The LTC kept interrupting the Professor's
prepared brief with questions and he could not finish his prepared
presentation. The LTC repeatedly expressed his fear that GPALS
could be converted into an offensive weapon system. Dmitri, our
interpreter, joined the argument by pointing out that verification
of weapon systems capabilities is difficult, citing how the
Backfire bomber's in-flight refuelling capability can be rapidly
changed as an example. Despite the officer's contrary point of
view, the discussion remained friendly and cordial at all times.
17 July- After breakfast, departed for Zagorsk. Lunch again at
Mohzaisk, and a visit to the Savinno- Storozhevsky monastery broke
up the day. Arrived in Zagorsk late in the evening. It was
especially noted that the road to Zagorsk from Moscow was the best
in the whole area, as it turns out this is because the Orthodox
church had a direct hand in its construction. The city itself is
small but fairly clean.
Detail: A note on Mohzaisk: This afforded a good opportunity to
observe life in a small town. The group ate lunch at the same
restaurant each way, and while the food was good by Russian
standards, the facilities were not. The restaurant has a plaza out
front with a fountain and pool. No water was in the pool, and the
plaza was overgrown with grass. No locals were observed eating in
the restaurant on either occasion. The condition of the town was
very poor with the only department store in town offering few goods
and even those were at high prices for the locals.
18 July- During the morning, the group visited the churches of
Zagorsk and the Vestry museum. The group was very fortunate to
witness the Festival of St Sergius, the second largest religious
festival at the monastery. The service was held out in the central
plaza of the monastery, and led by the Patriarch of the Russian
Orthodox church. There was a very large crowd, and after the
service the Patriarch addressed and blessed the crowd from the
balcony of his residence. It was especially interesting to note the
large number of young monks on the grounds . We were informed that
there are currently a thousand monks enrolled in the seminary,
which did not even exist three years ago. Some members of the
group toured a local flea-market where almost anything imaginable
was for sale, from vacuum tubes for televisions to a plethora of
pets and farm animals and food. The prices were high for the
locals but there was no lack of business.
After lunch, the majority of the group went to Radonezh to
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examine fortifications. Colonel Pyotr Fyodorovich Vashenka,
chairman of the History of Military Art Department, agreed to
answer our questions relating to military history. The discussion
lasted several hours and was very fruitful. The Colonel answered
questions about the military reforms of the 1920 's and the false
lessons of the Spanish civil war.
This evening an incident occurred in the dining room of the
Hotel. A drunk local attempted to dance with female members of the
tour group. Cpt . Jaworski interjected and told the local politely
in Russian that the women were eating their dinners and did not
want to be disturbed. Two of his friends retrieved him and while
this was going on a member of the group attempted to get the
police, but the hotel, for some reason, would not call the police,
and therefore they had to be flagged down on the street. When the
two militia members came in they met the two friends of the drunk
and the whole group left. Less than five minutes later, the drunk
appeared again and approached Cpt. Jaworski and told him he wanted
to go outside and fight. Cpt. Jaworski replied that he was just a
tourist eating dinner and did not want to fight anyone. The drunk
then pushed Cpt. Jaworski in his chair, and when Cpt. Jaworski got
up to move his chair back to the table the drunk pushed him again
and then pulled a lock-blade knife out of his pocket. By this time
the rest of the group stood up and grabbed the drunk and seven
policeman arrived in the dining room (including the two from
before) . The drunk was apprehended and Cpt. Jaworski was asked to
fill out a statement outside. While outside, in front of the
hotel, the drunk's two friends, threatened Cpt. Jaworski by saying
that they were members of the Mafia, and that no statement /charges
should be made against their drunk friend. This was done in the
presence of the others from the tour and the militia, with no
reaction from the militia noted. Cpt. Jaworski was then walked
down to the militia station because they said they didn't have the
proper forms with them. At the militia station, Cpt. Jaworski
waited two hours, with no statement being taken, and finally
requested to be brought back to the hotel when he overheard in
Russian that the drunk was an "old-time friend" of the assistant
police chief. No report was ever taken from Cpt. Jaworski.
19 July- Departed for Pereslavl. Toured the city, the bank of the
Plescheyevo lake, the museum of the Russian Fleet, the Pereslavl
ramparts, Red Vechevaya Square, and a tour of the museum at
Goritsky convent. Departed for Vladimir with accommodations and
dinner there.
20 July - After breakfast toured the Assumption Cathedral, the
Golden Gates, with a discussion of the Mongol Tartar invasion
followed by departure for Suzdal. In Suzdal toured the monasteries
and convents, and the Museum of Wooden Architecture. The latter
contains a number of exhibits which show how the average Russian
peasant lived into this century. After lunch departed for Rostov
Veliki and had accommodations and dinner there. This was without
a doubt the worst hotel many of the members have ever stayed in.
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The town of Rostov was built on a swamp with a small lake located
in the center of the town. The locals said the lake is so polluted
that it won't freeze in the winter, and that after clothes are
washed in it they quickly deteriorate. Also Cpt . Jaworski saw
marks on the front steel doors of the hotel which looked like they
were welded shut recently. When a hotel employee was asked about
this she replied the hotel had indeed been closed for several years
and was just recently reopened. The group could not be sure if the
hotel was opened for the tour but this could definitely be a part
of "the decision since it would mean a large amount of hard
currency. Even though the hotel was built less than 12 years ago
it is already falling apart and seems un-repairable and will
probably need to be torn down in the near future. In the past,
this had been a tourist area with people being attracted by the
lake, but due to the pollution, the tourist industry has collapsed.
The insect problem was awful as was the food, the rooms, and
everything associated with the Hotel Rostov.
21 July - After breakfast toured the monasteries on the shore of
the Nero lake. Also toured the Arts Museums that featured a
collection of Rostov enamels. After lunch departed for Zagorsk,
where the group had dinner. After dinner departed for the Moscow
train station to board the train to Kiev.
At the train station in Moscow, shortly before departure for
Kiev, two Colonels from the Frunze academy and their wives,
appeared to give us gifts and bid us farewell. One of them (the
shorter of the two with black hair) invited Prof. Tritten and Cpt.
Jaworski to visit Moscow next summer with their families for an
"un-of ficial , non-working vacation." He mentioned something about
both of them being guests in the official government "dachas." We
assume these are quarters reserved for the faculty and guests of
the Frunze academy. Dr. Tritten replied that he already had a
tentative offer from IMEMO to work in Moscow next year and was
considering it. Then the Col. stated that he and Trofimenko were
working on the different theories of developing the new military
strategy and doctrine and would introduce Dr. Tritten to him on his
next visit. Dr. Tritten responded that he already was acquainted
with Trofimenko and corresponded regularly with him. Then almost
as a change of thought, because time was short before our train
departed, the Col said the biggest problem of the reform process
currently is that the military wants it to proceed, but at a much
slower and careful/cautious pace, while the civilian leaders want
to move ahead too quickly and this can be very dangerous. We then
shook hands and departed by train to Kiev.
This Colonel was one of the several officers we met that said
there are many parallels between the 1924-25 reform and the reform
process that is currently ongoing. He also explained the key
difference between military reform and military reorganization.
These ideas were almost the same as those expressed by the deputy
director of the IMH General Har'kov.
The train ride to Kiev was uneventful and we all felt safe as
there were much better locks on the doors to the rooms, and decided
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not to post a watch outside the cabins.
22 July - Arrived in Kiev and were met at the train station by the
local tour guides, who immediately impressed us with their
efficiency. The group now had an air-conditioned bus and on the
way to the hotel the tour guides told us a little about the city
and passed out tourist maps of the city. We were all very
impressed with the appearance of Kiev and the attitude of the
population. Ukraine looked much better than Russia and the
appearance/cleanliness of the country combined with the attitude of
the people made it an enjoyable stay. Here LT Stanley, LT Mcllmail
and Cpt Jaworski met several businessmen from Europe and America,
and they all said that joint-ventures in Ukraine are very
profitable, but that wasn't the case in Russia. In sum, Ukraine
appeared to be hard at work to integrate itself into the European
community.
After a late breakfast there was a tour of the city followed by
a visit to the Museum Kosoi Kaponir, Kiev-Pechersky Fortress, and
the Museum of World War II. After lunch, there was a meeting with
the staffs and cadets of the Vasilevsky Air Defense Military
Academy of the Ground Forces, with a tour of the Academy's museum.
At night a joint banquet was held at the hotel with the officers of
the Academy.
23 July - After breakfast departed for the Lutezhsky springboard
for attack to force a crossing over Dnieper river and a tour of the
museum. The museum at Lutezhsky was interesting and the museum
guide gave a very interesting and detailed account of the battle to
liberate Kiev in November 1943. The guide stressed the use of
maskirovka; a whole Russian tank army moved from the Bukhrin
bridgehead to the Lutezhsky bridgehead at night without the use of
headlights. Decoy groups were used extensively to mask this
movement. The guide also pointed out the capture of Kiev was driven
primarily by political not military concerns. Stalin wanted Kiev in
Russian hands by the anniversary of the revolution and this led to
a large loss of life in a hasty attack.
After lunch there was a tour of the city with a visit to the
State History of the Ukraine Museum, the fortification structure
"The Golden Gates ' (Xlth century), St. Sofia Cathedral, St.
Andrew's church and St. Andrew's slope. Some members of the group
toured the city with an emphasis on the social aspects of day to
day life in Kiev. The local stores appear to have plenty of goods
and food did not appear to be a problem either. After dinner at
the hotel our group bid farewell to the remaining members of the
tour who were continuing south by train to Dnepropetrovsk. We
stayed in the hotel for the night.
24 July - After breakfast our group packed our luggage for the trip
back and did some last minute shopping. We were taken to the
airport by the tour company for the fee of $2 0.00 per person. At
the airport everything went smoothly except that Cpt. Jaworski had
two Soviet medals confiscated by Customs. Both medals were found
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during the X-raying of his luggage, and he was given a receipt for
them which entitled him to claim them within three years and give
them to someone in Ukraine. The customs officials were much more
alert and attentive than the ones in St. Petersburg, one more small
sign of the improvements in Ukraine vice Russia. Also none of us
had purchased a Ukrainian visa and we thought this might cause some
problems for our departure. Dr. Tritten explained to the
authorities, at one of the many checkpoints in the airport, that we
had only been in the country for two days. The authorities had no
steadfast rule about visas and said that since it was such a short
time we didn't need visas. This appeared to us that the laws
concerning visas is not really worked out yet in Ukraine. We
departed Kiev on Lufthansa and landed in Frankfurt where we spent
the night at the Ramada Inn. We were all very grateful to be back
in the West with all the conveniences we were accustomed to.
25 July - We departed on Delta non-stop from Frankfurt to Los
Angeles, where we transferred to a small plane for the connection
to our destination at Monterey. We were once again happy to be
back home
.
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^p Report . Quality of Analysis (Q of A)-funded Trip to Russia and Ukraine
T0 HQ ACC/IN/INX
1. Purpose. This trip report is in response to a Q of A-funded trip to Russia and Ukraine, covering the
dates of 2 Jul 92 - 25 Jul 92. My participation on the trip was as a student of Russian studies at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Additionally, I had just completed the Russian Basic Language
Course at the Defense Language Institute. The purpose of my trip was to experience, first hand, the
evolving social, political, economic, and military changes taking place in the former Soviet Union, as well
as to exercise my language skills I feel that I succeeded in achieving my stated purpose.
2. Itinerary. See attachment.
3. Discussion. The trip was organized by John Sloan Enterprises in coordination with the Russian
Military History Institute. The tour group consisted primarily of Americans and a smaller contingent of
foreigners from Great Britain, Sweden, and two individuals from Taiwan. The primary reason for the
tour was military historical research; consequently, the itinerary was heavily slanted towards military
historical sites, fortresses, ramparts, battlefields, and military museums of Soviet and Russian Empire
eras.
As readily apparent after a quick examination of the itinerary, the tour was conducted at a very fast pace.
We visited numerous cities, and, to say the least, covered a great distance. We traveled primarily by bus,
but had two overnight train rides I feel that the bus travel was beneficial in that it enabled us to see, up-
close, the Russian countryside and rural areas. This gave us a better appreciation for the country and a
sense for how most Russians really live. My personal objectives were to see as much Russian history and
culture as possible, but also witness the rapid social changes taking place in the countries. Additionally, a
primary objective of mine was to exercise my language skills by conversing, in Russian, as much as
ocsslWe. In shwrt, I v.ar.tcd V* absorb as rv.uch as I Tv^sibly could about the country which ! had ciiiiod
for the past two years. My plan of attack for achieving my objectives was to carefully chose those
scheduled tour activities in which I wanted to participate as well as develop my own sightseeing itinerary
along with two other "area specialist" Air Force officers.
Our arrival point was St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad). Because it was my first time in Russia, I was
not sure what to expect; however, I was shocked by the level of backwardness. St. Petersburg Airport, one
of the major entry points especially for Western foreigners, resembled a rural, run-down and outdated
airport. As an aside, the baggage claim area was rather humorous. There was no mechanized system of
luggage handling. The system consisted of a small hole in the wall of the terminal through which two
workers passed luggage and placed it onto a small shelf. At that point, travelers had to fight through
crowds of other travelers to search for their pieces of luggage. From that point, travelers attempted to
proceed through customs. We finally made it to our hotel after approximately 25 hours of traveling.
We spent four days in St. Petersburg. It is truly a beautiful city with many spectacular historical sights. I
did my best to see all of them; in particular, the Hermitage (i.e. the Winter Palace), Peter's Summer
Palace, Saint Isaac's Cathedral, the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Admiralty, and numerous military
collections in various museums. Of note, we toured Khronstadt Fortress which was formerly prohibited to
1 Atch
t^LadirtEti. it. our <LpxotLi.t.ion Itinerary
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Americans. Additionally, one of the highlights for me was an evening which we spent at the Kirov
Theater watching a ballet We also went to a symphony another evening.
As most foreigners note, the subway system is extremely impressive. The subways are truly museums in
and of themselves. They had spectacular chandeliers and murals on arched ceilings and, surprisingly, no
graffiti. Given the desperate state of the country, I expected to see dirty subways and a general lack of
order but was surprised at least when it came to the subways. There was, however, a general lack oforder
in the city. The buildings had a drab look about them-a general state of decay from no maintenance.
Russians noted to me in conversation that although the buildings were beautiful, they looked "tired", and
that "ten years ago they looked so much better." It occurred to me that the older generation longed for a
return to communism because there was "order" in those days.
We had the unfortunate circumstance ofbeing victims of crime our first night in St. Petersburg. One of
the individuals on our trip was robbed in his hotel room while he was sleeping. As a result, we learned an
early lesson about the extremely high level of crime especially directed against foreigners. There was and
is a large and growing Mafia in St. Petersburg. Not surprisingly, the high level of crime corresponded
with the general lack of order in addition to the desperate living conditions.
All in all, St. Petersburg was and is a wonderful city filled with history and culture and, as such, requires
more than four days to experience; in fact, the Hermitage itself takes more than four days. Our stay in St.
Petersburg, however, provided me with the basic knowledge about the city and I know that I will return
one day.
From St. Petersburg, were drove to the medieval city of Pskov. In place of touring the ramparts and
fortress at Pskov, I opted to tour the breathtaking monastery in Pechera which recently became operational
for religious services. I had the opportunity to experience a Russian Orthodox mass. We only spent one
day in Pskov and moved on to Narva which is actually in Estonia.
On the way to Narva, we visited the Novgorodian fortress at Kipor'ye (12th century), and then continued
on to the rival fortresses of Ivangorod and Novgorod. The Novgorod fortress located in Narva, Estonia,
had been recently renovated which presented an embarrassing contrast to the neighboring fortress in
Russia. Furthermore, the lunch we ate in Estonia that afternoon was the best we had on the entire trip.
Also of note, we had to purchase visas to enter Estonia which solidified their stand on being an
independent nation.
From Narva, we took • ie ovei*ughi udin to Moscow. My first irnpicssior. ofMoscow :.az uy; pv3!iV2. i
immediately felt the effects of widespread pollution. The air was filthy and actually hurt my lungs to
breath. At first glance, there was no charm to Moscow as there had been in St. Petersburg, however, Red
Square and the Kremlin certainly held a captivating appeal. We spent a total of five days in Moscow
which were filled from morning to night. I spent my days in Moscow touring the Kremlin and Red
Square and its many cathedrals and museums. Additionally, I spent a lot of time touring art galleries.
The most impressive event for me was the tour of the Armory in Red Square which holds an enormous
collection of crown jewels, carriages, coronation wardrobes of Russian tsars and tsarinas, silverware,
china, and a beautiful collection of Faberge eggs-certainly too much to absorb in one visit. We took a day
trip to the Aviation museum outside ofMoscow and saw a rather comprehensive collection of Soviet
aircraft from the inception of aviation history in Russia. Of note, we saw a piece of Gary Powers U-2.
In Moscow, I had the opportunity to have dinner with a Russian family. A professor of mine from the
Naval Postgraduate School was researching in Moscow, and invited me to have dinner with his Russian
landlords. This was a very valuable experience because they spoke no English which "forced" me to fully
exercise my language abilities. I found that I could communicate very well and comprehend fairly deep
subjects in Russian. I feel that this experience gave me a better understanding of the Russians. The wife
communicated to me that Russians are the way they are, that is, "passive", because they learned to be
under communism. Their feeling is that if something isn't right, settle for something else, versus
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resolving the problem. She said that this extends to every level of society and is deeply ingrained in their
minds. It was a very powerful and sad commentary on the state of affairs in the country.
From Moscow, we drove to Smolensk (a lengthy drive of eight hours) and viewed wonderful scenes of the
Russian countryside. It is commonly known that the Russian transportation infrastructure, in particular,
the roads, are substandard—our experience only reinforced that. Smolensk was also a very dirty city and
much poorer than Moscow. It had fewer goods available and the people were more disheveled and
desperate. Smolensk had a very dreary aura about it. We toured Smolensk for a day and then traveled
back to the Moscow area the next day.
For the next five days we traveled around the Moscow area visiting numerous cities of the Golden Ring.
More specifically, we visited Zagorsk, Rostov, Vladimir, and Suzdal. These are very old, beautiful, and
picturesque cities which comprise a major tourist route. I saw more breathtaking monasteries than I ever
believed could exist. We received guided tours of these cities, lectures regarding their involvement in the
Mongol campaigns, and toured numerous fortifications and cathedrals. Our tour during these days was
very exhausting as we were spending only one night at each of the cities and moving on early the next
day.
Finally, we entered the last leg of our tour as we departed to Kiev on the overnight train from Moscow.
We spent two days in Kiev and from first sight, our impression was very positive. Kiev had a more
uplifting aura about it in comparison to Russia. The was a noticeably more Western orientation to it;
there were signs and advertisements in Ukrainian/English and Ukrainian/German showing the presence
ofjoint ventures. Goods appeared more readilyavailable, and the food was considerably better. People
smiled more and seemed more proud of their country. People were also more politicized. One night a
group of us went across the street from our hotel and listened to a large gathering of men who were openly
discussing the current political environment in Ukraine. I felt that this was a positive sign on the road to
free speech and democracy.
Kiev was an absolutely beautiful city which we toured diligently and with pleasure. We toured the
Ukrainian State History Museum and our guide was a Ukrainian retired General. We also toured the
Percheski fortress. The second day, we received a guided tour of the city and its many cathedrals and
monasteries. In the afternoon, a small group of us, led by our professor from the Naval Postgraduate
School, met with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense for Training. He was very interested in officer
professional development and how our officers receive follow-on education.
4. Suggestions. I have one sugge^'on for future area specialist travelers, namely, I suggest thai
individuals do not travel in large tour groups. The problem is that there are too many people with too
many different agendas. Additionally, traveling with a large group of Americans highlights the group as
Americans. This serves to either intimidate people or highlight the group as a target for crime. It also
limits the amount of language practice.
5. Conclusion. This trip was, without question, a wonderful, valuable, unforgettable, and irreplaceable
experience. I believe that touring the country is the only way to acquire a true flavor and understanding of
the country and people which an analyst studies, and is the perfect end to two years of intensive study. I
feel that I have a more complete understanding of the history and culture of Russia, as well as the current
political mood. This trip has enabled me to more accurately and confidently do my job as a Tormer
Soviet Union" analyst. In these times of budget cuts, I believe that this program should not be eliminated;
it simply provides too many returns for the amount of money it costs. There is no replacement for this in-
country experience!
TH.(W*J
EVELYNE M. CONLON, Capt, USAF cc: HQ USAF/TNRF
Analyst, Former Soviet Union
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ITINERARY: TRIP TO RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, 2 - 25 JUL 92
2 Jul 92: Depart Monterey, CA for St. Petersburg
3 Jul 92: Arrive St. Petersburg
3 - 7 Jul 92: Tour St. Petersburg and Khronstadt
8
-9 Jul 92: Tour Pskov and Narva
10 - 14 Jul 92: Tour Moscow and area
15 - 16 Jul 92: Tour Smolensk
17 - 18 Jul 92: Tour Zagorsk
19 Jul 92: Tour Vladimir
20 Jul "92: Tour Rostov
21 Jul 92: Tour Suzdal
22
-24 Jul 92: Tour Kiev, Ukraine
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FKOM: Capt Warwick [comm (301) 688-8768]
NSA/H228 Fort Meade, Md 20755
SUBJ: Quality of Analysis Trip Report




1. The intent of this report is to provide your office with
details of the Quality of Analysis funded trip to Russia and
Ukraine by Captain Jay J. Warwick, 261-13-8936. Attached you will
find a summary of the excursion, complete with all recommendations
and lessons learned.
2. At the onset of this trip, I had set two professional goals.
The first was to learn as much as possible, by first-hand
experience, about the present condition of Russian society. This
was especially important given the extra-ordinary events occurring
in the country during the past two years and my concurrent,
in-depth study of those events, as a student at the Naval
Postgraduate School. The second was to use and refine my
newly-acquired language skills in "every day" situations such as
ordering a meal, taking a taxi, asking directions, or making a
telephone call. These goals were of primary importance and
concurrent with the historical research nature of the trip as
designed by the trip organizer, LTC John Sloan, U.S. Army
(Retired), and concurrent with the discussion of more purely
military matters, with our hosts, the Russian Military History
Institute and the Ukrainian Air Defense Academy, which were
presented to your office in my 3 Apr 92 application. Despite some
small problems due to the current deterioration of economic
conditions in Russia and the large size and related conflicting
research goals of tour members, all of my personal and
professional research goals were fully met. More precisely, this
trip made it possible for me to personally appreciate a portion
of Russian life, about which I could previously only vaguely
comprehend. As such, it was an invaluable experience which could
not have been obtained from a textbook. With some minor
precautions, I believe future participants will enjoy a similar
experience. I highly recommend this program for all qualified
applicants
.






2. Synopsis & summary
Tab 1 Prof. Tritten's
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DETAILED ITINERARY
2 Jul 0800 Departure from Monterey, Ca
3 Jul 1830 Arrival in St. Petersburg, check in and dinner
at Hotel Moscow
4 Jul 1000 Bus tour of city; tour of the Peter and Paul
Fortress with group
1330 Lunch at hotel with group
1430 Self tour of the city; walk along Nevsky
Prospekt with 3 group members
1900 Dinner at hotel with group
5 Jul 0930 Breakfast at hotel with group
1030 Tour of the Hermitage with group
1300 Lunch with group
1400 Bus trip to Kronstadt Naval Facility with
group; bus tour of Kronstadt; dinner at
Kronstadt hosted by deputy mayor of city
6 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group
0900 Departure for waterfront; boat to Czar's
Summer Palace with 3 group members
1500 Return to hotel
2000 Attended symphony orchestra in Petersburg
7 Jul 0900 Breakfast at hotel with group
1000 Return to Nevsky Prospekt to continue walking
tour with 2 group members
1400 Return to Hermitage; continue tour
1900 Attended the Kirov Ballet
8 Jul 0700 Early breakfast with group
0800 Group departed St. Petersburg for Pskov
1015 Arrival at the Fortresses of Ivangorod/Narva;
tour of the fortresses
1430 Lunch in Narva
1600 Departure for Pskov by bus
1900 Arrival in Pskov
1930 Dinner at Hotel Pskov
9 Jul 0730 Breakfast at Hotel Pskov
0830 Tour of monastery 50 KM from Pskov with group
1130 Arrival back at Pskov; tour of Pskov Fortress
1230 Departure for Novgorod by bus
1545 Arrival in Novgorod by bus
1600 Tour of the city and Fortress of Novgorod by
bus with group
1900 Dinner at Intourist Hotel in Novgorod
2000 Departure for Novgorod train station
2045 Train departed from Novgorod for Moscow
Atch 1
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0730 Arrival in Moscow by train
0830 Check-in at the Academy of Sciences Hotel and
breakfast
1000 Departed with group for the Aviation Museum in
Monino
1040 Arrived in Monino and toured museum
1345 Departed Monino with group for hotel
1430 Lunch; rested at hotel
1800 Dinner at hotel
1900 Attended the Moscow Circus with group
11 Jul 0930 Toured the Kremlin; Lenin's tomb, the Kremlin
wall, G.U.M.'s with 2 members of group
1500 Lunch at Pizza Hut
1600 Tour of the Arbat Market with 2 members of
group
2000 Dinner at hotel with group
Rest at hotel until noon
Walking tour of city near Lenin Stadium with 1
member of group
Return to Red Square and toured St. Basil's
Cathedral
Dinner at McDonald's with 5 members of group
Breakfast at hotel
Tour and walk through Children's World
Lunch near Red Square with 1 member of group
Return to G.U.M. 's
Banquet at the Russian Military History
Institute
Breakfast at hotel
Walk through Gorky Park with 2 members of
group
1100 Tour of Modern Art Gallery across from Gorky
Park with 2 members of group
1300 Return to Arbat Market with 2 members of group
1500 Met with Naval Postgraduate School Professor
Roman Laba at hotel
1900 Attended theatre in downtown Moscow
2100 Dinner at McDonald's
15 Jul 0800 Breakfast with group
0900 Departed Moscow for Smolensk with group by bus
1100 Toured Armour Museum in Kubinka with group
while enroute to Smolensk
1400 Lunch with group
1900 Arrival to hotel in Smolensk and dinner












16 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group
0900 Bus tour of city with a visit to the
Assumption Cathedral and the museum of World
Wai II with group
1300 Lunch at hotel with group
1400 Rest at hotel
1800 Walking tour of Smolensk; visited market
square, took bus to edge of town with 1 member
of group
17 Jul 0800 Breakfast with group
0900 Departure from Smolensk with group by bus to
Zagorsk
1300 Lunch in Mozhaisk with group
1600 A tour of Zvenigorod with a visit to the
Savino-Storozhevsky Monastery
1900 Accommodations and dinner in Zagorsk
18 Jul 0830 Breakfast at hotel with group
1000 A tour of the Vestry Museum with group
1100 Attendance of Russian Orthodox Service with
group
1220 A tour of the Architecture of Trinity Sergius
Monastery with group
1400 Lunch
1500 Rest at hotel
1830 Dinner at hotel with group
1900 Walking tour of city with 1 member of group
19 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group
0900 Departure for Pereslavl by bus with group
1030 Toured the City of Pereslavl, the bank of the
Plescheyevo Lake, the Museum of Russian Fleet,
the Pereslavl Ramparts, Red Vechevaya Square
and a tour of the Museum at the Goritsky
Convent with group
1430 Lunch with group
1530 Departure for Vladimir by bus with group
1900 Arrival, accommodations and dinner Vladimir
20 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group in Vladimir
0900 A tour of the Assumption Cathedral, The Golden
Gates, and discussion of the Mongol Tartar
Invasion
1000 Departure for Suzdal by bus with group
1030 Arrival in Suzdal with group, tour monasteries
and convents, The Museum of Wooden
Architecture
1530 Lunch in Suzdal with group
1630 Departure for Rostov
1930 Arrived at Rostov
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21 Jul 0800 Breakfast at Hotel with group
0900 Tour of the monasteries on the shore of Nero
Lake with group
1000 Tour of the art museums featuring the
Collection of Rostov Enamels with group
1300 Lunch with group
1400 Departure for Zagorsk by bus with group
1700 Arrival and dinner in Zagorsk
1800 Departed Zagorsk for Moscow
2000 Arrival in Moscow to board night train for
Kiev
2100 Train departed for Kiev
22 Jul 0910 Arrived in Kiev
1100 Breakfast, followed by a tour of the city with
a visit to the Museum "Kosoi Kaponir",
"Kiev-Pechersky Fortress" and the Museum of
World War II
1600 Lunch with group
1730 Met with staff of Valilevsky Air Defense
Military Academy, a tour of the Academy's
museum
2030 Joint banquet with the staff of the Academy
with group
23 Jul 0800 Breakfast at hotel with group
1000 Observed meeting between Professor James
Tritten and the Director for Military Training
and Education, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
1400 Lunch with group
1500 A tour of the city by bus with group
1900 Dinner at hotel with group
24 Jul 1100 Departed Kiev for Frankfurt, Ger.
25 Jul 1130 Departed Frankfurt, Ger. for Monterey, Ca
.
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SYNOPSIS AND SUMMARY
The trip involved participation in an international group tour
sponsored by the Russian Military History Institute, authorized by
their Chief of the General Staff. The tour was executed by the
joint venture, ASK Tours, with LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret) acting as
principal agent in the U.S. Participants included academics and
active and retired officers from Finland, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan,
the United Kindgom, and the U.S. According to each of the tour
participants themselves, virtually all of them were currently or
previously associated with various intelligence services.
2-3 July (Thursday-Friday): FLIGHT TO ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA.
The flight into Russia was very uneventful, except for a slight
delay on the ground in Frankfurt, Germany. Upon arrival in St.
Petersburg, we immediately noticed the inefficiency characteristic
of many operations in Russia. In particular, receiving operations
for ourselves and our luggage were very confusing. St.
Petersburg, a city of 5 million inhabitants, has an airport
comparable to a U.S. city of 50,000. There was only 1 baggage
claim belt in the entire airport and passengers from several
flights (a few hundred people) all converged on it at once when
our group needed to pick up our luggage. Passing through customs
was surprisingly simple and we were met by LTC John Sloan, USA
(Ret.) organizer of the participants of the tour. Met also by
Valentine Navara, co-leader of the St. Petersburg portion of the
tour.
Our first dinner included the Commanding Officer of the
Artillery, Engineering, and Signal Troops Museum and the Naval
Museum. The Artillery Museum Commander, Yevgeny Nikolaievich
Karchagan gave a short welcoming speech and the Commander of the
Naval Museum, a Captain 1st Rank, said nothing. I had no personal
contact with either of them. During this time, two members of the
ASK Tours Staff, Maxim and Dmitriy Alekseyevich Ivanov, were
introduced. These two were to remain with us for the remainder of
the tour. That evening, LT Scott Stanley, USN, one of our tour
participants, was robbed in his room while he and his roommate
were sleeping. A police report was filed the next day in the
hotel and at a police substation near the hotel.
4 July (Saturday): ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA
Tour group visited the Artillery Engineering and Troops Museum.
After a small introduction of the staff in the Museum's courtyard,
approximately 10 members of the group were given the opportunity
to tour the Peter and Paul Fortress, which was just across the
street. This tour was conducted by Valentine Navara. The
Fortress contains the graves of the majority of the Czars,
including Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. The Fortress,
for the most part, was in pristine condition, and is considered
one of the most important landmarks in St. Petersburg, although a
small portion of the interior was under repairs and some
scaffolding had been erected. Scaffolding was quite a common
sight in every city we visited. In the afternoon, I took a
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talking tour of Nevsky Prospekt with 3 other members of the group.
St. Petersburg is a city of striking contrasts. The architecture
along the main avenue of St. Petersburg is the most stunning I
have experienced: majestic cathedrals and domed churches,
beautiful, ornately decorated exteriors on almost all buildings.
I am sure at one time this city could proudly claim to be a
showcase of Europe. Currently, however, the entire city is in
shambles. Motionless construction cranes dot the skyline. The
affects of dirt and pollution are everywhere: on the streets, on
the sides of the buildings, and on the cars and busses. Much of
the city is in disrepair: many, many windows of the buildings
along the streets were broken out, there was uncollected trash
along the streets, which were full of pot holes. Everywhere
people asked for our business: to change money, to buy a Soviet
military uniform hat, a book, or a painting. Everyone is
3esperate for hard currency in a way that reminded me very much of
bhe Phillipines or Korea.
5 July (Sunday): ST. PETERSBURG WITH DAY TOUR TO KHRONSTADT NAVAL
BASE
Toured Hermitage in the morning. It was unbelievably
beautiful. There was art from every well-known artist in the
world. What was extra ordinary to me was the remarkable condition
Df each painting or sculpture despite no protection from the
public, and despite survival of the 1917 revolution and siege by
the Germans during World War II. In the afternoon, I accompanied
the tour group to Khronstadt Naval Base. Enroute, we went through
the industrial center of St. Petersburg. It does not appear to be
in good shape. We noted on this leg and subsequently that none of
the smokestacks in the city (or elsewhere in Russia) are
"smoking". We also went over a major water project between
Khronstadt and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. We
learned that it had been delayed due to cost overruns. Khronstadt
has been a closed city and was specially opened up for our tour.
Special permission was needed and had been obtained. Like most
areas in Russia, the entire base was in extremely poor disrepair
and it appeared that routine maintenance had not been accomplished
in quite a long period of time. At a reception in the Officers
Club, the City's Deputy Mayor introduced himself to us. I had no
personal contact with him. In port, I noticed several surface
ships, the only one of which I could recognize was an ice-breaker.
o tour the
de across
6 July (Monday) ST. PETERSBURG
With three other members of the tour group, decided t
Czar's Summer Palace, which was a 20-minute hydrofoil riu «autu
the bay. At the dock, we met a 19-year old woman named Mariana,
who offered to be our tour guide. The grounds surrounding the
palace were beautiful, decorated with many fountains. We were not
able to go inside the Palace due to repairs. Mariana was an
excellent guide. We talked mainly of her life in Petersburg and
the bad economic conditions under which the city is suffering.
That evening, we decided to attend the symphony orchestra near
the Hotel Europe. After our return, we were informed that there
had been another theft incident, this time involving John Sloan,
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and that Professor James Tritten, leader of our contingency from
Monterey, would go to the American consulate the next day to file
a report. He gave us the option of leaving, but we wanted to
continue the tour, and redoubled our efforts to avoid becoming the
objects of robbery.
7 July (Tuesday) ST. PETERSBURG
I and 3 other members of the group continued our walking tour
of Nevsky Prospekt and in the afternoon went back to the
Hermitage. After dinner, we attended the Kirov Ballet. It was
most extraordinary and very well done. The hall was inlaid with
gold and was a stark contrast to the poor conditions on the
street
.
8 July (Wednesday) DAY TRIP TO NARVA, ESTONIA AND OVERNIGHT IN
PSKOV, RUSSIA.
We visited two ancient fortresses right across the river from
each other at Ivangorod, Russia and Narva, Estonia. I got the
general impression that the people in Estonia are generally better
off than in Russia and wished to keep it that way. The food was
better, the condition of the museum was better than across the
river, and the town was cleaner. We then drove over some
extremely bad roads to Pskov. Upon entering the city, many, many
churches were apparent. The central Kremlin Fortress was
especially magnificent. The accommodations, however, in the Hotel
Pskov were deplorable.
9 July (Thursday) DAY TRIP OUTSIDE PSKOV TO PRESKERISKY MONASTERY,
RUSSIA; DRIVE TO NOVGOROD, RUSSIA AND TRAIN TO MOSCOW.
We drove to Novgorod on bad roads. Learned that the city was
virtually wiped from the face of the map by the Germans during the
Great Patriotic War, and was totally resettled after the war. We
took the night train to Moscow and posted guards during the night
and wired the doors of our compartments shut.
10 July (Friday) MOSCOW AND DAY TRIP TO MONINO
Arrived and met by Military Historical Institute staff Colonels
Vitaliy Bogdanov and Slava Terekhov and Senior Lieutenant or
Captain Aleksandr Fedoseyev. Also, two young translators were
introduced, Anatoliy Kamyshnikov and Nikolay Zubchock and was told
they were cadets in what was parallel to our Defense Language
Institute
.
Taken to the Air Force Museum at Monino. This was very
exciting to me because every conceivable Soviet fighter jet was on
display from the Mig-15 to the SU-27. During the tour, Captain
Evie Conlon and I were approached by two gentlemen who said that
they were from "Soviet Soldier" magazine and asked if we would
mind if they asked us a few questions for an article in the
magazine. One of the gentlemen had a small tape recorder with
him and recorded our conversation. He asked us where we had been,
and what we had seen and our overall impression of Russia. He
then asked us our professions in the military, to which we
responded that we were students. These two gentlemen departed and
asked a few questions of some of the other tour members. I noted
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that these same two gentlemen were present at a banquet held by
the Military History Institute for us a few days later and assumed
that they were part of their staff. They were in civilian clothes
the entire time I saw them. That evening, I attended the Moscow
Circus with the tour. It was apparent to me that a lot of the
performance was geared toward a western audience, because a lot of
the background music was recognizably American.
11 July (Saturday) MOSCOW
I and two other members of the group toured Moscow by foot to
include the Kremlin, Red Square, Lenin's Tomb, The Kremlin Wall,
The State Department Store, and the Arbat District. Moscow itself
seems to be in the same state of disrepair as St. Petersburg,
without the beautiful architecture. The greatest shock to me was
the open display of pornography in the subways, and at the
bookstands. It appears to me that Moscow society (and perhaps
most of the larger cities in Russia) are in the midst of a sexual
revolution much the same as the United States was in the 1960's.
This was reinforced in my mind by the revealing dress of the
younger women we encountered on the street. This, in addition to
the crime we had already seen, makes me believe that many of the
negative features of western culture is being introduced along
with the good ones, and in some circumstances, is taking
precedence
.
There appeared to be many, many Americans at the Kremlin, and
Russians seemed to be accommodating that reality. Several young
boys came up to us to ask us if we wanted to buy books of the
Kremlin and Moscow, and several young women asked us if we wanted
to pay for a guided tour of the Kremlin. We declined. Lenin's
Tomb was still open to the public and we stood in a surprisingly
short 20-minute line to see his body. Once we entered, the posted
guards kept whispering to all the people in line to be quiet,
underscoring the fact that this was still a place of reverence,
despite all that has happened. This was very surprising to all of
us. However, the real activity was at the Arbat, a 2-mile stretch
of open market place. Anything and everything was for sale,
watches, Soviet uniforms, art and communist memorabilia. It was
very apparent that this place was for westerners, with Russians
selling their goods for hard currency.
12 July (Sunday) MOSCOW
I and one other member of the group toured an open-air market,
stretching around Lenin Stadium. This was clearly a market for
Russians, not westerners. A line of people selling their goods
stretched toward and around the stadium as far as the eye could
see. Such common sights were: an old woman selling a single tube
of lipstick or a single pair of shoes; a man selling motor oil,
bathroom fixtures, or a starter from a car; or a couple selling
western-style clothes. The crowd was massive and we saw some
uniformed police patrolling the area, apparently to keep order.
In the afternoon, we returned to Red Square, and took a self
tour of St. Basil's Cathedral.
13 July (Monday) MOSCOW
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I and one other member of the group toured Children's World, a
well-known department store for children. It seemed typical for
most of the established stores we encountered: a combination of
disorganization and mismanagement. In order to make a purchase,
one first had to calculate how much you needed to spend, then get
in a line to pay the cashier. It was necessary to go to certain
cashiers for certain sections of the store. Then, it was
necessary to get in another line and present your receipt for your
purchase. This took an extraordinary amount of time if there was
a long line. Another striking feature of this store was its
enormity (4 floors) and the duplication of effort on each of the
floors and between floors. For example, one could find the same
item on opposing counters only 20 feet across from each other and
on differing floors, with no apparent ordering to help in finding
the item. We had lunch at a restaurant not far from Red Square,
with a Russian woman who spoke no English and was the chief of a
pharmacy. She was accompanying a German man who was an oil
excavator and was working in the Urals. He appeared to be wealthy
and had hired the woman to be his interpreter (she spoke German).
She told us how bad conditions were in her hometown in the Urals,
and how the Mafia had completely taken control of her city. She
said she could never get a sufficient supply of drugs and that it
was necessary to pay off the Mafia each month in order to prevent
the burning down of her pharmacy. She also mentioned the fact
that Moscow was full of businessmen from the west and how it was
almost impossible for her, as a Russian citizen, to get a hotel
room in the city without being in the company of a westerner who
could pay hard currency. After lunch, we briefly returned to the
State Department Store, and then attended a banquet at the Russian
Military History Institute. The dinner was pleasant, with the
best food we had yet received in Moscow. Dinner was interrupted
several times with toasts, many, many of which by the Russians
were centered around the Great Patriotic War. This speaks to the
very very great emotional tie they still feel toward this era.
Almost no mention was made of the present time, or the activities
which had occurred in the past 2 years.
14 July (Tuesday) MOSCOW
I and two other members of the group took a walking tour
through Gorky Park and an adjacent art gallery. We returned
briefly to the Arbat District in the early afternoon. In late
afternoon, we met with Professor Roman Laba, a former professor of
ours at the Naval Postgraduate School, who is currently doing
research in Moscow. One of the most interesting outcomes of this
meeting was that we talked about the reason why there appeared to
be very few homeless people in the streets, and why lines in the
food stores were non existent, a fact which many of us noticed.
Professor Laba indicated that conditions are currently so bad,
that no one has money to pay the recently elevated prices for
food, and that there is very little homelessness in Moscow, but
still the practice of two or three or more families living in a
single apartment. Therefore, the majority of the down and out
spend practically 100% of their incomes for food and stay indoors,
because they do not have anything left to spend on venturing out,
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and are out of the public eye. I and one other member from the
tour attended a local theatre performance in the evening, near the
center of the city.
15 July (Wednesday) BUS RIDE TO SMOLENSK.
Bus ride to Smolensk was uneventful. Enroute, ve went to the
Armor Museum in Kubinka which is not open to Russian citizens.
There was almost a full division worth of foreign and domestic
armor --380 vehicles. We arrived in Smolensk by early evening.
16 July (Thursday) SMOLENSK
We toured the museum of the Armed Forces and the Great
Patriotic War, the Cathedral of the Ascension, and the city walls.
During the late afternoon, I and one other member of the group
took a walking tour of the city and a bus ride to the edge of town
and back. We walked around the local farmer's market near the
center of the city. The quality of the fruits and vegetables was
very, very poor and the stench of rotten food was quite
overwhelming. A woman, from whom we had asked directions on the
street, told us that the quality of food in Smolensk was once one
of the finest in Russia, because the city was in a direct line
between the Baltic ports and Georgia and as such, enjoyed being on
a major trade route between the two areas. Since the dissolution
of the union, however they haven't seen the good quality anymore.
17 July (Friday) BUS RIDE TO ZAGORSK
Two of my colleagues from the postgraduate school decided they
wanted to take the train to Zargorsk, instead of our chartered
bus. The Russian tour guides got very upset at this, saying that
they were responsible for us. The leader of the
postgraduate school contingent, Professor James Tritten, suggested
the problem could be solved by picking them up at the train
station, as they had not left yet. This was accomplished, but the
entire bus ride to Zagorsk was tense over this event. Apparently,
one of the Russian tour guides later approached Professor Tritten
and said that another deviation from the program schedule would
result in another incident that would be unfavorable to both the
U.S. and Russian Governments. Professor Tritten later briefed all
of us not to make anymore deviations from the tour, despite a
clear understanding from the organizers of the tour by all from
the Monterey contingent that such deviations were acceptable.
Upon our arrival in Zagorsk, we were met by Colonels Bogdanov and
Tereditov and Captain Vartanov, who provided some of the tour
group with copies of papers and books that they had requested.
18 July (Saturday) ZAGORSK
Day tour of local fortifications and working monastery in
Zagorsk. The tour attended an outdoor church ceremony conducted
by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. A few thousand
Russian and Ukrainian pilgrims had sojourned to Zagorsk to be
there on this day. The ceremony was quite spectacular. After
lunch and some rest, I and another member of the group took a
short walking tour about the city. While I and my colleague were
taking this walk, an incident occurred in the hotel restaurant
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involving an active duty female U.S. Army Officer from our group
(LTC Diane Smith, stationed in England) an apparent drunk local
from the city, and another member from our group, CPT Jim
Javorski, USA. Because of this incident, Professor Jim Tritten
made a decision, after talking with our embassy in Moscow, for the
Monterey contingent to come home early. The next day, he vas
apparently told by the tour directors that such a change in our
flying schedule could not be made on such a short term notice, and
that we would need to continue with the group until our scheduled
departure in Kiev. This is what we did.
19 July (Sunday) VLADIMIR
The tour spent most of the day on the bus, stopping for visits
in Pereslavl, the bank of the Plescheyevo Lake, the Museum of the
Russian Fleet, the Pereslavl Ramparts, Red Garitsky convent. The
group arrived in Vladimir by evening.
20 July (Monday) BUS RIDE TO ROSTOV
Bus tour of the countryside north and northeast of Moscow with
two new Frunze instructors. These were later most likely
identified as LTC's Yurly Gordyeiv and Anatoliy Myzdrikov. I had
no contact with either of them. We toured the city of Vladimir by
bus and then departed for Suzdal. The bus ride was approximately
40 minutes. Suzdal is a small town of approximately 12,000 that
is known for its museum of wooden architecture. It took
approximately 2 hours to see the town. We reboarded the bus and
drove to Rostov. The accommodations at Rostov were absolutely
deplorable. Roaches and mosquitoes were everywhere. Several
rooms had no electricity, and all had no hot water and were
missing light bulbs. The hotel looked as if it had been deserted
for several decades and I was absolutely shocked to hear that it
had been built in 1980. I also heard that the lake near the city
was so polluted that it turned people's skin black when they tried
to bathe or swim in it and that it would not freeze in winter.
The city itself looked like what I imagine Post-World-War-I
I
Berlin did just after the war. It was very depressing.
21 July (Tuesday) BUS RIDE TO MOSCOW AND TRAIN TO KIEV.
Uneventful passage to Kiev. We did not post guards this time since
it seemed that the locks oh the compartment doors were safe.
22 July (Wednesday) KIEV, UKRAINE
Met at train station by Vera Novoselova from Incomart, the tour
agency responsible for this portion of the trip. Also met by two
new translators in civilian clothes.
Initial tour of the city and selected fortifications. Tour of
the Museum of the Great Partiotic War and visit to exhibits on
public display. Display included SS-5 missile, aircraft, armored
vehicles and boats, and some naval ordinance. Tour was met by
Retired General-Major Gavrish.
My initial impression of Kiev was that it was very different.
The streets were clean, the grass cut and flowers were being
tended. The people seemed happier.
Meeting at the Ukrainian Military Air Defense Academy of the
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Army named after Marshal of the Soviet Union, A.M. Vasilevsky.
This is not the same as the national air defense troops (Voyska
Protivovzdushnoy Oborony V-PVO) but rather ground forces dedicated
to air defense (Voyska Voyskovoy Protovovozdushnov Oborony)
.
Formal welcome by three general officers (waiting outside for
us). Commander of the academy is a General-Major Ivanich (with 40
years of service). His deputy is a Colonel Somel: Also present
is a general-lieutenant (probably retired) who has been at the
academy for 30 years. He is the senior instructor and a
doctor/professor whose specialty is short and medium range
ballistic missile defense. Retired General-Major Gavrish was also
present
.
We were given a handout about the academy and then told about
it. Point was made that it is part of the Ukrainian Republic and
not a CIS establishment. Students attend the academy after
serving with field forces for 5 years. The program lasts 3 years
and is limited to operational art. The current, and probably
future program, is to train officers for all countries in the CIS
and then return them to their native land for payback service.
Admitted that the future is not very certain. Students are
Captains or Majors that are promoted to Lieutenant Colonel upon
graduation.
When responding to questions, commander did not want to get
into the relationship of his troops to the V-PVO. Translator
botched question about relationship to naval infantry and coastal
defense forces but implied that there is no relationship yet.
Dodged questions about how curriculum had changed due to new
defensive doctrine (said they are only a defensive force).
Question from U.S. Army Major Kristi Crosby (self identified as
working for military intelligence) about whether they taught in
Ukrainian. The general said that they were not yet teaching in
Ukrainian but this may come later. In response to another
question, he said that he was not willing to discuss lessons or
Persian Gulf war in this audience.
We then had a tour of the Academy. We were taken into an
auditorium and shown a movie about the Great Patriotic War with
emphasis on the Kiev area.
That night we had a banquet with the general officers (one more
two-star was added) from the academy. Professor Tritten asked all
of the NPS students if one or two wanted to go to a supplemental
meeting to be held at the Academy the next day. He stated that he
needed at least one Russian-speaking student to accompany him
(since he speaks no Russian). As it turned out, I, Capt. Frank
McGuigan, Capt. Evie Conlon, and Capt. Eric Edgar, all U.S.A.F,
accompanied Professor Tritten, after receiving permission from the
senior air force official on trip, USAFR Lt Col Mark Monahan
23 July (Thursday) KIEV
Attended supplemental meeting as described on the previous day.
The substance of the meeting is described in detail in Tab 1,
which are Professor Tritten's personal notes of the meeting. All
Air Force participants present acted as observers and fielded a
few questions concerning the Naval Postgraduate School. I will
only add that the Ukrainian officials with which we met did not
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seem interested in Professor Tritten's presentation, but were
interested in the workings of the Naval Postgraduate School, the
requirements to enter the school, and the benefits to the
graduates of the school. They explained they were in the process
of re-building their military academy structure, and they were
curious as to how the United States operated their service
schools, and mid-career education. In the afternoon, I rejoined
the main tour group, who was continuing a bus tour of the city.
24 July (Friday) KIEV, UKRAINE AND FLIGHT TO FRANKFURT, GER.
Uneventful Flight to Germany
25 July (Saturday) FLIGHT TO MONTEREY
Uneventful Flight Home
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TITLE: PROFESSOR TRITTEN'S NOTES, 23 July
23 July (Thursday): MEETING WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER, KIEV,
UKRAINE.
Report of meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense for the
Ukraine, held in his office, supplementary to lead-in provided in
Enclosure (2)
.
We arrived at an office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
and were ushered into the office of General-Major Yuriy
Mikhailovich Prokafiev, Deputy Minister of Defense and Head of
Military Education and Training. A colonel from his outer office
also stayed in the room and took notes. Both the minister and
retired General-Lieutenant took notes as well. I gave a one hour
presentation on our new regional defense strategy, asking along
the way if they knew about this or that subject, trying to tailor
it to what they did not know. They did not want to talk about
scenarios, saying that they already had studied those.
Implication again, once something has been studied, it does not
again need to be reviewed since the answer has already been
obtained
.
Their questions included: numbers of troops and divisions to be
left in Europe under the current plan and my best guess for the
post-election period; what were America's capabilities to wage a
strategic-level war and operational-level campaign; lessons of the
Persian Gulf War; why were we upgrading the Pershing missiles; and
how would we implement our new doctrine and strategy; how could
the new doctrine be developed in a top-down manner. The generals
revealed their own bias that strategic-level war could be won by
air forces in the future. They also stated twice that their
emerging doctrine and strategy will be internal only.
We then shifted to a brief discussion on what type of degrees
were offered by the various U.S. military training and education
institutions. I explained the general processes as well. The
minister was interrupted by a telephone call from the Air Force
commander-in-chief. The translator suggested that we continue
with the general (who was expressing some concern to the
translator about the time that we were taking) and I asked the
general if we should not wait until the minister returned. He
shrugged his shoulders and said yes. I replied that this is what
we would do in our country as well. The minister then asked a
perfunctory question about Sweden. General Prokofiev then said
that he assumed we would like to know about his own country. We
said that we would.
The minister then talked for about one hour on the plans for
the Ukrainian armed forces. He did not pause for questions, nor
did we interrupt except for translation clarifications. I took
notes. He started with a long passage about Ukrainian history and
took great pains to stress the differences with Russia. He also
corrected history by stating that there never had been a treaty
with Russia at the time of Peter I and that the Ukraine had been
enslaved and not joined Russia of its own volition.
The minister continued with his own version of the events of
1917-1920. He ensured that we knew that the Ukraine had been
deceived by Russia in joining the USSR and that they were
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Tab 1
essentially forced to join. He then spoke of the time that
citizens were shot on the streets for speaking Ukrainian and that
the world should know about the truth of this era and not the
propaganda from Moscow.
Skipping the Great Patriotic War, the minister stressed that
the Ukraine had provided 95% of its output for the center in the
old Union. He also said that the old Union had devoted 37% of its
effort for defense. He specifically criticized the building of
large tank formations. According to the minister, the Ukraine had
only been allowed to keep 5% of its output for internal use and of
this, 20% was taxed. Those who knew the truth, in the past,
either left for the U.S. or went to prison.
The minister then discussed the problems facing the Ukraine
with large numbers of demobilized troops. He likened the
situation to that in Yugoslavia r He stressed that their military
doctrine would be an anti-bloc doctrine but that they would have
some sort of defensive arrangement with neighbors. The Ukraine
did not seek parity with their neighbors. Cooperation with other
nations would be sought; specific examples included cooperation
with the U.S. or Sweden in the field of terrorism, collective
research, and intelligence.
The minister talked about how difficult it was to get "arms"
out of the heads of officers who had been educated under the old
system. He talked in terms of the need for mental rather than
physical resources. He again complained about how much the
Ukraine has suffered at the hands of the USSR. His goal was to
create a military training and education system second to none in
the world. It would be better than that in the U.S. He discussed
the need to keep men in uniform as a temporary social welfare
program.
He then shifted to the subject of the Black Sea Fleet and
stated that it was not a strategic asset. His proof was that it
cost much less than some other fleet, lost in the translation. It
might have been the Northern Fleet since the word "Kola" came out
in the translation. The minister stated that Ukraine was not
interested in the Mediterranean. He said that their investment in
the fleet was 17% plus the value of the shipyards and that Russia
was only offiering 10-15%.
The minister said that it was not necessary for Russia to keep
bases on Ukrainian territory for the long term, specifically
Sevastopol. He then said that Russia would be offered a small
portion of bases that were Ukrainian to serve their temporary
needs. He then brought up the destroyer that had sortied from
Sevastopol a few days earlier and had sailed under a Ukrainian
flag for Odessa. He said that following this incident, the issue
of the bases had been settled with Russia and therefore, there
would be no further incidents of this type. The clear implication
was that the incident had been staged to obtain the concessions
that he announced. The minister then closed by saying that there
were other naval units still being considered, those not an actual
part of the fleet and neither a part of the base structure. Those
units would need to be settled in the future.
I closed the meeting by thanking the minister and telling him
how impressed we were with his country and what we had learned
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while visiting. I assured him that everything that we had seen or
been told would be passed on to others in the U.S. and Sweden. I
then offered to perform joint academic work with any of his people
on emerging U.S. defense doctrine and strategy and I left him my
card.
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OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Given the degenerating economic and political situation
currently taking place in the Commonwealth of Independent States,
it is no wonder that foreigners in general, and Americans in
particular will be prime targets for theft. We all were
specifically warned about this. One item that was relayed to a
portion of our tour group was that we never should give out our
room number to our hotel under any circumstances to someone we
didn't know or trust. Unfortunately this happened. The roommate
of the person who was robbed during our first night in St.
Petersburg had collected some money from tour members to be
exchanged into rubles. This roommate had made a deal with someone
he did not know in the lobby and gave out his room number to make
the exchange at a later time. The "exchanger" never showed
up and later that night, the room was robbed. The lesson to be
learned is that the whole incident was avoidable, with just a
little bit of "street smartness". Frankly, I hold the leaders of
the tour group partly to blame for placing us in a cheaper hotel
that had inadequate security. There were much better hotels in
town which could have been used, specifically the Hotel Europe or
the Astoria with visible, real security. For the amount that was
paid to the tour company for accommodations, much better
arrangements could have been made.
On this same subject, one suggestion that seemed to work very
well was the placement of money in concealed places in different
areas of my body. The idea here is that if you are robbed, the
thief will not take all of your money, just what is obvious.
Besides a regular wallet, I carried a money belt, and three
velcro wallets; one around each of my ankles secured by velcro
straps, and one in which I carried my passport and visa, which
hung around my neck, underneath my shirt. I was never robbed and
I felt very secure.
It is very true that the Mafia is active and the police are
very ineffective in their job of keeping total order. In my
opinion, the key to dealing with this problem is to maintain a low
profile. One should do nothing to highlight oneself as an
American or contribute in any way to the inflamation of a small
incident. Loud or boisterous talking (especially in English) and
alcohol in any form can only make a situation worse. Although I
was not present during the altercation on 18 July at the hotel in
Zagorsk, I feel that cooler heads and quieter language by the
Americans present would have turned it into a non-event, with no
need to call the embassy.
I feel the largeness of the tour group also contributed to this
problem. Not enough of the group could speak Russian. I suggest
that future groups should be held down to between 4 or 5 at a
maximum and 2 as a minimum. This number seemed to provide maximum
security without calling undue attention to the group. 53 is an
unmanageable number and this probably contributed to the Russian
tour guides' over reaction when 2 from our group tried to take an
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Atch 3
alternate means of transportation to our destination on 17 July.
(Smolensk to Zagorsk)
Concerning degrees of freedom for traveling in Russia, it would
be extremely helpful if some specific rules are made available for
future participants. For example, is it necessary to have prior
approval for a last minute change in one's travel itinerary? Who
issues this approval? What are the Russian Government's
restrictions for travel within their country by U.S. military
officers? Apparently none of these questions were adequately
answered before the trip started.
Some minor points. The food was generally bad and the water
was worse. Western bottled water was generally available in the
larger cities: Kiev, Moscow and St. Petersburg; but it took us a
few days to find a source each time we made a move between cities.
One of the smartest things we did was to bring enough water with
us (about a 2-day supply) until we could get our bearings. A jar
of peanut butter and some crackers is also a smart idea.
Above all, it was critically beneficial to have had the ability
to converse in the native language; from reading subway
directions, to asking directions and making phone calls for
people. It enabled those of us who spoke Russian to operate
within the culture freely and those who didn't depended upon those
who did. Minimum DLPT scores should be a mandatory requirement
for acceptance in the program.
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When the Bush administration formulated it's new national
security strategy in mid-1990, it made certain assumptions about
the security and military threat posed by the then-Soviet Union.
Generally that threat was described as having receded to a level
where the U.S. would have up to two-years of warning prior to a
major European-centered global war. With the demise of the
former "evil empire," the Bush administration and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff re-evaluated the threat from the defunct USSR and
made new assumptions about the security and military threat posed
by the Russian and other former Soviet republics. In May 1992,
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote that the
U.S. could now count on eight to ten-years strategic warning
before a resurgent/emergent global threat arose.
Students and faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
recently returned from a twenty-one day educational exchange
visit to Russia and the Ukraine. The group, led by the author,
from the School's Department of National Security Affairs, in-
cluded four Navy, three Air Force, and one Army officer students
who are specializing in Russian area studies. Funding was pro-
vided by the individual services under the Defense Advanced
Language and Area Studies (DALASP) and the Quality of Analysis
(QofA) Programs.
The July 1992 trip to Russia and the Ukraine was made to
help the researchers determine what is the current state of the
former Soviet Union and specifically the state of the various
republic military forces? What the researchers hoped to deter-
mine is if the Bush administration's planning assumptions are
still valid? The answer to that question is the subject for
subsequent additional research and analysis, the full results of
which will not be available until 1993.
The researchers will either conclude that America's assump-
tions about the former Soviet Union are no longer valid and the
U.S. and NATO need to modify defense programs, or, that the
planned demobilization of the West's armed forces that were once
poised against the USSR can, and should, take place. Such analy-
1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of




sis obviously addresses the sources of future international
stability and instability and the prospective U.S. foreign policy
and defense role - both subjects for active consideration by many
of us.
The trip offered a unique opportunity to study the evolving
former Soviet republics' military doctrines and military strate-
gies and the roles and missions that will be assigned to their
armed forces. The student and faculty researchers placed major
emphasis on observing the results of the changes in the military
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
emergence of independent republics. While in Russia and the
Ukraine, the group had the opportunity to interact with faculty
members, researchers, and military officers at the Military
History Institute, the Frunze Academy, the Institute of the
U.S.A. and Canada Studies, the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO) , the Vasilevsky Air Defense
Academy, and other military-academic institutions.
The Russian military opened up certain geographic and func-
tional areas to the NPS students and faculty that heretofore had
been closed to Western visitors. Among the highlights were a
visit to the Kronshtadt naval base (soon to become the headquar-
ters and location for the bulk of the Russian Baltic Fleet) the
armor museum at Kubinka, the aviation museum at Monino, and the
museum for artillery, engineering, and communications troops in
St. Petersburg. The NPS students and faculty attended special
seminars at these sites and had an audience with a Deputy Defense
Minister for the new republic of the Ukraine.
The comments below represent the raw results of some of the
research conducted on the trip. Documentation is not included
since no rules were established for attribution, or not, by each
individual interviewed. This will be clarified in writing before
any statements are directly attributed in public documents to
Russian or Ukrainian sources. The sources of the information
below range from a deputy minister of defense to serving general
officers to senior civilian academic researchers to civilian and
military instructors and professors. The sources worked at
various ministries, military academies, and institutes well known
to us in the West. Additional and detailed research results will
be published by NPS and should be available in early 1993.
Personalities and Current Political Issues
One of more intriguing questions that we had concerned a
series of Spring 1992 pro-Navy interviews with Andrey Afanasye-
vich Kokoshin, now Deputy Defense Minister for Russia, when he
was serving as the Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada
Institute. The character of these articles was inconsistent
with the earlier positions taken on defense by Kokoshin. We were
told that these articles were an attempt to buy favor from the




of Russian Defense Minister at the time) or the easy way out;
i.e. it would be easier establish a large navy on his initial
platform and if necessary to later say Russia could not afford or
did not need one than it would be to subsequently argue that
Russia needed a large ocean-going fleet.
We were also told that Kokoshin was supposed to get the job
as defense minister and that it was not clear why he did not.
Apparently the Russian military backed Kokoshin since they wanted
a civilian who could and would say "no" to Russian President
Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. We were told that the military did
not want the man who eventually was appointed Russian Defense
Minister, General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, because the
military was afraid that a serving officer would simply do what
he was told and not resist Yeltsin if necessary. When we asked
about the importance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed
Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , Marshal
of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, we were told that he
is not as important as he once was now that Russia has formed its
own armed forces.
The concept of the CIS as a political replacement for the
old USSR is not well understood by the Western media. No Russian
or Ukrainian ever referred to or used the term CIS during our
trip. What was used, is the name of the nation that we were in.
We observed a resurgence of strong national pride. We came away
with the conclusion that the military of the Ukrainian republic
is primarily loyal to Ukraine and not to Russia or the CIS. We
had received earlier suggestions from Russians that the Ukrainian
armed forces would actually be manned by Russians as the solution
for how the Russians were going to protect their southwestern
borders. That concept appears to be a Russian dream not shared
by anyone that we met in the Ukraine.
The Russians and Ukrainians appeared to have settled the
Black Sea Fleet by first deciding the type of political relation-
ship they wanted and letting that determine the importance of the
fleet controversy. The politicians did not let their military
leaders determine the outcome of this issue, which seemed to us
to be a very healthy sign.
After noting with a number of Russians the openness of the
current era and contrasted it with other historical periods of
similar disclosure, we asked when this current period would
close. The answer that we were most often given was "soon." Our
conclusion was that we should take full advantage of the current
opportunity to learn about the Russians and Ukrainians from
visits such as ours.
Russian Military Science
There has been an age-old debate over how Soviet military




actually knew Soviet military science. Regarding war's technical
characteristics, the Russians acknowledged that local/global was
the first order of distinction; the choice of nuclear or conven-
tional weapons was a secondary or tertiary issue. We were also
told that the former Chief of the General Staff of the USSR,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov, spoke
out against relying on nuclear weapons as early as 1966 at the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy. This early date appears to be
not known in the West and we were promised a copy of the tran-
script of this very early lecture.
We were told that the strategic missions of the Soviet armed
forces found in the 1987 book The Navy and elsewhere4 are not new
and that they can be inferred from the published mid-1970s lec-
tures from the Voroshilov Academy. Upon our return, a compari-
son of the strategic missions contained in The Navy and those
found in the mid-1970s Voroshilov Academy lecture notes reveals
significant differences in emphasis and content. As we know, the
strategic missions contained in The Navy also differed signifi-
cantly from those published by Marshal Vasiley Danilovich Soko-
lovskiy in his book Military Strategy. Everyone that we talked
to agreed that the strategic missions of the Russian or Ukrainian
armed forces will be different than either of these once new
military doctrines and strategies are approved.
We also had a series of discussions about the similarity of
future ground warfare with naval warfare and were told that the
Russians were researching this subject. This appears to be one of
their lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war and parallels
research previously published in the West.
Russian Military History
The Russians defined military history as anything that
happened through yesterday; hence they felt more "comfortable" in
discussing the history of the Persian Gulf war, or the history of
the initial Yeltsin period, etc., rather than emerging doctrine
and strategy. Our discussions of history often were surrogates
for discussions of today's issues. The Soviet military reforms
of 1924-1925 were most often used for such purposes and we spent
a considerable period of time considering the applicability of
that period to today. The Russians made sure that we received
the message that they would not simply replicate the forces
developed or the military strategy during that era.
Most of the instructors at the Frunze Academy said that they
have no substantive knowledge of Czarist-era Russian military
history, especially during its final days. They are only now
being allowed to research this period and hope to use history to
replace the legitimacy for their regime that was once provided
for by ideology. We were told, however, that it is neither new
nor unusual for Russians to research the defensive or initial




that we have seen published in their literature about the defen-
sive is not new research, but rather research that had been
performed previously. This research was not, however, available
to those outside of the "system" since it was previously classi-
fied secret.
We were told by the Russians that we should take advantage
of military historical research that they have done already so
that we would not need to perform it. Under "scientific" social-
ism, once a topic has been thoroughly and correctly researched,
it need not be done again by anyone again since only one answer
was possible. We were somewhat surprised that this view is still
alive and well in newly "democratic" Russia.
The Western Theater of War
We had numerous discussions about the Western reports of old
Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear war plans for the western theater of
military operations (WTVD) . These plans were recently published
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
their journal Survival . Most Russians were aware of the publi-
cation. This subject was perhaps the most sensitive of all that
we addressed with the Russians. At least one individual acknowl-
edged the existence and authenticity of these plans and stated
that nuclear operations were indeed to begin early in any war
with the West but they would have been limited to the WTVD. We
asked numerous individuals if the leaks were authoritative and
were told yes and that plans were being changed.
These plans did not correspond to themes used in articles,
speeches, and books of Marshal Ogarkov during the 1980s. It
seemed to us in the West that Ogarkov had not advocated nuclear
strikes during strategic operations in the WTVD and we had taken
his writings as evidence that Soviet military strategy and opera-
tional art had changed to deemphasize nuclear war fighting. We
were told that Marshal Ogarkov did not speak for the military
when he wrote those articles and monographs and that we should
have never interpreted those as anything more than his personal
views. If this is true, then much recent content analysis of
Soviet military literature may be fatally flawed.
Others in our group, not from NPS, were more interested in
proposed operations in the Northwestern TVD (NWTVD) and asked
similar direct questions. They were told that Soviet war plans
did not call for an invasion of Finmark under normal circumstanc-
es, but that there were contingency plans to go through Sweden
and occupy northern Norway as far south as Tromso. Such opera-
tions were not, however, to be central to the overall war effort.
We were asked how it would be interpreted in the West if a
variant three defensive military doctrine (Battle of Khalkhin Gol
surrogate) would be replaced by variant two (Battle of Kursk




direction but that the offensive counterattack might take place
primarily with air power (but not only with those forces) . The
Russians said that such a change should not bother us with buffer
states now between Russia and Germany.
Russian Military Education System
We confirmed that the business of the Frunze and Vasilevsky
Academies is operational art and tactics. We were told that
there are no Air Force or Navy officers (students or faculty) at
these academies. This somewhat surprised us since many in the
West assumed the Soviet educational system for the command and
general staff-level was similar to our own. Frunze students study
very little outside of their own ground forces; for example, the
Normandy invasion is studied at the Frunze Academy only as a
defensive operation and not in the context of projecting power
from the sea.
Each military service has its own schools for command and
general staff. "Combined arms," at the operational-level of war-
fare as taught at the Frunze Academy, is restricted to integra-
tion of all branches of the Ground Forces. The first time the
Soviet/Russian military gets together for multi-service, or
"joint," education is at General Staff Academy. This means that
the Western perception by many that "combined arms" operations
(at the operational-level of warfare) was a Soviet strength was
incorrect.
We asked about the impact on the curricula of academies of
the demise of an ideological role for the armed forces. We were
told that they had already revised their curricula but did not
add any new materials. Apparently they allowed for additional
in-depth coverage of what was already specified instead. We were
also told that the Frunze Academy previously spent 90% of their
time teaching nuclear or nuclear-related aspects of war and armed
conflict but that this is now down to around 10%.
We concluded from discussions of correlation of forces and
how to construct equivalent division and effective equivalent
divisions that our methods were very similar. The Russians made
great pains to use Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-
approved numbers. We also had a discussion about net assessment
as a methodology. We discussed the use of the IISS Military
Balance numbers rather than "real" numbers for education and
training. Most Russians seemed familiar with this document and
said that they used it for basic classroom exercises. None used
it for homework since, as we were told, Russian military officers





How do the Russians Learn About us?
A discussion which we had with virtually every instructor
with whom we talked involved how did the Soviets and how do the
Russians develop specialists about other nations? We were told
that this is strictly the role of intelligence services and that
there is no counterpart to Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) or sub-
specialists as found in the U.S. armed forces. At the Frunze
Academy instructors are merely given materials about the U.S. to
use in the classroom and are not expected to deviate from that
material. We discussed a wide variety of alternative plans and
sources of information.
We asked most Russians and Ukrainians if they were familiar
with the KGB's Operation RYAN, as reported by former KGB General
Oleg Gordievsky. All said yes and that Operation RYAN was
real. This topic was used in many additional discussions as an
example of how bad the KGB understood us and how dangerous it was
to place all their emphasis on learning about the U.S. on a
system that could have produced RYAN.
The Russians and Ukrainians seemed to not understand that in
the U.S., there might be officially published service positions
on the lessons of the Persian Gulf war that might differ with
views published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although we can see this in their own
writing, it seems to be a failure in understanding how to do
proper content analysis of U.S. literature evidence. They also
seemed to have great difficulty in understanding us since we did
not use standardized terms in our politico-military literature.
When Westerners use Soviet or Russian terms, they took this as
evidence that we had finally adopted the "correct" (Russian)
terms.
After reviewing comments on some of our own research and the
lack of depth of sources from their own country, most of us
concluded that although we are in America, we often have access
to some better Russian sources than they do. Duplication and
compartmentalization of efforts within Russia have resulted in a
lack of awareness of what internal resources are already avail-
able. The definition of initiative does not appear to include
researching any areas that have not been "assigned."
Nuclear and Other Issues
We were told that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) already had a permissive action link (PAL)
system to prevent inadvertent launch. PAL authorization would
have to be received in data form in order to be useful, i.e. an
alternative scenario of telephone authorization would not be
sufficient to "unlock" the systems. We were also told that the




on board SSBNs and might be willing to give up the other two legs
of the triad.
We also discussed Soviet nuclear targeting and Russian
President Yeltsin's statement that Russian missiles were no
longer targeting American (and other) cities. 4 This "shift" did
not require actual changes since, we were told, cities were not
targeted by design, only as an unfortunate consequence. Hence
when some in Russia said that nothing has changed as a result of
Yeltsin's actions, they are right. 15
We were told that the Soviets had "fooled us" over the Tu-22
BACKFIRE bomber and that it obviously was an intercontinental
weapons system. We were told that they could retrofit the refuel-
ing probe within hours. We were also told that since superpower
nuclear weapons issues are now essentially settled, the numbers
of warheads were going down substantially, and no one was arguing
internally over the role of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Rocket
Forces would be ranked lower in the overall precedence of mili-
tary services.
Regarding a new revolution in military affairs, we were told
that although a new revolution was regarded as theoretically
possible (due to advances in technology) , it would not happen due
to the realities of the economy. There would be no opportunities
for serial development of many new weapons and the Russians will
shift to a prototyping system to keep up with the West.
We were told that the Russian fleet would be limited to the
Barents and Northern Norwegian Seas, the Bering Sea and Sea of
Okhotsk, and the Northern Sea of Japan and specifically that it
would not deploy along the U.S. sea lines of communications.
What Were They Interested in From Us?
Russians questions of us involved six main areas: American
politics and politico-military doctrine and strategy; nuclear
issues; naval forces; NATO and Europe; war gaming; and about
themselves.
In the first area, the Russians were interested in: the
probable results of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections; how
would we implement our new military doctrine and strategy; how
could the new military doctrine and strategy actually have been
developed in a top-down manner; the status of the Competitive
Strategies Initiative (CSI) ; the difficulty of conversion and
reconversion of industry; what were America's unilateral capabil-
ities to wage a strategic-level war and operational-level cam-
paign; and the lessons of the Persian Gulf war?
In the nuclear area, the Russians asked us: if the recent
agreements on nuclear arms between Presidents George Bush and




doctrine and strategy; if lower numbers of strategic nuclear
warheads might suggest a shift to countervalue and non-prompt
nuclear targeting; how long it would take from receipt of warning
until our nuclear forces could respond; how the American military
viewed the deep reductions in nuclear forces; if the U.S. mili-
tary thought they would reprogram nuclear resources into conven-
tional forces; and what was the future of the strategic defense
initiative (SDI) and the global protection against limited
strikes (GPALS) program?
Regarding naval forces, the Russians asked: if any of the
documents concerning the new U.S. military doctrine and strategy
addressed sea communications and if we assumed any opposition at
sea; if we would now revise the AIRLAND battle doctrine and if
would it become an Air-Land-Sea doctrine; what was the future of
the U.S. Sixth Fleet; about naval arms control, specifically an
attempt to control naval arms through budget limitations; and why
the U.S., the British, and/or the French were still patrolling
off their coasts in the new international security environment
when they had ended all patrols off our coasts?
With regard to NATO and Europe, the Russians asked: what was
the impact on NATO of the creation of Western European Union
(WEU) armed forces; what was the number of U.S. troops and divi-
sions to be left in Europe under the current plan and our best
guess for the post-election period; whether the West ever had
serious plans to invade the Warsaw Treaty states; and why were we
upgrading the Pershing missiles? In discussions about military
capabilities versus intentions we were asked why each of us had
looked first at capabilities instead of intentions. They wanted
to know why we did not have plans to fight France or the United
Kingdom since these nations had capabilities to attack the U.S.?
The Russians also wanted to know how we do simulations and
war gaming; man/man or man/machine and if we had special teams to
play the enemy or computer models instead? We were told that
they now use green and dark blue to represent two opposing
sides. Regarding themselves, the Russians and Ukrainians asked
us about future cooperative security actions and how we thought
the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet issue should be settled.
One thing that surprised us was what they did not want to
know. During questions and answers that followed a presentation
about our new national security strategy, the Ukrainians did not
want us to explain our planning scenarios, saying that they
already had studied those and understood them.
Conclusions
From the perspective of the participants of the trip and the
sponsors who funded it, the benefits appear to be well worth the
costs involved. Each student will take with him/her the experi-




nians and use that experience during their military career. From
the perspective of a faculty member, it is clear that both NPS
instruction and research will benefit as well.
The participants of this research trip intend to prepare
additional technical reports as well as student theses based upon
their experiences while in Russia and the Ukraine. It is hoped
that the successes of this first endeavor will lead to repetition
while the current "window" of openness remains open and an expan-
sion of DALASP/QofA funded activities for students and faculty in
other areas of the world.
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"Touring" Russia and Ukraine
In July 1992 the authors participated in a tour of Russia, Estonia, and
Ukraine under the auspices of the DALASP (Defense Advanced Language and
Area Studies Program). Three are students in the new NPS intelligence
curriculum with an emphasis on Russian area studies. The trip was organized
through the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) by Professor James Tritten, CDR,
USN (Ret), and LTC John Sloan, USA (Ret). The tour was officially organized for
the study of Russian military history, and was sponsored by the Russian
Military History Institute. The trip included a number of professionals from that
field, and related fields such as political science, from around the world. One of
the participants who joined us from Norway was CAPT Robert Bathurst, USN
(Ret), former assistant attache in Moscow, a former NPS faculty member, and a
frequent contributor to the Quarterly . Other participants from NPS included LT
Scott Stanley (currently Asst. N2 at CINCUSNAVEUR), one Army FAO in training,
and three Air Force officers funded under the Quality of Analysis program. The
DALASP participants were on the trip for advanced language and area studies
familiarization and proficiency training.
Needless to say, this was a very exciting opportunity for in depth and first
hand study of the former "Evil Empire"! We have all cut our teeth on Soviet
order of battle and intently studied passing Soviet warships while wondering
what really was going on in the heads of our counterparts across the waves.
For the authors the chance to sit and talk with our opposite numbers on their
Page 69 Enclosure (3)
own territory was most gratifying. And we do mean our opposite numbers,
since the interpreters assigned to our group informed us they were either GRU
officers or cadets learning English.
We had conversations with numerous military officers on a wide range of
military historical topics as well as general social topics that we hoped would
shed some light on the character of the Russian and Ukrainian military. We met
with faculty, researchers, and students of the Russian Military History Institute,
the Frunze Academy, Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, and the Vasilevsky Air Defense
Academy in Kiev. We found them all very eager to discuss our observations of
Russian and Ukrainian military topics, and to a lesser extent to offer their own
observations on us. This exchange of ideas was very fruitful and is recorded in
detail in an NPS technical report by Professor Tritten.
The itinerary of the trip was as follows: St. Petersburg July 3-7; a tour of
northwestern Russia July 7-10; Moscow July 10-15; tours of the "golden ring"
cities surrounding Moscow July 15-22; Kiev July 22-24; and a return to Monterey
July 25. While in St. Petersburg we toured the Kronstadt Naval Base, the Naval
Museum, the cruiser Aurora, the city of Viborg, as well as the Artillery,
Engineering, and Signals Museum. The latter included naval ordnance and
firearms. There we held discussions on a wide range of subjects, including the
presentation by LT Mcllmail of an NPS student research study on an expected
course for the future of the Russian Navy. During the tours between the
major cities we also were treated to stops at the Armor Museum at Kubinka and
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the Aviation museum at Monino.
In Moscow further discussions were held at the Military History Institute,
U.S.A. and Canada Institute, and IMEMO. We had a particularly good exchange
at IMEMO with Vice Admiral (Ret.) Markov of the Russian Navy. All of these
tours and discussions were very helpful for the authors in gaining a better
understanding of the Russian military establishment and how it operated in
academic arenas. Numerous in-depth seminars were held with faculty of the
Frunze Academy while en route. These were most enlightening on the subject
of operational art.
For our fellow naval officers the time spent in Kronstadt, at the Naval
Museum, on the Aurora, and at Monino probably offers the most interest, so we
will address them in a little more depth.
The naval base at Kronstadt is located on Kotlin Island just outside St.
Petersburg in the Gulf of Finland. The base has been a mainstay in Russian
and Soviet defense since it was captured by Peter the Great in the Northern
War. The revolt by the sailors of Kronstadt against the Bolsheviks in the 1920's
is probably the best known battle fought there. Formerly a closed city, it was
quite a thrill for us as naval officers to be allowed onto the base. CAPT Bathurst
kept insisting we take his picture there!
We arrived at the base following a bus ride from St. Petersburg over a
new system of earthen dams under construction to connect the island with the
mainland and for flood control. The appearance of the base was cleaner than
St. Petersburg, but otherwise unimpressive. Considering that this is to be the
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new headquarters for the Baltic Fleet this was somewhat surprising. Few ships
were there: and old icebreaker and several training ships, all in a state of
disrepair, and two Whiskey and one Foxtrot submarines. Infrastructure on the
base was poor with most of the buildings in need of major repair. There were
few sailors or civilians seen in the streets.
The Officer's Club was the site of a reception for the tour group by the
deputy base commander and the town's Deputy Mayor. Conditions at the club
were below the standard of our own Navy's clubs, enlisted or officer.
All in all, the Kronstadt visit was eye-opening for us as this was our first
to a Russian military installation. We were not impressed. This was not the
case for some of the other points of naval interest that we visited.
On the afternoon of the 5th of July, our group visited the Central Naval
Museum. The institution was founded by Peter the Great, who decreed that a
model must be kept of each ship built in Russia. The museum is located on
Pushkin Square on Vasilevsky Island in the Neva river. The main building is of
classical design, and was constructed in the early 19th century. Prior to the
Revolution, the building was the Stock Exchange building. In front of the
building is a small park at the Strelka, Russian for "the Spit," which offers a
magnificent view of the city. The location previously served as the center of the
commercial harbor. Reminders of this function, are found in the two
monumental Rostral Columns, each over one hundred feet high. For years, oil
was burned in bowls at the top of the columns to serve as navigation aids. The
columns are distinctively decorated with the prows of sailing ships to
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commemorate Russian naval victories. This style is in imitation of the Roman
rostral columns commemorating their victory at sea over the Carthaginians.
We were warmly greeted at the museum by Captain First Rank Yevgenyy
Nikolaevich Korchagin. We split into groups to see the collections. Those of
our group who spoke Russian were at a distinct advantage because the
museum guides did not speak English, and we were not forced to be constantly
waiting for the translation. Those of us speaking Russian were escorted by a
retired Navy Captain whose knowledge of the collection was as enormous as
the collection itself. Among the 800,000 exhibits the museum contains many
historical treasures, including a 3,000 year-old boat recovered from the Bug
River. There is a boat constructed by Peter the Great, as well as some of his
hand tools. There are a great number of very detailed ship models, ensigns,
jacks, uniforms, examples of naval weaponry, and the personal effects of
Russian and Soviet naval heroes.
A visit to the cruiser Aurora provided an interesting example of political
correctness in Russia today. The exhibits and the presence of the ship herself
speak one story, but the guides spoke another. The cruiser was launched in
1903, and fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In October of 1917,
while the ship was scheduled for repairs, the crew joined the revolutionaries,
and by the order of the Military Revolutionary Committee sailed up the Neva and
trained her guns on the Winter Palace where the Provisional Government was
meeting. On the evening of the 25 October (7 November), the crew fired a blank
shot to signal the storming of palace, and the beginning of the Bolshevik
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Revolution.
As a result of the historic role played by the Aurora and her crew in the
Revolution, the cruiser, now part of the Central Naval Museum, is lovingly
preserved, and designated ship #1 of the fleet. The ship is filled with exhibits
recounting the Revolution and Civil War, and the later careers of the sailors who
sailed aboard her in that October. But to listen to our guide, also a retired Navy
Captain, the significance of the Aurora is that she is a fine example of naval
architecture at the turn of the century. It is also important to show people how
the average sailor lived in the Russian Navy, and, oh yes, she did play some
role in the Bolshevik Revolution. It would seem that many Russians are having
a difficult time with a history that serves no propaganda function.
Perhaps the most impressive of the museums which we visited was the
Monino Air Museum, located on the outskirts of Moscow. Any aviation
enthusiast visiting Moscow must see this museum. The museum houses aircraft
from not only the Soviet Air Force but also Air Defense and Naval Aviation. The
exhibits span the ages from frail World War One era scouts such as the
Nieuport and Sopwith Triplane to modern fourth generation fighters, including
the SU-27 (prototype) and the MiG-29.
The main hall of the museum includes small fighter-type aircraft from both
World Wars as well as dioramas and displays of the history of Russian and
Soviet military aviation. In the post-war exhibition area, our guide hurried us
past some wreckage from Col. Powers U-2 and seemed noticeably relieved when
no questions were asked about it. Interestingly, no lend-lease aircraft were on
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display in the Great Patriotic War section although our guide mentioned U.S
lend-lease aid a great deal.
The larger static displays are displayed in a park near the main hall.
Unfortunately, the elements seem to be taking their toll of the displays. All
postwar aircraft are displayed there, beginning with the MiG-9 Fargo, Russia's
first jet fighter and proceeding to the current generation, with only the MiG-31 in
absence. Bombers are well represented with Bear, Backfire, Badger and Bison,
among others, on display. Naval Aviation displays included the YAK-38 Forger
and a BE-12 Mail, as well as naval helicopters.
The real crowd pleasers were the experimental aircraft. An example of the
sleek SU-100 Mach 3 bomber, similar to the U.S XB-70, was on display. The
nose of this aircraft covers the cockpit and drops only during low speed flight,
meaning that at high speed the crew must fly on instruments only! The guides
said that they had built ten for the Air Force, in addition to ten for civilian use.
Other interesting exhibits included a sub-scale mock-up of a small space plane
and a high-speed drone, probably for reconnaissance.
Rounding out the museum is a separate hall which includes record-
breaking Russian Soviet aircraft, including Sikorsky's famous llya Murometz
four-engine bomber from 1914. In years past, our guide stated that they could
not say that the aircraft was built by Sikorsky as this would raise unwholesome
questions and instead said that it was built by a "consortium." All in all, this is
a most impressive museum and a must see for anyone interested in aviation or
military history.
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Although most of our time was spent in museums, at historical
battlefields, and in scholarly discussions with academics, perhaps the most
important part of the trip was the time we spent with ordinary Russians and
Ukrainians. From them we received insights that one cannot get from reading
reports. The nations of the former Soviet Union are in a tremendous state of
internal ferment. The people are very confused about what the future will hold
for them, and many are even unsure about what path they want their nation will
take. Although the Soviet Union is no more, and the military preparedness of
the successor states is reduced from previous times, internal conflicts are
raging, and show every indication that they will continue in the future.
Some have expressed to us that this is not a good time to be a specialist
in the former Soviet Union. We disagree. The most interesting intelligence
work is always done when change is occurring, not in a period of stability. We
are convinced the former Soviet Union will be an unstable place for many years.
CDR James Tritten, USN (Ret)
LT David Hanson, USN
LT Mark Admiral, USNR
LT James Mcllmail, USN
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2-3 July (Thursday-Friday) : Flight to St. Petersburg, Russia.
Uneventful flight to Russia. On the flight over, I completed
the index to my forthcoming book on America's new regional de-
fense strategy, and I delivered the manuscript to the Federal
Express office in Frankfurt, Germany for delivery to the publish-
er. Upon arrival at St. Petersburg, we immediately noticed the
inefficiency of the country in the manner of operations in the
airport terminal, specifically baggage. The St. Petersburg air-
port is smaller than the Monterey Peninsula Airport. We all
needed to declare all of our money and customs officials searched
our baggage coming into country. Met by LTC John Sloan, USA
(Ret.), organizer of the participants of the tour. Met also by
Valentine Navara, co-leader of the St. Petersburg portion of the
tour.
Our first dinner included the Commanding Officer of Artil-
lery, Engineering, and Signal Troops Museum and the Naval Museum.
The Artillery Museum commander, Yevgeny Nikolaievich Karchagan,
is a ground forces colonel that listened more than he talked. I
pressed him on current Russian military doctrine and strategy and
he replied that his job is to preserve hardware and not get
involved in such matters. He knew name of Aleksey G. Arbatov
[from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
- IMEMO] and the commander gave very strong impression that he
disliked him and that his type knew nothing about military mat-
ters. The commander was very critical of perestroika and Gor-
bachev when he finally opened up.
Our dinner also included the commanding officer of the Naval
Museum. He is a Captain 1st Rank and appeared more friendly but
our conversation had little substance of modern issues. Switched
to history as a surrogate and I got some interesting answers when
pressed on lessons learned about DESERT STORM [history is any-
thing that happened until yesterday] . The Navy officer appeared
surprised when I said that we [U.S.] did not learn the same les-
sons that Russia did about this war but he did not press me to
explain what I meant. He only said that the Persian Gulf war
proved that navies were shown to be very important.
There was some friction apparent services, but I could not
put my finger on exactly what. Discussions of the "decisive"
role of airpower in DESERT STORM was a trigger for intense dis-
cussion between these Russian officers, in Russian. Another
Russian civilian tour leader for the St. Petersburg portion of
the tour, Vladimir A. Snitkovsky, whose card describes him as a
chief expert analyst for ALKOR Technologies, Inc., said he would
talk to me later about Russian military doctrine and strategy but




During dinner, a photographer took everyone's pictures.
That evening, LT Scott Stanley USN, on of our tour participants,
is robbed in his hotel room while he and his roommate were in the
room. A police report was filed the next day in hotel and at
police substation near hotel. There was much discussion amongst
tour participants about precautions to be taken to safeguard
ourselves and our possessions. Met the leader of the entire
tour, Vyacheslav Stepashkin, from ASK Tours in Moscow. Two of
his staff, Maxim and Dmitriy Alekseyevich Ivanov, are introduced
as our translators. Also met Valyeriy A. Kudashkin, editor of
Orel military history magazine, and was told that he would be
accompanying us on the entire tour.
4 July (Saturday) : St. Petersburg, Russia.
Tour group visited the Artillery, Engineering, and Signal
Troops Museum. The photographer who took everyone's pictures the
previous evening was there and appeared to complete his mission.
None of us ever saw the pictures nor were we offered any for sale
later as you would find with a normal Western tour company. Cap-
tain Robert Bathurst, USN (Ret.), a tour participant, told us
that he had tried to get into the museum for many years but had
failed. He was most excited about what he saw. The museum com-
mander kept everything on tight schedule and was rude to his
civilian employees. These civilians looked like they were dressed
in their Sunday finest. The museum commander showed great respect
for retired Colonel participant in Great Patriotic War. We were
shown pieces of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 and a B-52 shot down in
Viet Nam. The museum contains many modern missiles and other
hardware. It includes naval missiles but there is no obvious
naval officer participation on the staff (each other combat arm
had one deputy)
.
The museum commander showed open disrespect for his communi-
cations officer deputy and communications troops. The schedule
appeared more important than substance. One woman staff member
was the daughter of the inventor of a famous rifle. Signal and
engineering troops were given second place. I presented the
museum a plaque from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at end
of tour.
We then visited the beautiful Naval Museum. We were told
that it might soon again be made into a stock exchange. There
was no mention of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei
G. Gorshkov despite a display of his bust, uniform, and other
associated memorabilia. A display of Admiral of the Fleet N.G.
Kuznetsov was likewise ignored. New aircraft carriers were on
display. No "history" of the post-communist period yet but
everyone made a great point of the forthcoming switch to St.




rov and Ushikov. The Russian Navy itself was not important
unless a great leader was available to make it into something.
Discussed the difference with U.S. naval traditions with students
and other tour members. Great respect in the museum for accom-
plishments of technology. The Russians claim that they invented
everything. I presented an NPS plaque to the museum commander,
Captain 1st Rank Yevgenyy Nikolaevich Korchagin, and he seemed
quite excited about it.
We visited the armored cruiser AURORA which was added to the
program at last minute apparently due to my discussion at dinner
the previous evening. The AURORA is ship #1 on the roles of the
former Soviet and revitalized Russian Navy. Did not have NPS
plaque with me but I arranged to have one presented later by LCDR
Jeff Kuipers, the Assistant U.S. Naval Attache in Moscow, because
I did not trust the tour organizers to actually deliver the
plaque to the AURORA.
A reception was hosted that evening by ALKOR, a private
corporation, at a St. Petersburg sports arena. I was asked by
LTC John Sloan to give a 4th of July speech, which I did. It was
videotaped and I later learned that it appeared on regional
television along with a report of the reception. In the speech,
I stressed the importance of historical opportunities for world
peace, challenges of capitalism and democracy. After the recep-
tion, I decided that they do not yet understand capitalism. It
was like they read a book but they had no idea what they were
really doing. Some of the Russian participants thought that we
were people who could contract to buy they products or services.
LTC John Sloan told us to ignore this and that Snitkovsky was
using the group to demonstrate to the Russians in attendance that
he could produce Americans and other foreigners.
During the reception, I encouraged the Russians to try to
succeed at capitalism and democracy despite the obvious difficul-
ties. There was a presentation of Russian cultural singing and
dancing. We saw lots of new technological opportunities; lasers
and crystals used in nuclear science especially. Some members of
the tour were lobbied quite heavily and some were even offered
contracts.
At the reception, I met with the Executive Officer from the
Kronshtadt naval base and he said that he would see me the next
day. He spoke no English and the conversation was superficial.
I also met with a Ph.D. who said that he was from the naval
archives. He spoke very good English and I tried to engage him
in more contemporary topics. He resisted and I switched to
historical surrogates. The conversation did not go very far.
From time to time on the rest of the St. Petersburg portion of
the trip, he would show up, including in strange places like our
hotel bar. No other Russians went there except for our inter-




sations after that time and instead I noticed that he spent most
of his time with the Swedish tour participants.
5 July (Sunday) : St Petersburg, Russia with day tour to Kronsh-
tadt Naval Base.
Toured Hermitage and noted that it had been preserved desp-
ite the "revolution" of 1917. Promised a tour of the special
military collection but this never occurred. Bus trip to Kronsh-
tadt naval base. Enroute, we go through the industrial center of
St. Petersburg. It does not appear in good shape. We are told
that the building where we just passed is where they used to make
the SS-20. Dmitriy says that this is proof that there are no
more secrets between us. We note on this leg and subsequently
that none of the smokestacks in the city (or elsewhere in Russia)
are "smoking." We also went over a major water project between
Kronshtadt and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland. We
learned that it was being delayed due to cost overruns. Its
purpose was flood control and the project has 15 gates and 1 ship
channel. LTC Stellan Bojerud, Swedish officer at Royal Staff
College and Lars Ulfving from the Swedish Ministry of Defense,
exhibited extraordinarily high interest in this portion of the
trip and took numerous photos. CAPT Bathurst was also very
excited about being in Kronshtadt since he also said that it was
extraordinary to be allowed to visit there.
Kronshtadt has been a closed city and was specially opened
up for our tour. Special permission was needed and had been ob-
tained. Cleaner and nicer than St. Petersburg. At a reception in
the officer's club, we were introduced to the city's Deputy Mayor
who appeared to be a serving officer. I noted that on an upper
floor of the officer's club, which was too large a building to
serve only as this, there were numerous radio antennas and elec-
tronics equipment and enlisted men on duty wearing headphones. In
the port we noticed two WHISKEY and one FOXTROT submarines, plus
an armed training ship. We were told that this was one of four
such ships. Upon my return to the U.S., I consulted a commercial
ship identification publication and now know that I saw a SMOL'N-
YY class training ship.
The base Executive Officer said that Kronshtadt will take
bulk of Baltic Fleet and headquarters soon. We wondered where
since the necessary infrastructure did not appear to be there.
Plaque presented to Executive Officer in honor of our visit. We
noticed that the local churches had been destroyed by the Bolshe-
viks during their rule and the major one on the island was con-
verted to a naval museum and auditorium. We toured the museum




6 July (Monday): St. Petersburg with day outing to Mannerheim
Line and Vyborg Fortress.
Tour led by Yuriy Koltsov, curator of the Suvorov Museum.
Learned that in the Winter War with Finland, strategic intel-
ligence that had been obtained by the Soviets was ignored by Sta-
lin. The Soviets apparently had an agent in the Finnish military
headquarters and reconnaissance teams had been sent in to explore
the Mannerheim line itself. The evidence was ignored, however,
the data locked in safes, and men with the access were killed
during the purges. The Russians made repeated statements that the
Winter War stupid and an embarrassment.
During the bus ride, the Taiwanese tour participants exhib-
ited extraordinary interest in my recent research paper on Ameri-
ca's new regionally-focused defense strategy. I gave one of them
an interview with the standard disclaimer. The first of these
identified himself as Tai Wan-chin, director of Institute of
Russian and Slavic Studies, Tamkang University, Taipei. The
second identified himself as Cheng Ching-Jung, reporter for China
Times Express . I was told by the senior U.S. Air Force tour
participant later that the Taiwanese were openly pumping every-
one. I concurred and warned all the students to be on guard. At
Vyborg we saw a KGB STENKA go out to sea. The bus passed through
a tank training area. We saw no obvious defensive preparations in
this border area. While on the bus tour, we noticed that statues
of Lenin still were in all the outlying towns and that fresh cut
flowers lay at the base of each.
I believe it was on this trip that the students reported to
me that they had been "interrogated" by one of the U.S. tour
participants. The students reported that he asked them very
detailed questions about who we were and who I was and he record-
ed the information in a journal. This subject of this journal
was subsequently mentioned by me to John Sloan but he said that
he had no knowledge of what this individual was doing. I encour-
aged the students to not contribute to this individual's efforts
since I was not sure for what purpose they were ongoing.
LTC John Sloan became involved with a hotel hallway theft
from an American citizen non-tour member. LT Scott Stanley con-
cludes that this was the same man who robbed him in his hotel
room. Much activity with militia and no obvious resolution of
the incident since the perpetrator claimed he was the son of a
militia general officer. I held a meeting of all the participants
from our school and decided to inform CPT Evelyn Conlon, USAF,
our school's female tour participants, that no one appeared able
to guarantee her safety. Additional discussions held with most
senior tour participants and consensus decision to file a formal
complaint with Consulate. I volunteered to go since with an
official passport, I could argue that the lack of safety in our
hotel was interfering with an official mission of the U.S. gov-





7 July (Tuesday) : St. Petersburg
I was asked by Vladimir Snitkovsky if wanted to discuss
naval modeling. I responded with a list of individuals from the
shipyard that I would also like to meet with. One of the indi-
viduals had apparently designed the TYPHOON submarine. The list
had been given to me by a friend in Washington, D.C. and included
people that he would meet with later in the Fall. Snitkovsky
agreed to try to arrange for this.
I went to American Consulate in St. Petersburg to report
crimes. Spoke to Bradford H. Johnson and Gregory P. Hulka, Vice
Consuls, James C. Wellman, Director of Security, and a female
political officer. Consular officials were very helpful. Given
blank forms for reports to be filled out and delivered to Ameri-
can Embassy when we arrived in Moscow. Our translator Max accom-
panied me but was not invited into the consulate. Mr. Wellman
came outside and talked to he and I about the theft and other
crime in city. Mr. Wellman told Max that the tour group should
hire a guard for our group or otherwise do what was necessary to
ensure our safety.
I rejoined the group at the programmed seminar being held
at the Artillery Museum. I took advantage of the opportunity to
openly take notes during the seminar. Most of the seminar was
simply uninteresting old historical reports. A paper was given
on importance of Battle of Midway by Russian who works at the
History Museum of the Peter and Paul Fortress. The author argued
that the Battle of Midway was even more important that the Battle
of Stalingrad. A Captain 2nd Rank, Commanding Officer of the
cruiser AURORA, got terribly upset at this paper and a 15-20
minute debate occurred (in Russian) that was not translated. The
afternoon session was not attended by Russian Navy participants.
LT James Mcllmail, USN, one of our NPS participants, gave
his paper on the recommended future of the Russian Navy. A
reception was held after the seminar and it included active
conversation with two Colonels who were the deputies and our
student participants. Noticed that the reception room had a
picture of Lenin with fresh cut flowers on the table underneath.
Snitkovsky said that he could not arrange my special meeting
and instead set up one with Professor V.I. Nikolaev, director,
research laboratory of the automatization of the designing ship's
power installations, department of ship's power installations,
Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. Unfortunately, no translator
was provided and all we could do was look at each other. Final-
ly, he gave me a proposal written in English (attached to this
enclosure) . I turned it over to the appropriate NPS faculty for




Returning from the seminar, we visited the Nikolaskiy Mari-
time Cathedral. They opened the second floor to us and we were
told that no foreigners had ever been there. We were also told
that this is where high Communist Party officials had been bap-
tized in the past ("You would not believe who has been baptized
here 11 . The second floor included two new plagues dedicated to
loss of two or three submarines. The Taiwan "journalist" took
pictures and said that he will send to me. I told him that I
would send him a copy of a recent technical report of mine in
trade (not received as of yet) . One plague was marble looking
and represented a loss of a submarine in 1989. The crew included
two Captains 1st Rank. The other was black in color and included
two dates (hence my supposition that it was for two submarines
perhaps) and had the number "K-19" on it. The second had the
crew's names without their ranks.
8 July (Wednesday): Day trip to Narva, Estonia and overnight in
Pskov, Russia.
When we woke up, we found that a guard had been posted out-
side of our rooms all night. No incidents occurred overnight. We
then drove to Narva, Estonia. No apparent military build-up on
either side of the border. Learned that the Estonian border
guards are high school student volunteers armed with total of
1,000 submachine guns. The border crossing appears to represent
a desire to establish themselves as independent and subject
Russians to some degree of humiliation by forcing them to show
passports and perhaps to collect a visa fee. The Estonians have
taken down the section of museum at the fortification in Narva
covering the Soviet occupation period.
We got the general impression that they are a happy people
who are better off than the Russians on the other side of the
border. Before going on trip, we did not understand that Narva
was in Estonia and we did not reguest specific clearance for the
2\ hours (or so) that we spent there. We then drove via some ex-
tremely bad roads to Pskov. Learned from Swedes that the new
patrol boat that they sold to the Estonian Navy is for internal
use on Lake Peipus, not for service on the Baltic Sea. The Swedes
are either selling them a new boat or modifying the first one for
internal lake service.
9 July (Thursday) : Day trip outside Pskov to Precherisky Monas-
tery, Russia, drive to Novgorod, Russia, and train to Moscow.
Saw military airfield outside Pskov and learned there was a
Guards Airborne Division in the vicinity. Drove to Novgorod on




people by the Germans during the Great Patriotic War. Novgorod
was totally resettled and rebuilt to a current population of
200,000. We took the night train to Moscow. We posted guards all
night and wired our doors shut. Upon arrival, we learned that the
train staff was told to stay up all night and look after us. We
concluded that this was done due to my visit to the consulate and
obvious concern for the group's safety.
10 July (Friday) : Moscow and day trip to Monino.
Arrived and met by Military Historical Institute staff
Colonels Vitaliy Bogdanov (speaks superb English) and Slava
Terekhov and Senior Lieutenant or Captain Aleksandr Fedoseyev
(speaks fair English) . Learned that ASK Tours had bought the
truck used to transport our baggage from someone in the military
for two bottles of vodka. Introduced to two young translators,
Anatoliy Kamyshnikov and Nikolay Zubchuck and told that they were
cadets in what was a parallel to our Defense Language Institute
(DLI) . I asked if that meant they were in the Army and they said
yes. I asked if that meant they were GRU and they said, not yet,
that this would be a choice once they graduated. Our students
dubbed them "GRUlets" and openly referred to them as this
throughout the Moscow and outlying area portion of the trip.
Taken to Air Force Museum at Monino. Security was much
tighter here than anywhere else. Nice briefing and lots of good
history. Asked about Korean war involvement since that was
missing from the display. I was told that a book was coming out
on this episode. Obtained Russian photographs of the aircraft on
display. We were told by Colonel Bogdanov that 3 pictures al-
lowed per person. Then he winked and said that maybe we could
take 4 or 5. Learned that the Russians produced 10 civilian and
10 military copies of an SST like plane that our U.S. Air Force
tour attendees stated they never knew went into serial produc-
tion, let alone that there was a military version. Many pro-
totypes and aircraft that never worked. Noted that the Tu-4 was
"designed" by them. Wartime women in biplanes as a honored
exhibit. Naval aircraft were present and included in the history
of aviation. Presented NPS plaque at the end of the tour. The
civilian director wanted me to take a copy of his book on the
museum. I told him to send it to me after he had it translated
into English. Senior Lieutenant Fedoseyev said that he could do
this. Nothing has yet arrived.
Enroute to our hotel, Senior Lieutenant Fedoseyev "sneered"
at the Russian White House, as the seat of Russian democracy.
Learned that he is a former airborne officer, now general type,
and former enlisted man with 10 years service. He said that he
is not vulnerable to the forthcoming cuts in the military since




Tried to discuss with him the implications of additional cuts in
the U.S. armed forces but he did not appear to be interested.
In the afternoon, a delegation from the tour visited the
Military History Institute. Colonel Bogdanov took us to the
office of the department head for foreign military history,
Captain 1st Rank and Professor Valery N. Vartanov. We learned
that Captain Vartanov did his thesis on Battle of Khalkin Gol
(there was a big map of the battle on his wall behind his desk)
.
Vartanov' s sole job appeared to be to organize us and to take us
to the General-Major who commands the institute. Learned from
someone that the commander is also the editor-in-chief of the
General Staff journal Voyennaya Mysl.
Our meeting was essentially non-productive. All we were
told is how wonderful it was going to be. When LTC John Sloan
tried to press about when we would get into substantive discus-
sions, we were again told how wonderful it was going to be and
not to forget that the Institute was a part of the Ministry of
Defense. We were told that any further research would have to be
approved once we had presented them with written copies of our
papers. Since I was the only one from NPS at this meeting, I
provided them with copies of my forthcoming technical report on
the Soviet/Russian views of the lessons learned of the Persian
Gulf war and a draft of my work to date on emerging Russian
military doctrine and strategy. I told the general that my
students and I would like to talk about those issues and not
history.
11 July (Saturday) : Moscow.
Morning visit to monasteries modified by Harriet Scott so
that we could visit a cemetery with famous individuals from
Russian and Soviet history. Most students and I joined her.
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov had big
modern monument with his full rank. I was under the impression
that he had been demoted and retired at a lesser rank. We were
told that the monument is original and not replacement due to his
rehabilitation. This means that when he was buried, he was
allowed to use his full rank or that it was restored. Saw grave
of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgeivich
Gorshkov. No marker yet. Told that it is being built and it
will be grander than that of Admiral Kuznetzov. Told that Mar-
shal of the Soviet Union Sergey F. Akhromeyev was not buried
there.
Met with Assistant Naval Attache, LCDR Jeff Kuipers, USN.
Asked him if he wanted to present a NPS plaque for us to the
cruiser AURORA. He said that he did and that he would do so. I
gave him the plaque. Briefed Jeff on the incident at St. Peters-




Afternoon window tour of Moscow and walking tour of Red
Square. Anything is for sale on the streets. Visit to the
Central Museum of the Armed Forces. Again the focus is on tech-
nology and how individuals have led the Soviet and Russian armed
forces to greatness, not on the greatness of the Russian people
or individual fighting man. Interesting model of a ballistic
missile and its silo. Presented the director an NPS plaque and
thanked him on behalf of the school. He appeared surprised that
I gave him the plaque and he went in back and came out with small
pins from the museum that he presented to everyone on the tour.
Attempted discussions with Colonel Bogdanov and Senior
Lieutenant Fedoseyev and was told that I must go tomorrow with
Frunze Academy faculty for such substantive discussions. Tried
again by asking their personal views and was told that we can
arrange private discussions for the following Monday or Tuesday.
These private discussions were never held. I told Fedoseyev that
I would be willing to accept the book by the aviation museum head
even if it was in Russian since a publisher might be willing to
translate it. They said they would attempt to get it for me.
They never did get it and never again brought up the subject.
12 July (Sunday) : Moscow and day trip to Tula.
Morning bus ride to Tula included a three-hour discussion
with Colonel Vitaliy Leonov, and instructor from the Frunze
Ground Forces Academy. Vitaliy spoke excellent English and said
that he was assigned to the Department of Military History. His
subjects included teaching about mostly local war but also global
war. Another instructor, Colonel Yuriy Pavlovich Babich, kept to
himself and did not engage me in conversation but did spend a
substantial amount of time with CPT Jim Jaworski. See Enclosure
(5) for notes of my substantive conversation with Vitaliy.
The Taiwanese "academic" Tai Wan-Chin entered the conversa-
tion towards the end of the trip (I suspect that he had been
listening and perhaps even taping our conversation) by pumping
Vitaliy for details. Tai Wan-Chin's efforts were embarrassing.
Vitaliy told me that he was going to have to report our conversa-
tion. I told him, "naturally," and I gave him my card. I sug-
gested that next Frunze instructor assigned to our group should
spend some time with me talking about our military doctrine and
strategy. I then gave him a copy of the National Military Stra-
tegy of the United States. He did not appear to be familiar with
it and thanked me. I also gave him a copy of a recent technical
report dealing with America's new regionally-focused defense
doctrine and strategy.
Vitaliy is an infantry officer. He has a wife and two chil-




the new Russian Minister of Defense, General-Colonel Pavel Ser-
geyevich Grachev, then a major. Vitaliy also served previously as
an Assistant Military Attache to India and in Germany in early
1970s. One of his sons is studying at civilian academy of aero-
space and another just entered higher military school. His wife
does not work but will return to work soon and again teach
school. Vitaliy is retiring in one month and has no plans. We
discussed Russia's veteran's retraining programs (essentially
nonexistent). I gave him examples of how we do it. Vitaliy
stressed that he was acting as our host for this portion of the
trip in capacity as military historical society member and not as
service officer. I presented him with an NPS plaque to be dis-
played at the Frunze Academy and thanked them for their contribu-
tions to our knowledge of history.
13 July (Monday) : Moscow.
At breakfast, Swedish LTC Bojerud expressed surprise that
Vitaliy had expressed no apparent interest in my offer to discuss
new regional defense strategy. He must have learned this from the
retired general who was there at the time. Tai Wan-Chin joined
our conversation and tried to find out more information about our
new strategy. LTC Bojerud expressed an interest in the number of
troops and America's POMCUS commitment in Europe. Russian Colonel
Bogdanov came to our table and reported that all our research
topics presented to his general at the Military History Institute
had been approved. I did not go with the tour group during the
morning since I had set up my own meeting with a researcher at
the U.S.A. and Canada Institute. I had met this researcher in
Monterey last year and have corresponded with him since then. We
had arranged this meeting by telephone a few days earlier. See
report of this visit contained in Enclosure (5)
.
After my meeting at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, I went
to the Military History Institute. Upon arrival at the Military
History Institute, I was asked to wait in the office of Captain
Vartanov. In the office was an editor and feature writer for the
Russian military journal Sovetskiy Voin who said they were there
to cover our seminar. Upon the arrival of the rest of the group,
we were ushered into a hall with displays of the great history of
the institute. I saw a map of the Great Patriotic War (now to be
renamed the 2nd Great Patriotic War with the 1st being the de-
fense against Napoleon) and pointed out actions in the Baltic to
our Swedish colleagues. They knew every action and said that
some of the Soviet claims of sinkings were bogus. The Swedes
thanked me for pointing out the map to them.
After a brief welcome talk in the hall, the director took us
into an auditorium for a more formal welcome in the company of
some 100 personnel. I sat on the stage and presented the direc-




exchange of views. I also gave him a copy of the National Mili-
tary Strategy of the United States and a recent technical report
discussing our new regionally-focused defense strategy and told
the audience that these were the benefits of open exchanges of
views.
We then split into three groups with all of us going into
the group that would look at modern issues. The students were
later told that the Russians did not want to form this third
group but did so after I kept insisting on dealing with more
modern issues. The other two groups dealt with the medieval
Russian and American (sic) period and the era of the Great Patri-
otic War. Our group was headed by Captain 1st Rank Vyacheslav P.
Zimonin, Ph.D. and Vice-chief of the Institute. In the audience
were 2 retired General-Colonels (also Professor/Doctors) , 1
retired colonel who spoke excellent English, 3 active colonels
including the editor of the Military Encyclopedia , 1 lieutenant
colonel, 1 major, and 2 civilians. See report of this seminar
contained in Enclosure (5)
.
Captain Zimonin came to me at the end of the seminar and
said that, I know you have questions and he introduced me to
General-Major Anatoliy G. Har'koff, Professor and Doctor, Deputy
Chief of the Institute. I apparently was to be seated with him
at dinner. I asked if I could instead sit with Major Victor M.
Gobarev, Ph.D. and President of the Council of Young Researchers
and was told Gobarev was not invited. I then asked him when I was
going to discuss substance with anyone from the Institute. I
quickly suggested the next morning and it was approved on the
spot. My boldness appeared to catch them off guard but I made it
clear that it had not yet been "wonderful" as promised by the
general who directed the institute and that we had given in
papers for prior approval in good faith. I then told Gobarev he
should come to the dinner so that we could talk a little and he
got an invitation but I was still seated with the general and
never got the opportunity.
Dinner was pleasant and I made a short speech with a toast
to peace, security, prosperity, and above all freedom. The
general deputy director and I talked and I learned that he was
not familiar with the term strategic culture. I gave him a short
course. The general was concerned with whether Russian vodka was
accepted as a drink of distinction amongst American society. I
told him it did not cost very much. I was extremely impressed
with their concern over participants in World War II so that they
could be honored with a toast as well as the lengths to which the
generals let a very old retired Captain 1st Rank, Igor Amosov,
who had fought in the war, go in making a similar and extremely
emotional speech and toast. Amosov' s toast was quite touching
and probably taught us more about the depth of feeling about the




14 July (Tuesday) : Moscow.
I took a group of students and returned to the Military
History Institute to meet with General Har'koff. The meeting was
cordial and the general was most forthcoming. We met in his
office and there was no indication that he was afraid to discuss
any issue even in the presence of the "GRUlet" translator. I
openly took notes at this seminar but tried to not write down
everything so that I could concentrate on getting into the gener-
al's mind. See Enclosure (5) for report on this meeting.
We then got rid of the "GRUlet 11 translator and went unaccom-
panied to a special seminar with students at IMEMO authorized by
Dr. Aleksey G. Arbatov, head of the department on disarmament. I
had met with Aleksey in Monterey two weeks before I went on this
trip and he had sent me a letter outlining who to call. When I
called Gennady K. Lednev, a senior researcher in the department,
he appeared to be expecting my call. In attendance was Gennady,
who came in off leave, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Nikolay Pavlovich
Markov and two others who did not introduce themselves. One of
these may have been named Sasha since he gave me a copy of a
journal to give to Professor William Potter at the Monterey
Institute for International Studies (MIIS) . The journal copy
said something like "regards, Sasha." Since I was talking ini-
tially, I opened a folder containing my briefing notes and I took
advantage of the opportunity to write down their questions and
other remarks. They also openly took notes. See Enclosure (5)
for a report of this meeting.
15 July (Wednesday) : Bus ride to Smolensk.
Bus ride to Smolensk included participation by two instruc-
tors from the Frunze Academy. One was LTC Viktor I. Kuznetsov
and the other was LTC Oleg Orekhov. Both have candidate degrees,
and neither initially appeared to speak English. While on the
bus trip, they gave a narration on how their academy trains
officers, conducts field exercises, and did so in the past. It
sounded much like what happens at our command and general staff
colleges. They invited us to attend the academy as students and
gave instructions on how to apply. While on the bus, I was sent
back a recent copy of Pravda which had the article on the organi-
zational development of the armed forces of the CIS and Russia.
This article by Shaposhnikov had been mentioned on the trip to
Tula by Colonel Vitaliy Leonov and apparently provided to me by
him through these new instructors.
We went via the armor museum in Kubinka which is not open to
Russian citizens. Had almost a full division worth of foreign
and domestic armor - 380 vehicles, none of which looked like they




there were differences in opinion between U.S. Army officers in
the group whether there was a T-80 on display that had been re-
labeled incorrectly. The most modern tank that I saw was a T-72
with reactive armor. What struck me, however, was that unlike
other museums, none of the land equipment was for naval forces
and no naval personnel appeared present. There were some armored
patrol boats in a rear grassy area but these were not restored
for display. Retired Swedish Major General Claes Skoglund at-
tempted to correct some of the displays of Swedish-designed
equipment, but the retired Russian colonel conducting our group
appeared ill at ease with making any changes to the approved
displays. From what I could learn, the Swedish general was
correct. U.S. Army officers in our group were told that they
would not take pictures but when the guides were not around (we
had the freedom to walk around) there was nothing to prevent the
taking of pictures.
Museum is commanded by a major of armor, Mikhail Chobitok.
The total staff is only seven individuals. Chobitok was willing
to sell uniforms off his back at very inflated prices. A team of
workers arrived while we were there and they brought in a truck
worth of World War II-era battlefield debris; i.e. stacks of
German helmets, badges, medals, etc. Was this deliberate or are
they still digging up the past?
After dinner, had social gathering with the two Frunze
Academy officers. Viktor made a conscious and overt effort to
meet with me and monopolize my conversation. He wanted to know
how much I made and how much I had to spend for housing. We dis-
cussed my personal life to some degree and what types of aircraft
I had flown. He is married to a women that he met in Novosibirsk
(mid-Siberia) and has served in the air forces, rocket forces,
and ground forces. He also did not drink very much and finally
stopped drinking altogether. I concluded that he was GRU since
why else would he have served with so many armed services?
Viktor was not subtle and he was loud.
Viktor wanted to engage in a substantive discussion. He
opened with a question about how America will view the military
might of Russia now that there has been a break-up of the former
USSR. I replied: (1) that this is what we were here to learn,
(2) that it would depend upon how the CFE Treaty was implemented,
and (3) that of course Russia would be viewed as a considerable
military power. He kept interrupting me and clearly wanted to
engage in a substantive discussion.
Viktor asked me if I would be willing to discuss American
military doctrine and strategy if it was not secret. This was
what I had suggested to Colonel Vitaliy Leonov on the trip to
Tula. I made sure that he understood exactly what I was willing
to talk about and then I agreed to do so the next day if he would
be willing to discuss the same to my students. We agreed to have




16 July (Thursday) : Smolensk.
Toured the Museum of the Armed Forces and the Great Patriot-
ic War. MiG-23 aircraft in rear with steps to look inside cock-
pit. Bust of Stalin inside may be the first and only one that we
have seen on the trip. Guide made sure that we knew that during
the Great Patriotic War, Stalin had never actually visited the
front; he had, however, visited near the front northeast of
Smolensk. Had meting with students to try to decide what we had
not seen. First was a lot of military aircraft in the skies.
Second was any political posters. Third was pregnant women. We
then tried to ascertain what we had seen that surprised us. First
was the number of statues of Lenin and their decoration with
fresh flowers. Second was the absence of freedom.
Evening staff car tour of defensive operation at Smolensk.
Covered the advance of the German Army on same day 51 years ago.
A very interesting experience that will help me better understand
land warfare when I teach it. Retired Swedish General Skoglund
appeared very knowledgeable about the matter. I later learned
from him that a Swedish exchange officer had been serving with
the Germans during this battle. Upon my return, I found no one
that knew that the Swedes had exchange officers with the Germans
during combat operations in World War II. The Swedes have appar-
ently published a great deal about this but very few people in
the U.S. reads Swedish. Skoglund is a former chief of staff for
the Swedish Army.
Evening seminar with students and Viktor via Dmitriy, the
tour translator. I was surprised that he was the one selected
since I had asked one of the "GRUlets" to come and translate. I
think it was at this time that one of them told our students
outside of the seminar room that Dmitriy was KGB. Viktor also
had brought in a woman from Smolensk, a director for one of the
museum displays that our group had visited this morning. I was
introduced to her and she appeared to speak no English. I told
Viktor that she should go next door where there were a number of
single young men who would enjoy practicing their Russian.
Viktor said that she would stay. I decided that she was either
his mistress or a Russian intelligence operative who was getting
a demonstration of English. I made sure that no American was in
the seminar room with Viktor and the others without at least one
other American.
See Enclosure (5) for a report on this seminar. The evening
ended with Viktor and Oleg remaining in the room with the female
from Smolensk. I heard them lock their door and she emerged with
them in the morning. She was very good looking and we were given
no explanations. Most of the tour group noticed that she appar-




17 July (Friday) : Bus ride to Zagorsk.
Two students told me that they were going to take the train
to Zagorsk instead of riding the bus. We had all talked about
this the previous day and I did not have a problem with it. John
Sloan and a number of the Russian tour guides had all heard us
discuss it and had not objected. The bus ride was going to be
very uncomfortable and I told the tour directors that I had
considered it myself. When the bus went to leave, the Russians
got very upset that the students had left. We were told that the
tour guides were "responsible" for us. I defused the situation
by telling them to simply go the train station and pick them up.
We did and I asked Sloan how we needed to obtain permission to
deviate from the scheduled plan. I was told that we simply
needed to apply ahead of time. This was not what we had done in
the past and was not what I had confirmed in writing to Sloan
before we left on the tour. I showed Sloan the written confirma-
tion I had sent him and reminded him that he had read it and said
yes that we could deviate. Sloan did not back me up, however,
during this incident and kept saying that he had never said that
we could deviate from the programmed tour.
The students then asked Sloan if instead of traveling to
Vladimir and Rostov in a few days, they could they return to
Moscow where they would stay with a family arranged by Professor
Roman Laba, an NPS faculty member staying in Moscow to perform
research. Sloan appeared to say that he would make this formal
request. It also became obvious that the Russian tour director
and Sloan were of the opinion that some of the students had
already spent the night in Moscow with this family. I tried to
correct this misapprehension a number of times but it was obvious
that this was what they believed and they would not change their
opinion.
The bus trip all day to Zagorsk was tense. The Frunze
instructors continued briefing on defensive military operations
in vicinity of Smolensk. When I attempted to reengage Colonel
Oleg Orekhov on the subject of Henry Trofimenko, he said that he
didn't know what I was talking about. I left him alone. While
at a stop, Dmitriy engaged me in a conversation while we were
alone and behind the bus. He began to talk to me about further
incidents and our safety. In the presence of Colonel Kuznetsov,
Dmitriy gave me an explicit warning that any further modifica-
tions of the itinerary would lead to an "incident" that would be
photographed and reported in the press and would not be to the
liking of the U.S. or Russian governments. Kuznetsov appeared to
agree with what Dmitriy was saying although he supposedly did not
speak English. Dmitriy specifically warned me that the incident




I met with our students and told them to double all precau-
tions and withdraw all requests for modifications of the pro-
grammed itinerary. We discussed possible translation problems
and I concluded that I had indeed been given a direct warning.
For additional details, see Enclosure (6) .
»
Upon our arrival in Zagorsk, we were met by Colonels Bogda-
nov and Terekhov and Captain Vartanov who provided some of the
tour group with copies of papers and books that they had request-
ed. We did not see them later and I do not think that they spent
the night.
18 July (Saturday) : Zagorsk.
Day tour of local fortifications. I had a private two-hour
discussion with a new Frunze instructor, Colonel Petr Fyodorovich
Vashchenko. There was another instructor, a retired colonel in
civilian clothes. Petr is an infantry officer and a former regi-
mental commander in Afghanistan. He later told one of the stud-
ents that he was the chairman of the department of the History of
Military Art. Instead of viewing a religious procession, we held
a discussion focused on how to teach military history and mili-
tary art. One of the "GRUlets" translated. See Enclosure (5) for
a report of this substantive discussion.
Petr held an afternoon seminar with the students, retired
U.S. Army Colonel and Dr. Edward Bruner, Lars Ulfving, and the
retired Swedish General Skoglund. I did not stay for all of this
session. Most of the session again dealt with the reforms of the
1920's. By now we all realized that this was the appropriate
historical surrogate for discussion of today. Petr also dis-
cussed with the students how the Soviets had not learned the
proper lessons of the Spanish civil war. When I returned, the
Swedish general was asking questions about independent airborne
operatsii . Petr told him a few times that these were simply not
planned for and that independent airborne combat actions would
only be taken at the tactical-level of warfare. The Swedish
general kept up with this theme in many other sessions.
During a routine dinner, an apparent drunk physically accos-
ted LTC Dianne Smith, USA, causing an immediate reaction by the
twenty (or so) tour participants at our table. The perpetrator
left voluntarily but under the escort of some hotel employees.
We though the incident had passed but then the apparent drunk
returned into restaurant. He made threatening gestures to the
entire group but none of us reacted. He was escorted out again
by hotel employees and the militia but again returned. This time
he appeared to bump up against the individual who sat at the end




Perpetrator threatened Jim and appeared to pull something
out of his pocket. We later learned from Jim that it was a knife.
Most of the rest of the table stood up and gathered around Jim
for protection. No one made any threatening gestures nor said
anything provocative. At one point one of our tour participants,
Mr. Vladimir Poltoratzky, self-identified as a U.S. Army intel-
ligence civil service employee, who is quite large, Slavic, and
speaks fluent Russian, went over to the apparent drunk, shook his
hand, and looked like he was trying to calm down the situation.
The Russian tour group leadership made no effort to handle
the situation. Mr. Valeriy Kudashkin and the one woman in charge
of this portion of the tour were at our table but did nothing to
participate. John Sloan came in from another room and attempted
to take charge and get the hotel staff or militia to eject the
perpetrator for good. Our tour translators refused to get in-
volved or even translate the reports of the incident into Rus-
sian. The "GRUlets" were no where to be seen. Hotel staff made
one more attempt to contain the situation and then disappeared.
Initial militia attempt appeared serious but the perpetrator
returned anyway. Militia finally came back in with a force of
around six men including one in beret. John Sloan again took
charge to have this individual ejected and charged with a crime.
John told the militia that incident would be reported to the
embassy with a recommendation to place the establishment "off-
limits." John appeared to be quite serious in his efforts to
handle the situation.
John Sloan returned and said that he was going to file a
report with the militia and wanted a witness. Jim Jaworski was
the obvious candidate and he went off with the group. After
twenty minutes or so, Jim returned saying that he had never left
the hotel and that the militia wanted to release the individual
since he was mafia. John came back in and said that we was going
to insist that charges be filed. Jim Jaworski came back from the
militia station and told us that no charges looked like they were
going to be filed. He also said that there were three "friends"
of the perpetrator who were waiting outside of the hotel and then
had gone to the militia station as well. John Sloan finally also
returned but could not tell us what was going on.
I discussed the situation with all of the students, some of
the more senior retired military in the group, and with John
Sloan. General consensus from students that they were afraid for
their safety and they did not consider staying in Russia as worth
the price we were having to pay. I agreed and decided that it
did not matter if the incident was a set up by the KGB or the
case of a mafia drunk out of control. John indicated that he was
considering canceling the entire tour. I told him that I was
calling the Assistant Naval Attache to ask for guidance and I




I talked to Assistant Naval Attache LCDR Jeff Kuipers and
told him what the situation was. I asked Jeff for his recom-
mendation on our course of action and he recommended that we
leave Russia. I agreed and asked him to repeat it to John Sloan
who was there. John could not hear Jeff and the message was
relayed via one of the students. I got on the phone again with
Jeff and started to tell him where we were going and how to reach
us in each city. When I tried to be more specific, the line went
dead.
I asked tour group leader Maxim if it were actually possible
to go to Moscow airport tomorrow and physically leave Russia. I
was told yes that this was possible. I therefore notified Max
that I wished to withdraw my group from the trip due to the lack
of physical safety. I was told that this would be possible. His
wife, Natasha, another tour director, came and asked me again why
we were leaving and I said because the tour group, nor the hotel,
nor the militia could guarantee the safety of our group. She
agreed that this was true but asked me again why that meant we
wanted to leave and thereby cause her to fill out much paperwork
with her government.
I told Natasha that she should ask Dmitriy what had been
said to me the day before. Since she did not appear to under-
stand (she had not been on that portion of the trip) , I told her
that Dmitriy had warned me about incidents involving our group
and that we had seen that warning demonstrated tonight. She
immediately terminated the conversation and walked away to a seat
all by herself and sat down. I then saw her go over to Dmitriy,
who had suddenly appeared on the scene, and talk to him. Dmitriy
registered no facial reaction to whatever she said and when they
were done talking, Natasha went over to a corner and sat down by
herself and looked rather upset. She made no further effort to
speak with me. Max and I discussed further the plans to obtain
new airline tickets and I told him to have someone make reserva-
tions on the first planes out of Moscow which would get us start-
ed on our return to Monterey. He agreed to do this and told me
that his wife was going to the airport the next morning.
I went to the room of one of the group who was leaving to
return to the U.S. and was being taken to the airport by Natasha
the next morning. I asked him to call the Department of National
Security Affairs at NPS and sketch out what had happened to our
group and that we would be returning early. My intent was to
ensure that NPS would know that we were leaving early but that
they would not have to do anything but approve any telephone
requests from airlines to change our airline tickets. He agreed
to call NPS on Monday morning and apparently he did. This indi-
vidual also agreed to take a computer disk back to the U.S. as a
backup and that I would call him upon my return with instructions
to mail it to me if our disks here were confiscated. I assured
him that there was no classified material on the disk and that I




19 July (Sunday) : Vladimir.
Swedish LTC Bojerud told me that his group was also very
considering pulling out of the tour and wanted to know what was
happening with us. I briefed him on the situation. I was then
told by the Russian tour company directors that I would be impos-
sible to go to the airport until we had tickets in our hand. I
replied that we had tickets and we would take care of exchanging
them ourselves if they would simply take us to the airport. I
was then told that they had already checked (Natasha had gone to
the airport) and there were no reservations available until after
we were going to leave Russia anyway by train. The situation was
obviously that we now were being told that we could not leave the
country except via the scheduled tour route. I concluded that we
were being held against our will and were essentially prisoners
of the tour company.
Talked to students and was told by some that they were
afraid for their safety and they wanted to leave. All agreed to
abide by my decision. During a bus stop, I met with and struck
"deal" with Dmitriy, the Russian tour leader responsible for that
portion of the trip, and John Sloan to withdraw our request to
leave and to remain with tour if Dmitriy (I pointed my finger
directly at him) would ensure that there were no further incid-
ents. Dmitriy agreed.
The bus then reloaded and I was taken to a telephone within
five minutes (we were in the middle of nowhere) where connection
made with our Assistant Naval Attache, LCDR Jeff Kuipers. I told
Jeff about the "deal" with Dmitriy and that we were no longer
going to seek an early departure. He asked me to file a report
with the regional security officer and I said that I would.
Asked Jeff to contact NPS Department of National Security Affairs
and let them know what was going on and that we could not get out
of the country early. Jeff said he would FAX NPS a short memo
which he apparently did. Jeff then asked me when we were return-
ing to Moscow so that we could be met at the train station.
Before I could complete the reply, the line went dead. Max was
outside of the room listening to my entire conversation.
I was soon notified by CPT Jim Jaworski that the militia
had never bothered to take his statement last night. John Sloan
and I discussed this and we both agreed that neither of us knew
what was going on but that the new compromise solution would
probably work.
We continued on our all day bus trip to Vladimir. Toured a
museum of the Russian fleet located near the lake where Peter the
Great sailed when a young man. Saw working models of WHISKEY




ordnance at this museum. No opportunity to discuss substance with
two new Frunze Academy instructors who rode the bus but departed
before we got to the hotel.
20 July (Monday) : Bus ride to Rostov.
Bus tour of countryside north and northeast of Moscow with
two new Frunze instructors. These later were most likely identi-
fied as LTCs Yuriy Gordyeiv and Anatoliy Myzdrikov. There was no
opportunity for a substantive discussion and they left us midday
without any fanfare. Upon our arrival in Rostov, I went up to
the two new Frunze Academy instructors, Colonel Valentine Alek-
sandrovich Runov (looks very much like Bill Clinton) and LTC
Pavel Dmitriovich Alekseyev, who were waiting on the steps of the
hotel and asked if they could meet with me and a few of the
students. They agreed and a special seminar was held.
Details of this seminar are contained in Enclosure (5).
Additional comments are made in Enclosure (6)
.
21 July (Tuesday) : Bus ride to Moscow and train to Kiev.
The Frunze instructors accompanied us on tour of Rostov
area. No substantive discussions or follow-up from the previous
evening. Again told by Swedish LTC Bojerud that they would leave
the tour also if there was any way to actually do so. I con-
firmed that we had withdrawn our request to depart early. While
at dinner in Zagorskand later in Moscow, I gave copies of my
computer disk to others from the group who were leaving early.
Somewhere and sometime during the last few days, I had a
discussion with the "GRUlets" concerning their fate at the end of
training. I learned from them that the old contracts for lan-
guage training did not specify in which nation they would serve
upon graduation. At the end of their training, therefore, each
would have to decide which Army they would enter. One of the
cadets was from the Ukraine and seemed especially proud of this
heritage. He was undecided, however, in which Army he would
serve.
Met at the train station in Moscow by Colonel Oleg Orekhov
who was accompanied by his wife (we were never introduced) . He
asked one student and one translator to find me so that we could
talk. He immediately went into subject of Henry Trofimenko. He
said that Henry was indeed helping them (implying at the Frunze
Academy) to understand America. I replied that Henry was a good
man who understood us. Oleg asked if I knew him personally and
according to CPT Jim Jaworski, who was present, offered to intro-




replied that I knew Trofimenko and that he had provided insight-
ful comments on my forthcoming book. Oleg seemed impressed.
Oleg then asked me to come back to Russia and take a vaca-
tion with him. He added that I should bring my wife and that we
would get a "presidential" dacha. I said that this might actual-
ly be possible since I had been asked to consider working next
Summer with Aleksey Arbatov at IMEMO. Again Oleg seemed im-
pressed. He then started a conversation about how the military
was against rapid military reform and the civilians wanted to
proceed to quickly. Most of this did not get translated well and
I learned of it later from CPT Jaworski. The train was starting
to leave and we said goodbye and departed. I considered Oleg's
discussion most unusual and his offer for a vacation most out of
character.
Uneventful passage to Kiev. We did not post guards this
time since it seemed that the locks on the compartment doors were
safe. I also met a medical research scientist, Sergey, who spoke
fluent English. He assured us that this train was safe. Sergey
said that he had worked in New York for 6 months and had visited
the Asilomar conference center on the Monterey Peninsula.
July 22 (Wednesday) : Kiev, Ukraine.
Met at train station by Vera Novoselova from INCOMART, the
tour agency responsible for this portion of the trip. Also met by
two new translators in civilian clothes. I asked them if they
were cadets like the "GRUlets" from Moscow. They responded that
they had already graduated. I asked them if that meant they were
in the Army and the GRU. They responded, yes, of course, what
did you expect?
Initial tour of the city and selected fortifications. Tour
of the Museum of the Great Patriotic War and visit to exhibits on
public display. Display included SS-20 missile, aircraft, ar-
mored vehicles and boats, and some naval ordnance. Tour was met
by retired General-Major Gavrish. I asked Max if there were any
more modern armored vehicles, such as the T-80. Max said that
there was no T-80.
Our initial impressions of Kiev was that it was very differ-
ent. The streets were clean, the grass cut, and flowers were
being tended. The people seemed happier. Discussion session
held with students to see if anyone agreed with my assessment
that countervalue targeting of Russia would not serve U.S. inter-
ests. Another thought is that since they seem to respect tech-
nology (witness what we were shown at museums and they thoughts
on DESERT STORM) , can we use superior technology as a "club" in
threats to bolster conventional deterrence? Discussion of what




tion with rebuilding as the solution (even a hundred times)
.
Clearly the Russian leaders do not value their people nor cities.
Russia can be run by a handful of people who can control the
media and the military/militia. The people have been trained to
obey and serve. They merely await orders.
Meeting at the Ukrainian Military Air Defense Academy of the
Army named after Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky.
This is not the same as the national air defense troops (Voyska
Protivovozdushnoy Oborony V-PVO) but rather ground forces dedi-
cated to air defense (Voyska Voyskovoy Protovovozdushnoy
Oborony) . Formal welcome by three general officers (waiting
outside for us) . Commander of the academy is a General-Major
B.I. Dukhov (with 40 years of service). His deputy is a Colonel
Somel? Also present is a General-Lieutenant (probably retired)
who has been at the academy for 30 years. He is the senior
instructor and a doctor/professor whose specialty is short and
medium range ballistic missile defense. Retired General-Major
Gavrish was also present.
We were given a handout (attached to this enclosure) about
the academy and then told about it. Point was made that it is
part of the Ukrainian Republic and not a CIS establishment.
Students attend the academy after serving with field forces for 5
years. The program lasts 3 years and is limited to operational
art. The current, and probably future program, is to train
officers for all countries in the CIS and then return them to
their native land for payback service. Admitted that the future
is not very certain. Students are Captains or Majors that are
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel upon graduation.
When responding to questions, commander did not want to get
into the relationship of his troops to the V-PVO. Translator
botched question about relationship to naval infantry and coastal
defense forces but implied that there is no relationship yet
(note subsequently in museum saw evidence of interaction with
naval forces) . Dodged questions about how curriculum had changed
due to new defensive doctrine (said they are only a defensive
force). Question from U.S. Army Major Kristi Crosby (self-
identified as working for military intelligence) about whether
they taught in Ukrainian. The general said that they were not yet
teaching in Ukrainian but this may come later. In response to
another question, he said that he was not willing to discuss
lessons or Persian Gulf war in this audience.
Tour of museum of the academy. Saw some minor displays
indicating that naval forces were included (photographs of exer-
cises) . No U-2 at this museum. I decide to take it upon myself
to offer a special seminar on the new national security strategy.
I attempt to have Dmitriy translate for me but he ignored my
request and takes Max over to an air defense gun and pretends to




I ask one of the other translators to talk to the academy
commander. I tell him although his academy is concerned with
only operational art, certainly he and some of his senior faculty
members have been educated in doctrine and strategy. He concurs
and I then ask if he would like a presentation about the new U.S.
regional defense strategy. He looks at me without answering and
I explain who I am and that I have just written a book on the
subject. He replies that he would very much like to hear what I
have to say. We discuss when and it appears that he is busy the
next day but he quickly offers up his Colonel deputy. I agree to
meet with them the next morning.
Following the initial discussion and agreement for a supple-
mental meeting at the Academy the next day, I notice that the
deputy goes and talks with Max and Dmitriy and then Max and
Dmitriy have a long discussion. I go over to Dmitriy and ask him
to ask the colonel if they would mind if a few of my students
accompany me tomorrow. Dmitriy responds that he thinks they will
be too busy to meet with me tomorrow.
We were then taken into an auditorium and shown a movie
about the Great Patriotic War with emphasis on the Kiev area.
While departing the museum, I walk alongside the colonel and tell
him that I will see him tomorrow. He looks surprised and says
that he was told that I would be busy with the programmed events.
I respond that I will skip those events and would be more than
happy to meet with him if he still wants to meet with me. He
said that he would be very happy to meet with me.
That night we had a banquet with the general officers (one
more two star was added) from the academy. I talked to some of
them outside and asked if they would mind if I brought even more
students. Eventually, I increased the amount to 6 and included
Swedish LTC Bojerud. The retired General-Lieutenant asked me if
I was really only a retired Captain 2nd Rank, clearly I must be a
retired general officer. I replied that in our country it was
not uncommon for individuals of my rank to study doctrine and
strategy. I then introduced him to two students (rank Navy
Lieutenant) and told him that they too would study this subject.
He shook his head and walked away.
During the banquet, a toast was offered to the newly inde-
pendent republic of the Ukraine. The students said that the
commander of the academy did not drink to this. I presented a
plaque from NPS and thanked the generals for their openness and
for the opportunity to meet with the faculty tomorrow. I then
offered a very emotional toast for the veteran's of the Great
Patriotic War and those who had not returned from battle. I was
told that we should not clink our glasses for such a toast since
those who had not returned were not there to drink with us.
After the banquet, one translator came up to me and said that he




John Sloan told me that tomorrow he had set up a meeting
with an advisor to the Ukrainian Minister for Security and that I
was invited to attend. I agreed. Mark Monnahan, the senior U.S.
Air Force attendee on our trip told the Air Force students that
they would not attend this meeting since this was more official
than meeting with academics and it had not been prearranged with
the embassy.
July 23 (Thursday) : Kiev, Ukraine.
At breakfast, I was introduced to Dmitriy I. Vydrin, an
individual who was described by John Sloan as the advisor to the
Ukrainian Minister for Security. This ministry is concerned with
KGB-like activities and not defense, per se. I got his address
and promised to come to his office in the early afternoon. Two
translators showed up (one was new) to escort us. The transla-
tors would not use the taxicabs in front of the hotel and insist-
ed that we go down to the main street where they were cheaper.
The driver got lost going to the academy.
Upon our arrival, we were ushered into the deputy comman-
der's office and we sat at the table. Also present was the re-
tired General-Lieutenant, senior instructor. I introduced every-
one and got ready to begin. The colonel said that although he
had agreed to meet with me, unfortunately, we would not meet
since the Deputy Minister of Defense decided that he wanted to
meet with me instead. We were taken outside by the retired
General-Lieutenant to two cars and I noticed that one of the
translators was leaving. He came to me and said that he had some
new tasking. I told the Air Force students that were accompany-
ing me that it would probably be highly embarrassing for them to
leave and I suggested that they stay with me, despite the concern
of the senior Air Force individual on the trip that his "people"
not get into an "official" meeting. They all agreed.
The remaining translator was Ukrainian (by birth) and spent
the ride telling me how independent they were. I specifically
asked about the loyalty of general officers and he said that they
all had their opportunity to leave and probably could not do so
in the future. The implication was that a line had been drawn in
the sand, similar to West Point at the beginning of the Civil
War, and those who stayed had made their own bed.
A report on the substance of the meeting with the Deputy
Defense Mininster is contained in Enclosure (5) . Following this
meeting, the General-Lieutenant came with us to the gate, and
provided us with a small bus and driver. They took me to the





My last meeting on the tour was at the Center of Political
Innovations with Dr. Leonid S. Tupchiyenko, General Director, and
Dmitriy I. Vydrin, Scientific Supervisor. The latter is appar-
ently the political advisor to the Ukrainian Minister for State
Security (Marchek, the former chief of the KGB) . These individu-
als stated that they were attempting to set up a Ukrainian ver-
sion of RAND. Also at the meeting were a number of other tour
participants, LTC John Sloan, and a German graduate student from
the University of Maryland (studying under Dr. Katherine McArdell
Kelleher)
.
Our discussions included a wide range of subjects, including
how one should design a military educational structure. In
response to my question about coalition defenses for the Ukraine,
I was told that the Ukraine was not interested in any collective
security arrangements that would once again involve their loss of
freedom. Actually I had meant arrangements with the West and
obviously the answer involved Russia. They stated that any
collective arrangements would first involve the Black Sea. They
also denied any interest in ballistic missile defense and stated
that NATO was a better alternative.
After this meeting, I called the U.S. Embassy in Kiev to
report the meeting with the Deputy Defense Minister. I was told
by the ambassador's secretary that the defense attache had yet to
arrive and that the assistant, a chief warrant officer, was out
of the office until next week. I told her to tell him that I had
the meeting and would send him a report of the meeting upon my
return to the U.S. I left my name and telephone numbers.
July 24 (Friday) : Kiev, Ukraine and flight to Frankfurt, Germany.
Departed Kiev airport in early afternoon. No problems
encountered during customs search other than confiscation of two
medals that had been purchased by CPT Jaworski. He was given a
receipt and told that he could have them back when he returned to
Kiev (during the next three years) . I had passed out copies of
my computer disk to every student so that if my computer was
"dropped" during the customs procedure, or confiscated, my notes
would get through. There were no problems.
Upon arrival in Frankfurt, held two impromptu discussions to
consider what we had learned during our trip and whether it had
been worth it.
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The Hilitary Air defence Academy is ruite young academy.
Till 196? the officers with high education for the Army Defence
forces were education in the Artillery Academy, at the commanding
faculty of anti-aircraft artillery.
v>








College of the Army Defence Forces. In 197^ the Academy vranch
was mace on the basis of commanding faculty. And in 1977 this




5j For short term of its existence the Academy v;as transformed
o
q in the leading military training college of the Army Air Defence
o Force?.
O
n. I'-ainly the College authority is determined vy gracuators.
IX
The Academy graduators serve almost in each military unit of
the Air Defence Forces.
They provide high combat readiness, active participation in
the personal combat training, learning of the new combat msteriel,
organization of its technical maintenance.
Eundreds of the Academy graduators were awarded the USEE
orders and medals.
For * years the officers are trained in hasic models of
weapons and automatic control systems, the organization of
the maintenance and combat employment.
The structure of tse officers training includes * integreited
systems :
fundamental theoretical training
v a eic pra^t^cT training
supervised training in duties.
Thi main task of tsi system of fundamental theoretical training
is to form the strong, fundamental knowledge in the sphere of the
social development, military struugl, tactics and minor strategics,
the structure and development of the Army Air Defence armament,
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2.
the means cf its employment and tse methodic basis of the
managment. Approximately *C of the training time is rivrn fcr
thes purpose anc the means of their comvat employment.
The material hasis of this system of training is the new
perspective ( v asic) v/apen systems, larg units anc units of
the Army Air Defence forces eouippec with the letter.
Approximately && of the training time is givn for the purpose.
Approximateli 'Cr of the training time is given for super-
vised training in duties.
The main efforts are concentraited in creaiting the offi-
cers scills and abilitis to control units £s in peace as well as
in war time.
This structure of the training system provides the high
cualified specialists, and the main distinctive feature of the
specialist shoulr ve the ability to the active study and pro-
viding in practice all progressive matters in the military affeirs
sciens, education of the personal.
Such specialist must comvine the v.lde and deep training
on the whole complex of theoretical anc practical disciplines with
the ability to selffinding of the new principal desicions cf the
military problems, to understand in the flow of military-technical
and socio-political information.
The active approach is widely used in the training and
education proces in the academy and also the following modem
active methods of the training are used : business games, command
and staff training, discussion, self supervised training, battl
control training, individually plans training, vich giver? the
possibility to intensify the training process, to rise activity
of the officers in the classes.







The academy has modern training fascilities, which car heir
to condact the training process vith the use of latest achievements
of the science and technics, computers, simulators end technical
means of education.
During the short peric of time the Academy "become the leacinc
UJ
2 science center of the Army Air Defence trooos.The bircest scienti-
z
uj fie researches and inventions are put intu modem technics and
>
o
O armaments and influenced greatlv on the armament develorment.
»-
<
o Ad^uncture and doctorature functioning in the Acar'emv became
uj
D the basis for the good developed evetem of the scientific and rede-




c commetees v.-orc on the avarring of scientific degrees cf Doctor and
Candidate of Science.
Total number of the scientists curing the academy lyfe is more
than '% . l\any of them head the faculty collectives in the Academy
and other colleges, succesfuly v.-orc in the scientific and research
institutions.
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Enclosure (5)
Substantive Research Findings
12 July (Sunday) : Discussion on Day Trip to Tula.
Bus ride to/from Tula discussions with Colonel Vitaliy
Leonov, and instructor from the Frunze Ground Forces Academy,
supplementary to materials contained in Enclosure (4). Vitaliy
and I had a detailed discussion of the breakdown of the technical
categories of war and he said local/global was the first order of
distinction. Vitaliy also said that there was no distinction for
nuclear weaponry; war is war and the choice of nuclear or conven-
tional weapons is a secondary or tertiary issue. This coincides
with my own analysis. We continued our discussion to include the
separation of warfare into its three levels. He used examples
right out of the matrices that I had developed for my own class-
room use. I plan to send him my matrices and ask him for com-
ments.
Vitaliy stressed that the concern at the Frunze Academy is
operational art and tactical only. I wanted to expand the dis-
cussion to the strategic-level. Vitaliy said that each service
has its own schools for command and general staff and the first
time the Soviet/Russian military gets together for "combined
arms" education is at General Staff Academy, formerly named for
Voroshilov. He said that the Frunze Academy is getting smaller
but will continue in future including training for foreign offic-
ers. I assumed that his definition of "foreign" included nations
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but I did not ask
him for clarification. Vitaliy said that there were no Navy
officers at the Frunze Academy. This is unusual since at U.S.
command and general staff colleges, all services are generally
represented. I decided to follow-up this theme with additional
instructors.
Vitaliy stated that the teaching method is to have all the
instructors meet as a collective before a new series of classes
and then agree what will be taught. He said that all Frunze
instructors are military officers and none are civilians. When
we were discussing opportunities for him upon retirement, Vitaliy
said that an instructor's academic rank does not stay with them
when they leave the Academy and he did not know of any opportuni-
ties to use his academic experience at a civilian school. He also
said that he could not assign his students reading as homework;
everything needed to be presented in class. This may help to
explain why the curriculum at the Frunze Academy is three years
long. He also said that the Soviet/Russian military did not send
officers to civilian schools for advanced political-military
education. I discussed the advantages of different methods of
education, especially to help them learn about us. This is a




Vitaliy seemed interested in why I retired and now work at same
place as a civilian.
Vitaliy said that the instructors at the Frunze Academy have
no knowledge of Russian military history. Only now are they
being allowed to look at this subject for first time. He made it
clear that history is defined as anything that happened through
yesterday. Hence he felt more comfortable in discussing the
history of the Persian Gulf war, or the history of the Gorbachev
era, etc. , rather than the implications of the war on emerging
doctrine and strategy. The discussions of history, however, were
really implications for today. Regarding the Persian Gulf war,
Vitaliy thought that value of navies had been proven. I dis-
agreed (to get a discussion going) and he seemed surprised but he
did not press me. We then had a discussion of the concept of
official service positions vice official ministry-level or Gener-
al Staff-level views and how one might have to understand that
when reading lessons learned issued by either the U.S. or
Soviet/Russian governments or defense establishments. Vitaliy
seemed to agree that the ground offensive was needed in Operation
DESERT STORM.
I asked Vitaliy about the impact of the demise of any ideo-
logical role for the Russian armed forces. He said that they
already have had an opportunity to revise the curriculum. They
apparently did not add any new materials but allowed for addi-
tional in-depth coverage of what was already specified. We had a
discussion of correlation of forces at the Battles of Kursk and
Stalingrad, and during the Manchurian Operation. We then had a
technical discussion of how to construct equivalent division and
effective equivalent divisions as a classroom exercise.
I decided that our methods were very similar and that Vita-
liy made great pains to use Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) -approved numbers. We then had a discussion about net
assessment as a methodology with these use of equivalent and
effective equivalent divisions as examples. Tanks as other
examples with Vitaliy offering up CFE-approved values for various
tanks relative to others.
We got into a discussion which I later used with virtually
every instructor with whom I talked. It involved how do you
develop specialists about other nations. Vitaliy stated that
this is role of intelligence services. I suggested that line
officers and civilians have major role to play as well. He said
that as an instructor at the Frunze Academy, he was merely given
materials to use in the classroom and could not deviate from that
material. I asked from where the material was obtained and he
replied that the academy is given material by the intelligence
services to use about the U.S. and they did not develop their own
specialists. Vitaliy appeared very knowledgeable about U.S.
military doctrine and strategy and interested in discussing it.




told him that I used it as a textbook as well. I also told him
that I knew Henry and corresponded with him on my research activ-
ities.
Discussion and in-depth analysis of what the term "initia-
tive" means. Vitaliy offered an example of not doing something
that obviously does not need to be done, since it was unexpected-
ly already done by someone else, and instead doing the next logi-
cal thing. He said that war plans are never complete and one must
always be prepared to initiate logical actions. Plans are de-
signed to fleshed out on the field and not followed blindly.
Discussion of responsibility of division-level commanders. Over-
all message is that there are boxes of responsibility and author-
ity and that you can do anything in your box but you cannot
exceed the box.
I discussed with Vitaliy my plans to meet later during our
trip to Moscow with staff from the U.S.A. and Canada Institute
and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO) . We started a discussion about the future organizational
development of the armed forces and he referred me to a recent
article in Pravda by Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) . I said that I did not have it and
he agreed to try to find it and send it with the instructors that
would accompany us to Smolensk. He did this and I have the
article.
We then started a discussion of nuclear issues. Vitaliy
conceded that we all need to reduce nuclear armaments to much
lower levels. I agreed. We discussed the use of the Internation-
al Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance to use
for training. He seemed familiar with it and said that they use
it at the Frunze Academy as well for basic classroom exercises.
From this I learned that his students are not assigned any home-
work at all.
I then opened with a discussion of the report of
Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear war plans for the western theater of
military operations (WTVD) found in the September/October issue
of IISS's journal Survival [refers to article "Offensive defense
in the Warsaw Pact," by Lothar Riihl on pp. 442-450 of that
issue] . Vitaliy got upset with the question and at an ill-timed
stop of the bus for a break, he returned with retired Major
General Claes Skoglund, the tour's Swedish general, who he then




13 July (Monday): Seminars at U.S.A. and Canada Institute and
Military History Institute
Report of seminar held at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute
supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4)
.
Igor Sutyagin, researcher at the Institute for the U.S.A.
and Canada Studies, picked me up at my hotel and escorted me to
the Institute. He presented me with a set of prints of Soviet
uniforms for the students. He was wearing a pin that I gave him
last year in Monterey. Upon arrival at the institute, I was left
alone in his office for one hour while the department had a
meeting to discuss a researcher's dissertation. While in the
room, people would come in, from time to time, and expressed no
surprise that someone that they did not know was sitting there.
A computer had been left on, which I did not touch. I used the
time to read Igor's written comments on a draft of a paper that I
had sent him in May (attached to this enclosure)
.
I was then escorted to departmental meeting and introduced
to Sergey M. Rogov, head of the department on military-political
affairs. I was told to introduce myself and make about a half
hour presentation on America's new regionally-focused defense
doctrine and strategy. I asked Sergey if I should assume that
the audience had read my paper and he said "no." I gave a fif-
teen minute overview of the new strategy and told them that they
could read more about it in my article "The New American National
Security Strategy," in their own journal SSHA: Ekonomika, Politi-
ka, Ideologiya , issue no. 12, 1991, p. 28-43. The audience size
was about twenty, including at least two retired general offic-
ers. The talk was the same that I give at general audiences in
the U.S. and that I gave on the USIA-funded AmPart speaking tour
last January.
I asked them for detailed questions to serve as the focus
for my remarks and I spent another fifteen minutes answering
them. Their questions included: (1) the probable results of the
upcoming U.S. presidential elections, (2) the impact on NATO of
the creation of Western European Union armed forces, (3) the
future of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, (4) the difficulty of conversion
and reconversion of industry, (5) future cooperative security ac-
tions, and (6) how to deal with the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea
Fleet issue. Since I used my notes to give my own talk, I felt
free to write down their questions. I gave diplomatically cor-
rect answers and carefully identified my opinions as my own where
it was warranted.
After the questions and answers session, Igor and I walked
back to his office and then to lunch at the institute buffet.
Along the way to lunch, Igor pressed me about our competitive
strategies initiative and he told me that he was surprised that




assessment since the professor had written a study about the
process. I told him what I knew about competitive strategies.
Lunch cost less than twenty-five cents and the retired
generals also ate there. Igor told me that for one month recently
no one at the institute had been paid due to the lack of money.
Igor asked if I would like to go and see a special air museum
where I could sit in the cockpit of a fighter. I told him that I
was interested but that I did not have the time. Igor told me
that he had been in touch with Rear Admiral Vladimir S. Kryazhev,
Deputy Head of the Naval Directorate, at the Russian General
Staff. I had written the admiral a letter asking for an audience
while I was in Moscow but found it impossible to obtain the
address to write him or deliver a Federal Express package. I had
eventually sent my letter for the admiral to Igor and asked him
to deliver it. The admiral had indeed either received or heard
about my request for a visit and told Igor that he could not see
me since he was on the general staff. I passed this information
on to the U.S. Assistant Naval Attache when I next saw him and
remarked that the U.S. Navy had hosted Kryazhev in Monterey and I
was very disappointed that he could not reciprocate. Jeff seemed
to indicate that the embassy could use this lack of reciprocity
to their advantage.
A similar letter had been sent to Captain 1st Rank Vlasov at
the Main Navy Staff but this too was undeliverable. In that
case, I instructed Federal Express to deliver it to the U.S.
Embassy to the LCDR Jeff Kuipers, the Assistant Naval Attache.
When I spoke to Jeff a few days earlier at our hotel, he indi-
cated that he never received it. When I returned to the U.S.,
Jeff told me that he eventually found it in their office but that
it had never been brought to his attention.
We returned to Igor's office where I discussed the notes
that he gave me with comments on my paper. It was obvious that
even though I am in America, I have access to some better Russian
sources than he does. This was a similar pattern repeated else-
where. There were a number of sources in my endnotes that were
marked by him indicating that he had not yet seen them and would
search for them.
Igor asked me whether the West ever had plans to invade the
Warsaw Treaty states. I said no. I asked him if he was familiar
with the KGB's Operation Ryan, as reported by former KGB General
Oleg Gordievskiy. He said yes and that it was real. I then used
this topic for many additional discussion held with other Rus-
sians as an example of how bad the KGB understood us and how much
improvement was needed in their efforts. Igor and I then had an
in-depth discussion on the subject of military capabilities
versus intentions and why each side had to look first at capabil-
ities before they should look at intentions. Igor wanted to




Kingdom since they had capabilities that could hurt the U.S. I
gave him diplomatically correct answers.
One of Igor's comments was that now retired Marshal of the
Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov had spoken out against relying on
nuclear weapons as early as 1966. He said that he leaned of that
from Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture notes that were not
available to the West. I asked him if I could be provided with a
copy or at least an academic citation. He said that he would
provide this. It has not yet arrived.
We then had an in-depth discussion of the use of nuclear
weapons by the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in the WTVD, as
reported by the IISS journal Survival. Igor's written comments
included an acknowledgement that nuclear operations were to begin
early but would have been limited to the WTVD. I asked him if
the leaks in Survival and in the Soviet press were authoritative
and he said yes.
Igor also said that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) already had a permissive action link (PAL)
system to prevent inadvertent launch. In response to a follow-on
question, he said that the data would have to be received in
digital or analog form (I do not recall which) in order to be
useful, i.e. an alternative scenario that I posed of telephone
receipt of authorization would not be sufficient.
Igor seemed eager to ask me how it would be interpreted in
the West if a variant three defensive military doctrine would be
replaced by variant two. He seemed quite sure that this was the
direction that they were heading. He hinted that the offensive
counterattack might take place with primarily with airpower but
not only with those forces. He said it should not bother us with
buffer states now between Russia and Germany. I told him that we
would obviously be more comfortable with a variant three defense.
We also discussed Soviet nuclear targeting and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin's statement that Russian missiles were no
longer targeting American (and other) cities. According to Igor,
apparently this "shift" did not require actual changes since
cities were not targeted by design, only as an unfortunate conse-
quence. Hence when some in Russia said that nothing has changed
as a result of Yeltsin's actions, they are right.
The final discussions concerned the strategic missions of
the armed forces. Igor strongly suggested that the missions
found in the 1987 book The Navy are not new and that if I looked
at the published Voroshilov Academy lectures from the mid-1970s,
I would see them there as well. I have done so and do not see the
evidence Igor said was there. He added that he always understood





Somewhere in the middle of all of this, I asked Igor about
the pro-Navy articles that had been authored by Andrey A. Ko-
koshin, now Deputy Defense Minister for Russia, and formerly the
Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute. He said that
these articles were either an attempt to buy favor from the Navy
(since Kokoshin had been picked to be the new defense minister)
or the easy way out (it would be easier later to say Russia could
not afford or did not need a large fleet) . Igor repeated that
Kokoshin was supposed to have the job as defense minister and he
added that the military backed him since they wanted a civilian
who could say "no" to Yeltsin. Igor stressed that the military
did not want General-Colonel Grachev since they were afraid that
he would simply do what he was told.
Somewhere else on this trip, someone told me that General
Grachev still thought like a division commander and did not have
what it takes to be the head of the military. Igor seemed to put
down Grachev in the tone of his voice. We also discussed the
possibility of another military coup and Igor expressed the
opinion that this would not happen.
At some point, we discussed the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.
Although neither of us had a solution, Igor lamented that some of
his senior colleges were split internally on this issue. One
side of them wanted to advance the cause of democracy and allow
the Ukraine to take a part of the fleet. The other side of the
same individual was nationalistic and wanted to retain the fleet.
Igor said that a solution was reached and that it will be an-
nounced soon. I suggested on Navy day and he said perhaps. He
also indicated that his own institute had sent a recommendation
to the Supreme Soviet to not make the fleet the major issue but
rather instead concentrate on keeping good relations with the
Ukraine. This was how I had answered the question posed to me
during the seminar. Igor conceded that the issue might really be
over who will sell the fleet.
I asked Igor about the revised ranking of the services and
asked him how that was going. He said that he had been unaware
of this until he read it in my paper. He thanked me for the
information. His attitude was that since nuclear weapons are
settled and going down in numbers, hence the Strategic Rocket
Forces would be ranked lower. No one was arguing over them.
At some point in the discussion, I asked Igor about the
importance of Marshal Shaposhnikov. Igor agreed with my sugges-
tion that Shaposhnikov may not be as important as he was in the
past now that Russia has formed its own armed forces.
Igor was interested in further collaboration. I gave him a
note from Brassey's publishers concerning his idea for a Russian
Jane's using Russian formerly classified material. I told him
that he did not need to go through me. I also specified the




that he work with the materials that I had already sent him; i.e.
the new U.S. national security strategy or lessons learned from
the Persian Gulf war. We agreed to attempt to publish something
both in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and/or Morskoy
Sbornik. I asked him what ever happened to the follow-on to my
article in SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya and he told me
that the editor told him that one article on that subject was
sufficient.
Upon leaving his office, we agreed to stay in touch, I gave
him a key chain from Monterey and a small Navy pin. A number of
times during the day, he had indicated that we might get together
again before I left Moscow but I put him off due to other commit-
ments. We departed his office and went by taxicab to the Military
History Institute. Igor accompanied me so that we could continue
the discussion despite the shortness of time. At no time did
Igor back away from any discussion of issues and he spoke freely
in the cab. Only one in his office did he lower his voice when I
asked about the future of President Yeltsin. When we parted,
Igor said that we could not meet tomorrow since it was his moth-
er's birthday. My assessment of this department of the U.S.A. and
Canada Institute was that it was hungry for materials from the
U.S. since it lacked a budget to buy it for themselves.
Report of seminar held at the Military History Institute
supplementary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4)
.
At the Military History Institute, Captain 1st Rank P.
Zimonin said that we should start and I gave the first presenta-
tion for a little over five minutes. It was an overview of our
new regionally-focused defense doctrine and strategy. I only
covered sources, decision-making, and my conclusions. I then said
that I would like to give them the opportunity to ask me ques-
tions since they could read my paper at their leisure (my recent
technical report had been provided in the main auditorium pre-
viously) . Since this was an open seminar and I needed my notes
to make the presentation, I openly took notes of my own.
The first question was from a civilian who wondered if the
U.S. had finally adopted proper terminology. I replied that we
had not and that I was deliberately using Russian terms so that
they would be translated into proper Russian and the audience
would better understand what I was talking about. He then fol-
lowed with why we didn't use the correct terms. I gave him a
lesson in freedom and democracy and the lack of standardization.
The second question was if we had dropped our competitive
strategies initiative. I suggested that he read our reports from
the Secretary of Defense to the Congress and draw his own conclu-
sions. I also described the office's location in the Pentagon.
I then said that the concept was still in many people's minds
even though there might not be a prestigious office nor a lot of




The third question was if we would revise the AIRLAND battle
and would it now be Air-Land-Sea. I suggested that he look at my
paper on the Soviet/Russian lessons learned from the Persian Gulf
war (provided Friday) and that perhaps we did not agree with
their lessons. He did not follow up.
The fourth question was from Major Victor M. Gobarev, Ph.D.
and President of the Council of Young Researchers. Victor spoke
excellent English and appeared to have a lot to say about what
the Russians were doing at the symposium. He appeared to have
some authority over the translators. Did this mean that he was a
GRU officer? Victor made a conscious effort to flatter me by
referring to my prize-winning article "The Bear's Carrot" which
appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in 1986. He
wanted to know that if it was ideology that held the USSR togeth-
er, what would do that in the future. I replied that the work of
the Military History Institute would be vital since Russia needed
to discover its roots and heritage and this would provide the
basis for national cohesion.
At this point, Captain Zimonin ended the questions. Other
papers were presented but questions were held to the end of the
seminar rather than the end of each paper. After the last Ameri-
can paper was presented, there was a break and only a few of the
Russians returned. The two retired general officers had appar-
ently been delegated the responsibility of a formal reply to our
research. One, General-Colonel and Professor Doctor stated that
the U.S. had only changed the socio-political aspects of doctrine
and not its aggressive military-technical nature. He went on
with a polemical criticism of the U.S. and NATO. There was no
opportunity to reply. The general also gave an explanation as to
why Soviet defense expenditures were so high, to which retired
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) senior executive servant (SES)
Bill Lee stated "nyet." A lively give and take followed.
The other general officer asked questions and was a bit more
subdued but again there was no opportunity to reply. The editor
of the Military Encyclopedia was more civilized and wanted to
know about geographic/horizontal escalation but there was no
opportunity to reply. He also stated that there should be more
joint research. We were informed that we were holding everyone
up for dinner and the session ended. Despite our session being a
bit of a problem for the Russians when we started, it was the





14 July (Tuesday) : Seminars at Military History Institute and
Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
.
Report of seminar at the Military History Institute supple-
mentary to lead-in found in Enclosure (4)
.
Meeting with General-Major Anatoliy G. Har'koff, Professor
and Doctor, Deputy Chief of the Military History Institute. The
general began by introducing himself to the students with a short
biography. The new information that he added was that his thesis
was on combat readiness of the armed forces prior o the Great
Patriotic War. He showed us a book that was the published ver-
sion of his thesis. Har'koff is a member of some commission to
investigate U.S. POWs. Details were taken down by one of our U.S.
Air Force tour attendees.
Har'koff indicated that he was the author of a primary
section of a major textbook that dealt with the reforms of the
1920s. This book is The History of Military Arts: A Textbook for
Military Academies of the Soviet Armed Forces, by B.V. Panov,
V.N. Kiselev, I.I. Kartavtsev, et. al., signed to press October
28, 1984 (JPRS-UMA-85-009-L, March 21, 1985). Har'koff also
showed us copies of other books and articles that he wrote, one
article was in English and had his picture.
I asked General Har'koff whether there was a historical
parallel to a nation that attempted to defend its borders with
light forces backed up by tactical and operational reserves and a
large strategic reserve far in the rear with the possibility of
counterof f ensive operations beyond its own borders with only
airpower. The general replied that it was not too important to
study past parallels and that we should learn more about the new
international security environment and devise military doctrines
and strategies based upon these new realities. I was surprised
at his answer since it did not correspond with past practice of
the use of historical surrogates and indicated his willingness to
do away with the need to couch our discussion in historic terms.
It may have also indicated that the historical surrogate I used
(what I thought was where they were headed) has not been re-
searched, indicating that it is not the direction of future
doctrine.
General Har'koff indicated that my conclusions on the Battle
of Khalkin Gol was correct, Marshal Zhukov won because of his
commitment of strategic reserves at the correct moment. I had
not implied this in my question. Perhaps this was a translation
problem and perhaps there was something he was avoiding?
We then got into a discussion of the importance of studying
the military reforms of 1924-1925 since they were very instruc-
tive for the situation today. He then said that he would answer
my previous question. He described the defensive doctrine of




forces for the strategic reserves. He then said that they will
not necessarily repeat this history but merely use it to select
what worked the best. I noticed that Har'koff used the technique
of initial brief answers to my in-depth questions and then re-
turning to them later with a more substantive answer.
I followed this with a direct question about the size of the
fleet. He indicated that the fleet would stop growing. I asked
for a historical parallel for the future fleet and he indicated
that it might be the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Then he got
excited and told me to look at the 9th Army or Corps (translation
problem) and see that today it would be professional versus
mobilized forces. He indicated that the history of joint warfare
during this period was very instructive today. I am not familiar
with the period that he referred to. I wrote the general a
letter and asked him to clarify what he said.
The general indicated that he was writing a monograph on the
history of the Cold War for the RAND Corporation. I asked him
who he was working with and he got vague saying that he did not
remember the name and that it was somewhere on his desk. Later
he pulled out a Russian newspaper that had a picture of Ben
Lambeth. I asked him if Ben was who he was working with and he
said yes. He said that he did not have a FAX number for RAND and
that he only met with Ben when he came to Moscow for other rea-
sons. I know Ben and will talk to him about Har'koff.
The general hinted a first and then openly solicited for an
invitation to the U.S. I replied that if he were going to the
U.S. anyway, our school might be able to cover the costs of a
visit to Monterey. This needs to me looked into since RAND might
be interested in partially paying his way if he is really working
with them. He said we must ask for him by name and that he can
only come if we pay the total costs.
The general stated that he needed better sources for the new
U.S. military doctrine and national security strategy. I told
him that much of this was already in his country and he needed to
make use of the resources at the civilian academic institutions.
It would take some 4-5 hours to copy all of the source materials
that I have. He asked if I could send him a copy of my book and
I agreed. This opened a further discussion of how we could swap
books and other source materials.
I asked the general if he was familiar with the article by
General-Major Yuriy V. Lebedev, General-Lieutenant (Retired) I.S.
Lyutov, and Colonel V.A. Nazarenko, "Persian Gulf War: Lessons
and Conclusions," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, nos. 11-12
(December 1991): pp. 109-117 (JPRS-UMT-92-005-L, March 23, 1992,
pp. 60-64). He said that he was. I asked him about a specific
paragraph dealing with the use of land rather than the holding of
land as a concept for ground forces operations. He got quite




there was a great similarity of such operations with naval war-
fare. I asked him if they were researching this area and he said
yes. I told him that I had done research on this area already
and published two articles that he might find of interest. He
did not ask me for them. Instead he indicated that the new
coastal divisions were a recognition of the similarity of land
and sea warfare.
The general responded to a student's question about a revo-
lution in military affairs by saying that although this was
theoretically possible due to advances in technology, it would
not happen due to the realities of the economy. There would be
no opportunities for serial development of new weaponry, indicat-
ing that they will shift to prototyping. The general also said
that tanks have outlived there usefulness.
At some time later in this discussion, the general told us
that we should take advantage of research that each of us has
done already so that it would not need to be performed again. I
believe that this was a serious comment and indicated that under
"scientific" socialism, once a topic has been researched, it need
not be done again. Under such a system, there would not be any
need to review conclusions by others nor tolerance for a diversi-
ty of views. Based on similar comments by others later, I feel
that this was a legitimate comment and represented how they think
rather than an attempt to solicit research results.
Twice during discussion, the general gave the impression
that he accepted the view that peace would be maintained by a
parity of nuclear weapons. I clarified and asked him if he ac-
cepted deterrence as a concept and he said yes. I made sure that
our "GRUlet" translator correctly used deterrence from the con-
cept of punishment rather than denial.
I offered to collaborate with the Institute in some jointly
authored article, monograph, or book on military doctrine and
strategy or the lessons of the Persian Gulf war. He said that I
should send him a proposal in writing and specify exactly what
the Russian participant would be expected to do. I will do this
soon.
I asked the general if he was familiar with the published
"leaks" of Soviet war plans in the WTVD. He said that he was
familiar with them I said that we had followed the articles of
Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, former Chief of the
USSR General Staff, and seen that he did not appear to advocate
relying on nuclear strikes for strategic operations in the WTVD.
I then asked the general to comment. His reply was that Ogarkov
did not speak for the military when he wrote he articles and
monographs and that we should have never interpreted those as
anything more than his personal views. He then rambled a bit but
appeared to confirm these war plans by saying they would be




Report of seminar held at IMEMO supplementary to lead-in
found in Enclosure (4)
.
We then went to IMEMO and had a second substantive meeting
of the day. I assumed that the attendees already knew about the
new U.S. national security strategy, hence I simply opened it up
to questions after presenting them with a copy of the National
Military Strategy of the United States and a recent technical
report of mine on our new regionally-focused defense doctrine and
strategy. The Russians deferred to Vice Admiral (Ret.) Nikolay
Pavlovich Markov, who spoke through a translator. Everyone else
spoke English. The firsts question was if any of the documents
concerning the new American doctrine had anything to do with sea
communications. I responded with lift and prepositioning goals
contained in the annual reports of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Follow-on question wanted to know if we assumed any opposi-
tion at sea. I responded with an outlining of planning scenarios
contained in the Joint Military Net Assessment and those found in
the New York Times and Washington Post reporting on leaks from
the Defense Planning Guidance . I did not say that these
scenarios were authoritative but merely said they were useful in
talking about future warfare. After going over the framework for
scenarios, I said that in most of these, there would be no as-
sumed threat on the open oceans for most but that in certain
cases, depending upon who was involved with a crisis, it might
involve nations that had a naval force of substance.
The admiral came right back at me by directly asking why we,
the British, and/or the French were still patrolling off their
coasts in the new international security environment when they
had ended all patrols off our coast. I gave him a diplomatic
answer with multiple possible explanations and let him decide
which he wanted since I obviously did not really know.
Gennady K. Lednev then asked if the recent agreements on
nuclear arms between Bush and Yeltsin would require a revision of
the strategy. I said no, that they were consistent with our
doctrine and strategy. I did suggest, however, that lower num-
bers of warheads might suggest a shift to countervalue and non-
prompt nuclear targeting. They appeared to agree by nodding.
I then asked to have the students begin their questions.
The first had to do with the depth of operations from the land
for the future Russian Navy. The admiral stated that the fleet
would be limited to the Barents and Northern Norwegian Seas, the
Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and the Northern Sea of Japan. He
said it would not deploy anywhere else. He then made it even
more clear that it would not deploy along the U.S. sea lines of
communications. A follow-on indicated that both sides should
withdraw from the Mediterranean as if they still deployed there.




and didn't seem like this was an issue anymore. He also spoke
favorably about joint exercises and joint peacekeeping deploy-
ments in the future.
I was then asked about naval arms control and gave them a
canned lecture on the subject which I have used in a wide variety
of audiences elsewhere. They wrote it all down. They then asked
why not control arms through budget limitations and I responded
that this was being done by both nations legislatures already.
This might be an area for future joint research with IMEMO.
They then wanted to know about how the American military
viewed the deep reductions in nuclear forces and I said they
viewed it favorably. A follow-on wanted to know if the military
thought they would reprogram that money into conventional forces
and I said that most of us assumed it would be lost to other non-
defense programs. They then suggested that some of the high
ranking military planners thought that the Russian air-breathing
leg of the triad was unnecessary and that the sea-based leg was
the way to go in the future.
I offered to work on a collaborative basis with them on
military doctrine and strategy or the lessons from the Persian
Gulf war. They suggested that I contact Captain 1st Rank (Ret.)
Boris N. Makayev, who was currently on leave. I remembered his
name from my June meeting with Aleksey Arbatov. He is supposedly
the ghost writer for the late Fleet Admiral Gorshkov. I left a
copy of my paper on the Soviet/Russian lessons learned of the
Persian Gulf war since they said he would be interested. I asked
if any of them were coming to the U.S. and they rolled their eyes
saying that Aleksey used all the travel money. The meeting ended
on schedule and we all shook hands.
16 July (Thursday) : Smolensk Seminar.
Report of seminar held in hotel at Smolensk supplementary to
lead-in materials found in Enclosure (4) .
The seminar with LTC Viktor I. Kuznetsov was a very inter-
esting session that lasted around five hours. I took no notes but
CPT Edgar may have done so. One of the students later told me
that Kuznetsov identified himself as the co-author of an article
with Colonel V.F. Yashin, "Army Counterof fensive Operations
(Historical Experience)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, No.
1, January 1992, pp. 26-34 ( JPRS-92-UMT-006-L, May 14, 1992, pp.
15-20) . The subject of the seminar was to first include a presen-
tation by me of the new regionally-focused defense doctrine and
strategy. Rather than a formal presentation, the session became
a free-for-all discussion. At one point we discussed the open-
ness of the current era in contrast with other historical periods




period would close. I could not tell if it was Dmitriy or Viktor
who actually answered, but the answer that I was given was
"soon." One of the students who was at the seminar later told me
that Dmitriy was adding much of his own words to whatever Viktor
was telling me. I agreed since many times Viktor's answer was
measured in seconds while Dmitriy 's translation often went on for
minutes. I also made mention of my discussion on the Tula trip
with Colonel Vitaliy Leonov and said that I had probably asked
him one guestion too many. Viktor appeared to agree.
Viktor was most interested in discussing the future of the
strategic defense initiative (SDI) and appeared unfamiliar with
the planned system for the global protection against limited
strikes (GPALS) . Viktor was rude and kept interrupting to make
points about the need to give up all nuclear weapons. Wanted me
to explain to him how you could tell the difference between an
offensive and a defensive nuclear missile. I responded with
classic lecture on differences between counterforce and counter-
value targeting. He never seemed to get it and I decided that he
was trying to see if I would become exasperated. I did not.
Viktor asked me, about four times, straight out how long it
would take from receipt of warning until our nuclear forces could
respond. I replied in each case that this was old thinking and
that under countervalue targeting each side could eliminate a
hair trigger posture in favor of a much more delayed response of
punishment. He did not appear to be serious in his efforts to
learn about the new U.S. regional defense strategy. I decided
that he was not really an instructor. He never discussed his joy
in teaching nor how he taught his students despite my attempts to
engage him in such discussions.
Viktor told us that the Soviets had fooled the Americans
regarding the Tu-22 BACKFIRE bomber and that this was obviously
an intercontinental bomber. He said that they could retrofit the
refueling probe within hours. He tried to make the same point
with ballistic missile defensive systems by saying that these too
could be turned into offensive systems.
Viktor also told me that it was not unusual nor new for
Russians to be researching the defensive or initial period of the
Great Patriotic War. He said that in the Czarist-era, they only
researched what did not work well (defense) but that under the
Soviet system, they researched everything but showed us only
research on the offensive.
Viktor told me that war is broken into offensive, counterof-
fensive, defensive, and defense from weapons of mass destruction.
Did not appear familiar with the breakdown according to tradi-
tional military-technical aspects. This further reinforced my
conclusion that he was not an instructor and I do not believe
that he was the same person who had just authored a major article




Finally, I asked Viktor how Russia would handle its new
defense problem on the southwestern theater of strategic military
operations, i.e. there would be no Russian ground forces in that
sector. Viktor told me that this would not be a problem since the
Russians would man the Ukrainian armed forces.
I then spoke to the other instructor, Colonel Oleg Orekhov,
and he started out the conversation by saying that he was not
GRU. We then had a pleasant discussion of how we taught our
students. I gave him the routine pitch about how to break out of
the shell of limited his knowledge about us that was handed to
him by the intelligence services. He appeared to have done more
work in trying to learn about us but conceded the main sources
were those provided by his own government. He did say that the
Frunze Academy employed some civilian specialists who knew about
the U.S. I told him about his own Institute of the U.S.A. and
Canada Studies and other sources he could use. He seemed famil-
iar with the works of Henry Trofimenko and said that he would
talk to me about this later. His sources of information about
the U.S. were the journal Foreign Military Review, intelligence
information, special collections, government books, and a few
U.S. subscriptions. He also said that the Frunze Academy had
civilian instructors. No one else had ever said this.
Perhaps the most interesting thing was that he asked me to
describe Soviet military doctrine in the 1960s. I did so and he
said that I had it right. He then asked me why it had changed
from reliance on nuclear primarily to a shift towards convention-
al weapons. I said that it was probably a combination of the
change in leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev and foment from
below. Obviously it might have also been a response to NATO's
new military strategy of flexible response (MC 14/3) . Oleg told
me that since Brezhnev was the leader of the government under
Khrushchev, it was impossible for them to have different views.
He did not say anything further about what might have caused the
changes otherwise.
18 July (Saturday) : Zagorsk discussion.
Report of discussion with Frunze instructor held in Zagorsk,
supplementary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (4)
.
I had a private two-hour discussion with a new Frunze in-
structor, Colonel Petr Fyodorovich Vashchenko. Petr is a co-
author of the very interesting article "In Aid of Those Studying
Military History: Military Reform in the USSR," Voyenno-Istori-
cheskiy Zhurnal
, No. 12, 1989, pp. 33-40 ( JPRS-UMA-90-010, April
25, 1990, pp. 58-63). I think that it was during this discussion
that he said that his students basically had no homework. Went




suggestions of alternative sources. He seemed to be a genuine
instructor.
During discussion of Frunze military reforms of 1924, he
repeatedly stated that at that time, the defensive was only al-
lowed at the operational and tactical levels. At the strategic
level of war, the offensive was the only option. He described
that offensive as being able to cross the borders of an enemy
state and to penetrate to a depth of around 250 kilometers.
In a discussion of the Persian Gulf war, Petr stated that
this operation was not simply an episode but a model for future
war. It was not, however, the only model. Seemed very concerned
with precision guided munitions. We also got into a discussion
of the similarity of war at sea to war ashore but he did not seem
interested in pursuing it.
I pressed Petr about their recent research into the defen-
sive. He stated that this was not new research, but rather that
research about the defensive period of the Great Patriotic War,
and wars in general, had been ongoing constantly. Such research
was not, however, available to those outside of the Academy since
it was classified secret. This is new information.
20 July (Monday) : Special Seminar at Rostov.
Report of special seminar held in hotel in Rostov, supple-
mentary to lead-in provided in Enclosure (4)
.
The Frunze instructors provided to us for that evening were
Colonel Valentine A. Runov and LTC Pavel Dmitriovich Alekseyev.
Runov is a co-author of the very interesting article "In Aid of
Those Studying Military History: Military Reform in the USSR,"
Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal
,
No. 12, 1989, pp. 33-40 (JPRS-UMA-
90-010, April 25, 1990, pp. 58-63).
I decided to openly take notes at the seminar. One of the
"GRUlets" acted as a translator. There was a discussion of how
each side taught military history and military art. One of the
major participants in this portion of the seminar was Colonel
Webb Kremer, USA (Ret.), a former armor officer. There was a lot
of discussion of number of classroom hours devoted to each sub-
ject area. No one made any attempt to ask about NPS or the Naval
War College even though I was there. Mr. Peter Tsouras, self-
identified as working for U.S. Army intelligence, asked about how
lessons learned at Frunze Academy were transmitted to field. The
Russians replied that was often Frunze faculty learned lessons
from the field itself (so his question assumed something that was
not necessarily the case) but the academy often provided lessons




produced by the students, faculty, and staff, and special discus-
sion seminars.
Pavel stated that his primary field of research was the
initial period of the Great Patriotic War. He stressed that this
was important today. Valentine stated that he was interested in
local wars and the history of the Russian Army. He also stated
that local wars were of interest today. Pavel stated that Valen-
tine was writing a history of the Frunze Academy itself.
The Russians fumbled question of mine about the characteris-
tics of war and armed conflict. It appeared more that I inter-
rupted something rather than that he could not answer the ques-
tion. In their answer, they did say that they previously spent
90% of their time teaching aspects of war that were nuclear or
nuclear-related but that this was now down to around 10%. I
consider this significant. Also said that they are concerned with
defense against high technology weapons of great accuracy.
Tsouras asked for clarification on defense or employment and
defense was repeated. At a later time, the Russians tried to
answer my question and offered the opinion that the military-
technical classifications of war were (1) those between regular
forces armed with high technology weapons used in classical
military operations, and (2) those where one side had all types
of weapons and regular forces and the other side has irregular
forces as in Afghanistan. This is not consistent with previous
characterizations of war. Is it new or an off-the-cuff answer?
Response to student question about Persian Gulf war got
response that tanks were still important in the ground operation
of any future war. Response to my question about Navy faculty
and students was there are none even though admitted studied
Normandy strategic amphibious operation. Then added as an after-
thought that they did have some "marines." I asked clarification
if that meant naval infantry or coastal defense divisions and
they got all upset and ducked the question. Study of Normandy
without Navy logistics means to me that the case is presented as
a defensive operation and not offensive in the context of pro-
jecting power from the sea.
I asked about the similarity to war at sea to warfare ashore
and got garbled answer that seemed to imply that the Naval Acade-
my had the job or researching naval art and the Frunze Academy
was trying to sort out military art only. Implication is that no
one is talking to each other at the operational-level of warfare
and that such combined arms discussions only take place at the
strategic-level. This would also mean that the U.S. perception
that combined arms operations (at the operational-level of war-
fare) is a former Soviet strength was incorrect. The correct
perception is apparently that combined arms is the province of
instruction at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, hence it is





Retired Swedish General Skoglund asked about independent
airborne operatsii and received the same replies as in the past.
Airborne combat actions are at the tactical-level of warfare.
The general pressed them and got a response that the 4th airborne
operation during the Battle for Moscow was the classic independ-
ent model (rather than Normandy) . They disagreed whether this
was an operational or tactical-level action.
Response to my question about how they did simulations and
war gaming was that they did man/man and man/machine. I followed
with clarification if they had special teams to play the enemy
(not really) and if they had computer models to represent an
enemy (yes) . They used green and dark blue to represent two
sides. They stopped the flow of the discussion and asked me
about our methods. I responded with Naval War College team to
play enemy and efforts by RAND Corporation to replicate the
behavior of other nations by the use of computer models. They
asked if Russia was now the enemy. I responded with regional
defense strategy with multiple enemies. U.S. Army civil service
tour participant Peter Tsouras provided clarification that Russia
was not the enemy, including the precise use of the term in
Russian. This interruption and quizzing of me was most peculiar
and stood out.
I asked them if they had any questions for me about the
regional defense strategy and base force. They responded quickly
by asking what type of defense did we feel that Iraq had during
Operation DESERT STORM. I deferred to the various active and
retired U.S. Army personnel in the room who said basically that
it was a classic Soviet model. I added that antilanding defenses
were as well but that it was usual for our Army to ignore the
maritime aspects of warfare.
Second question to me was about whether Russian membership
in NATO would lead to long-term stability. I replied with alter-
native and unilateral actions by Russia that could lead to same
result.
July 23 (Thursday) : Meeting with Deputy Defense Minister, Kiev,
Ukraine.
Report of meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense for the
Ukraine, held in his office, supplementary to lead-in provided in
Enclosure (4)
.
We arrived at an office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
and were ushered into the office of General-Major Yuriy Mikhailo-
vich Prokofiev, Deputy Minister of Defense and Head of Military
Education and Training. A colonel from his outer office also




retired General-Lieutenant took notes as well. I gave a one hour
presentation on our new regional defense strategy, asking along
the way if they knew about this or that subject, trying to tailor
it to what they did not know. They did not want to talk about
scenarios, saying that they already had studied those. Implica-
tion again, one something has been studied, it does not again
need to be reviewed since the answer has already been obtained.
Their questions included: numbers of troops and divisions to
be left in Europe under the current plan and my best guess for
the post-election period; what were America's capabilities to
wage a strategic-level war and operational-level campaign; less-
ons of the Persian Gulf war; why were we upgrading the Pershing
missiles; and how would we implement our new doctrine and strate-
gy; how could the new doctrine be developed in a top-down manner.
The generals revealed their own bias that strategic-level war
could be won by air forces in the future. They also stated twice
that their emerging doctrine and strategy will be internal only.
We then shifted to a brief discussion on what type of de-
grees were offered by the various U.S. military training and
education institutions. I explained the general processes as
well. The minister was interrupted by a telephone call from the
Air Force commander-in-chief. The translator suggested that we
continue with the general (who was expressing some concern to the
translator about the time that we were taking) and I asked the
general if we should not wait until the minister returned. He
shrugged his shoulders and said yes. I replied that this is what
we would do in our country as well. The minister then asked a
perfunctory question about Sweden. General Prokofiev then said
that he assumed we would like to know about his own country. We
said that we would.
The minister then talked for about one hour on the plans for
the Ukrainian armed forces. He did not pause for questions, nor
did we interrupt except for translation clarifications. I took
notes. He started with a long passage about Ukrainian history
and took great pains to stress the differences with Russia. He
also corrected history my stating that there never had been a
treaty with Russia at the time of Peter I and that the Ukraine
had been enslaved and not joined Russia of its own volition.
The minister continued with his own version of the events of
1917-1920. He ensured that we knew that the Ukraine had been
deceived by Russia in joining the USSR and that they were essen-
tially forced to join. He then spoke of the time that citizens
were shot on the streets for speaking Ukrainian and that the
world should know about the truth of this era and not the propa-
ganda from Moscow.
Skipping the Great Patriotic War, the minister stressed that
the Ukraine had provided 95% of its output for the center in the




its effort for defense. He specifically criticized the building
of large tank formations. According to the minister, the Ukraine
had only been allowed to keep 5% of its output for internal use
and of this, 20% was taxes. Those who knew the truth, in the
past, either left for the U.S. or went to prison.
The minister then discussed the problems facing the Ukraine
with large numbers of demobilized troops. He likened the situa-
tion to that in Yugoslavia. He stressed that their military
doctrine would be an anti-bloc doctrine but that they would have
some sort of defensive arrangement with neighbors. The Ukraine
did not seek parity with their neighbors. Cooperation with other
nations would be sought; specific examples included cooperation
with the U.S. or Sweden in the field of terrorism, collective
research, and intelligence.
The minister talked about how difficult it was to get "arms"
out of the heads of officers who had been educated under the old
system. He talked in terms of the need for mental rather than
physical resources. He again complained about how much the Uk-
raine has suffered at the hands of the USSR. His goal was to
create a military training and education system second to none in
the world. It would be better than that in the U.S. He dis-
cussed the need to keep men in uniform as a temporary social
welfare program.
He then shifted to the subject of the Black Sea Fleet and
stated that it was not a strategic asset. His proof was that it
cost much less than some other fleet, lost in the translation.
It might have been the Northern Fleet since the word "Kola" came
out in the translation. The minister stated that the Ukraine was
not interested in the Mediterranean. He said that their invest-
ment in the fleet was 17% plus the value of the shipyards and
that Russia was only offering 10-15%.
The minister said that it was not necessary for Russia to
keep bases on Ukrainian territory for the long term, specifically
Sevastopol. He then said that Russia would be offered a small
portion of bases that were Ukrainian to serve their temporary
needs. He then brought up the destroyer that had sortied from
Sevastopol a few days earlier and had sailed under a Ukrainian
flag to Odessa. He said that following this incident, the issue
of the bases had been settled with Russia and therefore, there
would be no further incidents of this type. The clear implica-
tion was that the incident had been staged to obtain the conces-
sions that he announced. The minister then closed by saying that
there were other naval units still being considered, those not an
actual part of the fleet and neither a part of the base struc-
ture. Those units would need to be settled in the future.
I closed the meeting by thanking the minister and telling
him how impressed we were with his country and what we had




had seen or been told would be passed on to others in the U.S.
and Sweden. I then offered to perform joint academic work with
any of his people on emerging U.S. defense doctrine and strategy




Has "Cold War" Ended?
(American questions and possible Russian answers)
Comments on
"Military Strategy in the Former Soviet Union"
by
James John Tritten (May 13, 1992 Draft)
"P." will stay for "page", "prg" - for "paragraph"
"Has the Soviet threat to the United States and NATO
gone away? Is the danger of a superpower war so remote
today that we should shift our strategic planning focus to
contingency operations and nonmilitary threats?" (p.l,
prg. 2)
Sure, the answer is "yes". That is extremely important— iAX JT*lfc* AotW
now to understand that such the threat has never existed - wfjw&ri \*t >CK c+
exactly as the opposite "American threat" to the USSR. My m»\*Twv, **vt^*V
point is that grounds for those "threats" laid in common ""p^" \*vJ*+A*A
misunderstanding and misperception . The Soviet Union simply /amwa^-^u*^
.
went far further along the line si vis pacem, para bellum - c/Su> r^t^ariC-
•than the West. The Soviet Union was ready to accept much — eftsJ*v> &"*+*-
heavier burden to ensure military security than the West
did. There were a lot of reasons for that and totalitarian \i«j* TA^ **<L|
character of our society was not the least among them. f**.^/- +**- +~^
Nevertheless all the time the Communist leadership of
our state was preoccupied with the task of defense of the « »
country. Look at the history - were there any exam ple when £-**• ** | **jflP
the Soviet Union behaved aggressively in the connection
wTTTt strong power?' Al 1 examples of "Soviet aggressions"
widely discussed in Western literature are examples of
actions "strong against we^k " : Poland in 1920, Baltic
states, Poland and Finland in 1939, Hungary in 1956,
Afganistan in 1979. Checkoslovakia of 1968 could be the
only possible exception — if one proved that the West
really planned invaded the country that time as was stated
in the Soviet Union to justify the action. Do you know did
the West plan?
1968, Damanskiy Island. Conflict with China. Strong
against strong? Aggressive and resolute actions? Wrong -
the Soviet Union began threat with nuclear weapons only
when has disclosed that Chinese panicky feared that the
Soviet Union would threat with the weapons and could try to
put that threat into life.
In 1941 Stalin was sure that sooner or later Hitler
would attack — and prohibited troops to take defensive
prepared positions in order not to give to Germans occasion
for provocation. Stalin was sure that the UK along with
France were in collusion with Germany and prepared hostile
actions against the USSR. Who could reassure him in the
light of the "strange war" in Europe? And Stalin signed
pact with Germany - to reduce (or even prevent) possibility
of surprise attack.
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Stalin's attempt failed — and proved for a long period
that diplomacy and treaties were not the best way to
ensure military security of the state. Since 1917, the
October Revolution, Soviet leadership lived and acted under
the slogan "We live in hostile [imperialist] encirclement".
Psychology of "surrounded fortress" became ground on which
almost all plans and actions were made. And German invasion
gave to it so strong momentum that inertia is obvious until
now.
It is necessary to add that after—World War II actions
of the West were not without sin too. If you equal fascist
(as a form of imperialist) Germany and totalitarian
communist Soviet Union, if you state that all country
develop to the common point ("theory of convergency " ) - why
then you decide action aimed on sharing of markets and
spheres of influence (Persia, 1945-46; Germany, 1948;
Korea, 1950; Hungary, Chechoslovakia, Poland etc) as a
Communist threat to the Free World and not as simply
j
another example of tensions inside common imperialist
world? The United States attacked Grenada, Panama too,
didn't they? Lenin began in 1918 with "state-monopoly
i capitalism". His successors forgot to change the line. Then
where is communist threat?
• Sure definite differences between the West and our
country really existed. Not the least among them was that
\ totalitarian regime could not (and can't at all) allow wise
people to influence the leadership. I am awfully sorry but
it seems for me that our leaders degenerated tremendously
'. fast. May be being even wise in the personal but not
( political sense they did not understand what happened
,
around and feared that "hostile imperialist encirclement"
0pvn?vu would try to destroy them, their power and the state for
r*\h* which they were in charge. Tragic example of Great
(3»^«**i^*) Patriotic War has proved that was not idle fear. Try to
UaU- imagine what Pearl Harbor would be for the American people
if in the result of it Japanese in a couple of week would
take Chicago and Boston, blockade (for three years!) New
York and stay in ten miles from Capitol Hill?
And after WW II imperialist states continued the line:
American military bases encircled the USSR, atomic bombers
began patrolling, nuclear missiles appeared in Turkey, the
UK and Germany. What that was? For what purpose?
Preparation for new June 1941? Why did the West prefer to
play with double rules: one, fair, for himself, another,
hostile, for the USSR?
Those all were applied upon problems the country felt
in economy. Over—centralized model proved itself to be
insufficient, the state began to lose positions. To
re-establish them, support or (later) even revitalize
former influence and greatness of the state - that was
important task too.
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Military power was good solution for that kind of
people. (Let's remember: the weaker any (and quite
capitalist! ) state is the more attention it pays to
military attributes.) It was easily understandable. And it
allowed to kill some birds with one stone. Military power
allowed to ensure military security. Military power and
influence could compensate lack of economic power and
influence. And military power allowed to soften influence
of imperialists' "double rules of a game" during attempts
to establish political or economical presence in remote
regions. As you remember Germany after Versal began with
military power too...
Germany was too small to stop and began world war. The
USSR exactly as Russian Empire was self-sufficient and had
not necessity to take territory — may be except those which
were critical for freedom of actions. (But the USA controls
the zone of Panama channel too!) Markets and spheres of
influence - that what were necessary. Where s.re differences
between that position and the position of the current
United States? And, therefore - where Are grounds for the
threat of attack against the Western Europe? Where is
military threat to the United States and NATO?
I'd like to add a small detail which could be both
interesting and important: those separate tank regiments
located just on Western borders in Groups of Forces had in
classified Soviet regulations name "regiment of border
cover". How do you think - is it appropriate name for units
whose task is to invade?
Sure, contradictions between current great imperialist
powers really exist. Does it mean the danger of
Japan-American or Anglo-French war exist today? Considering
all above mentioned it seems to me possible to decide that
t the danger of Soviet-American or Soviet-Western war rtnf=<=,
jQtK - Ifjr not e::ceed the threat of the, fnrmers . Could we shif t in
K, ,j *>*- these conditions our strategic planning focus to S/PJ , w^*- ?*-
V>"* conting ency operations or we couldn't? Frankly the answer ^^^J^^^L
is odvious Tor me . What would be your answer? <*uA.oNf
You can argue me considering Soviet military plan s in
connection with employment of nuclear weapons in the
£c - I "**- Western Europe . That s interesting point ! It would be
*S**" productive to discuss it along with some other related
" problems which Are important for better understanding of
current situation - and possible perspectives.
H±t.
First of all I'd like to make short historical review
of Soviet position concerning nuclear weapons. Till the end
of 1953 the Soviet leadership saw nuclear weapons itself as
instrument of American political pressure upon the Soviet
Union. That was continuation of the line began by Stalin in
Potsdam when he refused to "understand" Truman's words
about atomic bomb in American possession. Soviet
ideological instruments worked hard to low importance of
the Bomb. The USSR refused to understand American pressure
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- and that reduced value of the former. At that period
atomic weapons were decided to be simply another extremely
powerful weapon.
The second peri od could be named "romantic". Military
(and politicians) understood that nuclear weapons are more
than increased fire-power of troops. Those become "final
and resolute instrument" — all could be resolved with i t.
Sokolovskiy ' s book is about it: future war wi 1 1 be al 1-out
missile-nuclear one, strategic missiles and their actions
on international scale will be the main essence of war,
conventional battle on theaters will only use results of
the former. That means war will be on necessity bl ietzkrieg
- any delays could take place only because lack of nuclear
weapons. It's necessary to add that in that situation high
readiness of forces on day-to-day basis is essential order.
We began it that time - we continued it up to now.
Meanwhile the period lasted since roughly 1955 to
1969. As early as J.966 on the All -army meeting Oqarkov
stated attention paid to nuclear weapons was too high. On
my opinion t irst of all he said about strategic weapons.
{ That was beginning of acceptance by the Soviet military and
[ political leadership of the state of nuclear stalemate on
strategic level. And Brezhnev's speech in Tula was simply
formal statement that the period of strategic nuclear
.".! stalemate was on scene. As an logical result in 1976 the
Soviet Union and the United States signed Agreement on
prevention of nuclear war.
[
Nevertheless the "syndrome of surrounded fortress"
along with the perception of Western threat has not gone in
our country with the beginning of that new period. And the
task to ensure military security of the country against
.1 "the most probable" threat still stood intact. According to
political guide Soviet military designed war-fighting plans
which should serve purposes of war— termination.
| One clever man said almost a century ago ""decently"
or "indecently" does nor exist in policy, there are only
"profitable" and "unprofitable"". I am awfully sorry
because cynicism of these words but history displays he was
right. I am afraid there is really no place for absolute
idealists in realpol itik .
There were really Soviet plans of employment of
tactical nuclear weapons against NATO command posts,
I communication centers, nuclear weapons means of delivery
t and their storages and important elements of transport
infrastructure (bridges, road and railway junctions) on the
territory of Western Fi>rnpe>. Fulfillment of these plans
should start in the case of large-scale European conflict
involving USA and USSR after break of fire and in the face
! of inevitable escalation. Soviet Army should not enter
durable exchange of pin-point conventional strikes but
resort to employment of nuclear weapons on early stages of
conf 1 ic t . Described kinds of targets should be destroyed in
Page 136 Enclosure (5)
what could be named a kind of rrp-p^i'tj - <? strike . 513
tactical charges were allocated for that purpose. After
fulfillment of the strike rapid offensive and seizure of
all Western Europe should happen.
The main i o'er a of ! hese plans was single in its
duality. To prevent development to steps of the "stairs of
escalation" which suppose employment of American nuclear
weapons against Soviet territory. And through quick
seizure of Western Europe - where the USA had a lot of
economic interests - make continuation of the war to
intercontinental nuclear exchange unprofitable and
senseless for the United States. That was extremely
important that nuclear exchange was restricted both in » VJ^^*^^'
l evel (tactical) and geograp hy (Western Europe). / r*\.S- / »"
— S"r*r*r
That is why these plans did not suppose and simply
could not suppose employment of strategic weapons agains t
North America. (Moreover - all plans of its employment were
based on "second strike" or "launch under attack" ideas.)
In this light one could better understand Brezhnev's
statement that the Soviet Union would not use nuclear
weapon first - the United States rather than the whole
world was addressee of this statement! The USSR tried to
tell to the USA its logic and prove absence of intentions
to destroy America. The fate of Europe was not so clear.
But American plans (Carter's for instance), as I remember,
did not bring to Europe good news too.
Therefore, to my opinion, Europeans were quite right
when worried about possible unwillingness of the USA to
fulfill its nuclear guarantee and use nuclear weapons
against Soviet territory. As I understand Soviet plans were
constructed around assumption Americans would not risk
their homeland if they would be sure Soviets would not try
to threat them. Sure in attitude to Europe that was
"indecent" policy. Was it "unprofitable" for the Soviet
Union? And may be for the United States? Who knows... I
think these facts could give birth to doubts that Soviet
plans were absolutely aggressive. That is great problem - .. i,^*- ^*-
how to preserve your Motherland : may be not the best way ^^" L^J^/^
was chosen but there were strong reasons to believe i t
would wor k
.
If somebody began to laugh or swear about those plans
I would disagree with him. Are those plans more ridiculous
or dangerous than American inter—war Basic War Plan "Red" S'
on fighting against Great Britain or early-after WW II
plans of war against Canada? That is job of military - to
be prepared for a wide specter of possible (and sometimes
even impossible) hostilities. It is very bad when
politicians lose good sense and take these plans without
serious consideration of their real essence.
Hence one should decide the Soviet General Staff
carried out political guidelines that there were
possibility to limit direct East-West military conflict to
Page 137 Enclosure (5)
battle of Europe. And limit that battle to conventional
warfare - i.e. to the kind of battle which could not pose
direct threat to Soviet territory. Tactical nuclear weapon
was one of numerous instruments of such the warfare. And
such the Battle of Europe for the Soviet Union was not
nuclear war - in definition.
What about political utility... It would be better to
say that then Soviet leadership saw political utility in
seizure of Western Europe in order to preserve Soviet
national territory in any way. Tactical nuclear weapons
were not the essence of the problem. Prevent
intercontinental nuclear exchange - that was the task.
Therefore view on political utility of nuclear weapons are
simply not the subject of discussion because in this case
we deal with Soviet plans of war-termination. Sure, on
favorable for the Soviet Union conditions — i.e. before
strikes would reach Soviet territory.
That is not surprising in these conditions that "there
have always been differences in opinion (in the USSR and
the United States) concerning whether a war with the United
States could or should be limited to a single theater of
or i gin" (p. 5, prg.2). Wasn't "uncertainty and
unpredictability" one of important principles of nuclear
deterrence on its early stages? There were not serious
differences: even among our leaders there were not
suicides, simply limitations of scale of warfare decided to
be task of wartime - before beginning of a war all should
be done to prevent fire.
If one try to imagine that the opposite is correct
let's ask him to explain why the Soviet Union did not
start firing in Cuban crisis? Eventually all big American
cities except Seattle were in range of SS-5 deployed at
Cuba . .
.
It was decided later by politicians that to maintain
uncertainty on the level of intercontinental exchange was
too risky business. Nevertheless principles of deterrence
stood intact. Hence one should not be surprised that "the
former Soviet leadership actually renounced only
nuclear—rocket war on a scale that would equate to a world
war, not all nuclear war" (p. 5, prg.3). As I remember the
United States also refuses to confirm or deny their plans
concerning nuclear weapons in case of war.
You can tell me: "Okay, but existing offensive former
Soviet nuclear forces far exceed that necessary for
delivering a retaliatory strike - even under the worst
case. Defensive systems and R&D program to improve those
defensive systems are strong evidence that the Soviet never
and the Russian still have never accepted the mutual
vulnerability required under mutual assured destruction
(MAD) (p. 13, prg.5). Isn't that taken in complex an
evidence of Aggressive intentions?"
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Frankly I disagree with this quite possible statement.
What do you decide to be the worst case for the Soviet
Union? As you know over—centralization was essential
feature of the Soviet model. Do you think such an important
instrument of state policy as strategic nuclear forces
avoided it? I think you &re wrong if you suppose so. It's
hard for you to believe in it but even Soviet SSBNs can fi/h '
not launch their missiles wi thru 1 1 nrrl<=r from the Center .
Hence the worst case for the Soviet Uni on was and for
Russia still is the overwhelming strike agains t C3 I which
paralyze the whole forces and lead to full inability to
carry out any retaliatory strik e. That is why on my opinion
the Soviet Union maintained huge strategic arsenal - in
order to ensure that in the worst esse at least a couple of
missiles would be launched (thanks to Heavens!) as a result
of convulsions of disabled C3 system. One should not forget ~)
also that McNamara ' s estimates of size of forces necessary U-Jw wv*v*> -
to inflict unacceptable damage was quite popula r that time
in the Soviet Union too. The system seems to you to be
(softly saying) strange? Sure, but we don't discuss the
system itself now... We would have to start from the
October Revolution to understand it.
What about the second part of discussed statement it
seems to me there is definite contradiction in it with
historical logic. Have the United States not accepted the
mutual vulnerability required under MAD when proposed and
began to construct ABM systems in 1960s and then in 1980s? /V\ r\v) U«-
Even the hypothesis has riqhts to live that those defensive „_
systems and R&D aimed on their improvement could be taken jt~**ft-
as signs that level of unacceptable damage was even lower
for the Soviet leadership than for the United States? (I
understand all problems related with such a suggestion.)
And you do write that "an offensive-capable... nuclear
force [as any other force - I.S.] does not automatically
indicate an offensive military doctrine or strategy.
Critics should remember that once the United States had
total strategic nuclear superiority over the USSR - within
an overall defensive military doctrine and strategy" (p. 13,
prg.5)
.
So it seems to me obvious that there were never rea l
Soviet threa t to the United States and NATO or the opposite
— there were always only invented ones caused by
misunderstanding and misperception of each other. That did
not and does not reduce the danger of holocaust - but it is
important to understand that reason for such a catastrophe
would be not antagonistic contradictions between two our
states or two our camps but unreadiness or inability to
hear and understand each other. ,
That is why I ask has "Cold War" ended. Have you ended
it or continue to stay in it through maintaining of the
disappearing invented threat whose time has already to
have gone — by discussions about order of remoteness of the
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Soviet threat to the United States and NATO? If the latter
— you have real chance to lose the battle for peace. And
the fact that another side will lose too will be poor
satisfaction.
For further discussion of military strategy in the
former Soviet Union it is crucial to agree on the point -
is there Soviet/Russian threat to the United States and the
West or there is no. Because it is this point which will
influence upon your assessment of military doctrines and
strategy in emerging new independent states. From my point
of view those are simply attempts to reject the "syndrome
of surrounded fortress". That is what on my opinion meant
statement of Dr. Sergey Rogov, the Deputy Director of the
Institute for the USA & Canada studies that "external
events would probably not directly affect Russia's state
security and that the most important threats &re internal"
(quotation on p. 11, prg . 1 ) . Appeal to rethink heightened
estimates of external threat - that is on my opinion the
essence of the statement.
"Emerging military doctrine for the former Soviet
Union, as of April 1992, therefore did. not appear to be
offensively oriented in the manner of the old theaters
strategic offensive operation that worried NATO for many
years" (p. 11, prg. 5). Well-known maxima is that "offensive
is the best defense". Our fears simply reduced and
necessity in such scale o f "defense through offens ive"
disappeared
.
If you disagree with me on the point about existence
of Soviet/Russian threat your assessment of the situation
and perspectives can be just opposite. Let me clarify the
latter.
You are greeting the idea proposed by Andrey Kokoshin
and Maj.-Gen. Valentin Larionov in 19SS that Soviet/Russian
Armed Forces should have capability and plan only "to repel
the invasion to the border but not cross and continue the
counteroffensive in enemy territory" (p. 22, prg. 3). What
will you. say if the new Russian military doctrine will
contain in
.
turn thesis that Russian troops in case of
aggression will cross the border and take definite actions
in enemy tern tory?
And what will be your desision if in that case troops
will not be "spread out along a forward edge" what "most
likely indicates a defensive strategy" but rather will be
"concentrated in... individual sectors of the front" so one
will be able to "conclude that there a.re offensive plans"
(quotation on Aleksey Arbatov, p. 16, prg. 4)?
If you decide Russian threat and danger of
American/NATO-Russian war still exists you can remember the
radiostation in small German town on the German-Rol ish
border, attack on which became casus belli for the Second
World War and decide that the peace in the world is in
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danger. If you agree with me you can think over the
situation and decide that Kokoshin '
s
statement was rather a
dream or articulation of peaceful Soviet intentions or even
ov&r-sTmpl ification of the matter than real basis for
military doc trine.
United Nations' troops in the Gulf did not cross
border during the first stage of hosti 1 ity . Nevertheless
that did not interfere to bomb Baghda d and almost exhaust
Irag. The question is: will, for instance, limited aviation
attacks be decided "crossing of border" or not? One can ty*-
easily imagine situation when "continue counterof f ensive in ~Z^ ,
enemy territory" will be necessary to remove immediate T^*
threat to security — that is, for instance repelling of air W*"
attack carried out with pin-point strikes of air— to-surface CLCQjJ*^**
missiles while platforms don't enter air space over
victim's national territory.
Almost the same about the idea proposed by Aleksey
Arbatov on delimitation of offensive and defensive
orientations (p. 16, prg.4). Frankly I am not so big expert
in tactics but I have some doubts that even in current
situation of high mobility of troops there is no along
Russian borders preferred directions of attack - which
should be obviously covered harder. And in opposite - those
sectors where attack is eventually improbable lack
necessity to be covered. Taken in complex with possible
Russian unwillingness to reject totally the possibility of
counterof fensive this could serve as nice ground for
concerns about aggressive Russian plans.
Another example: "Russian Federation President Boris
N. Eltsin told his American television audience in January
1992 that nuclear missiles under Russian control would no
long er target American cities. .. Yet reports in the Russia
media indicated that despite these statements, nothing had
really changed" (p. 15, prg.l).
What will you say if obtain solid evidence Russian
will have nothing changed in flight orders of their
missiles? Will that mean that Russian reject line on
improvement of relations and time of Cold War come back? (I
don't even emphasize the fact that the United States
refused to make the same statement but in turn confirmed
that American forces continued to be targeted onto "objects
most valuable for new states' leadership".) The latest time
American cities themselves simply were not targets for
Soviet missiles - the worst case was strike against
military and military-industrial objects located in or near
cities. But we still remain in the old framework of
strategic relations and nobody promised yet to avoi d
mili tary industry . (I'd like to discuss preferred on my
opinion principles of employment of nuclear weapons for
deterrence as a separate topic.) It was not necessary to
change eventually anything to accomplish President s
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statement - and nothing has been changed. Where is problem
or unfair behavior? Is there any ground for concern or
suspicion?
I can increase list of examples. One point concerning
naval problems can be of special interest. Let's try to
imagine that Russia rejects idea of SSBN bastions and let
strategic submarines to carry out their mission alone. What
is that — evidence that Russia is so sure there will be no
war with the USA and West that doesn't feel necessity to
defend SSBNs? But may be that is re-evaluation of sea-based
strategic systems' value for Russia in real geo-political
fp situation and desision to use ships covered SSBNs to
enhance anti-SLOC forces? In this light will Sorokin's
recommendations be the best case for the Wes t (p. 24,
prg.l)?
t-
I took your attention for so long time for the only
purpose: try to clarify my point that we lived in world of
invented threa ts which paradoxically created real danger
for our well-being and even existence itself. I see the
only exit f rom this situation - to " disarm" our own
men ta 1 i ty , believe that if we pull down our guns, remove
fingers from red buttons our security will improve, not
disappear. Si vis pscem, para pacem - that should be motto.
I would add: be ready for peace with full sp*ecter of its
peaceful but extremely difficult problems.
As I remember in mid-lS'SOs there was big NATO staff
exercise with extensive computing of possible events in
case of full-scale WTO invasion. The result was
stupefying: it became obvious that invaded forces could
march no further than twenty kilometers into German
territory and at that point would be stopped and repelled.
If I'm right there were only two reports on the subject -
one in Western and one in Soviet military newspaper. May be
the reason for absence of discussion on that extremely
interesting result was that both sides were uninterested in
it? May be it's time to reverse the way?




p. 4 Fiq.l SOCIOPOLITICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF
"In support of allies" (applies to Russia) - I think
it will stay "declaratory" until the situation become calm.
The perception of it in Russia now is dual:
a) what's the necessity to defend somebody? (and
possible continuation: if they claim us occupants; if we
ourselves need at least normal life.)
b
)
Russia really concerns about statements on Russian
neo-colomal ism and needs very strong legitimate base f or
actions aimed on de tense of anybody exce pt Russi a itself .
"Supressing liberation struggle" (concerning all
republics) - I think that is mistake to define current
probability of occurence as "low". Just opposite - it's
high. Because unfair internal structure of the Soviet Union
there are tremendously many territorial, national and even
political (communists vs. democrats vs. nationalists etc)
problems in republics. Current events prove my point: you
can look at
- Karabakh (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan);
- Moldova ("democratic" Moldavians vs.
communist/nationalists Ukrainian and Russian in
Pridnestrovie and nationalists in Gagauzia);
- Ukraine - nationalists Carpathian region would be
glad to separate, almost the same situation with Russian
minority in eastern part of republic 1 : Donbass, border
regions
;
- well-known Chechnya which is formally part of
Russian Federation;
- Chechnya again with its own internal problem of
Ingush people - the republic was Chechen-Ingush and now the
second part tries to separate;
- Georgia which prevents unification of artificially
separated Osetia (Northen in Russia, Southern in Georgia);
- Tadjikistan in the Central Asia which is getting
torn now because internal political problems...
That is important to take into account that in all
that places armed force is acting instrument.
"Defense of reactionary regimes" - "low". I'd better
state "moderate " - for instance it seems Russia
unofficially support communist Pridnyestrovie - is that
support of reactionary regime? May be that is support for
national liberation war? It is sensitive point and it
should be thought over deeper.
1 Which is minority only in Ukraine as a whole but majority in
that region
.
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"Defense against internal reactionaries" - "high".
First of all it's necessary to decide who are
"reactionaries" - see the previous paragraph. In case of
Russia this statement seems to be disputable: there are
many doubts now that Russian army would fight against
people (who's else "reactionaries"?) by the order of the
government which managed to raise very sharp tension in the
society. Many people doubt they should support not the line
but definite specific actions of the government. "Defense
against internal reac tioneries" lays in this grey zone.
P.6, prq . 1
.
footnote 10: «new strategic missions
,
"repelling of a missile attack from space" and the "utter
routing of the armed forces and military potential of the
enemy ">>. I think that is mistake - t hese missions exist at
least for lattest 20 year s. You could l ook for instance at
"Voroshilov lectures" :
"Because of the likelihood of surprise enemy attack
from the air, the National Air Defense Forces must be in
constant readiness to repel massive and individual attacks
by enemy intercontinental rockets, submarine-launched
rockets, flifhts of strategic and tactical aircraft from
different directions, and space means..." 2 .
<<Conter-air and counter-space defense is among tasks
of Voisk PVO Strany>>3 .
"The achievement of the aim of war... would be
accomplished through destruction of the main groupings of
enemy armed forces... as well as the destruction of the
enemy military-economic base, disruption of the government
and military control systems..."*.
P . S F i q .
5
"Suppression of Enemy Mil-Econ Potential
- Navy (Anti-BLOC)"
Here is aqain our disagreement on the assessment of
the role of anti—SLOC mission in Soviet pi anninq . What k l n
d
of "suppression of mi 1 i tary-economy potential " do you
suppose if we planned bl ietzkrieg"? You applicate your own
experience of two last wars and think future war with
different advesary will be carried out on base of the same
plans. You perfectly know lessons of failed German
anti-SLOC campaigns: successful execution of that mission
is impossible without sufficient air and support. Soviet
Navy had not instruments for that support. Why do you think
Soviet Navy wanted to repeat unhappy German experience for
z The Voroshilov Lectures. Materials from the Soviet General
Staff Academy" vol.2, p. 19 - that is statement for foreign
student of 1973!
3
"Razvitie protivivizdushnoy oborony" (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976)
p. 191. That statement was discussed for instance in "Soviet
Military Doctrine and Western Doctrine" ed . by Gregory Flinn
(London , 1989)
.
* Voroshilov Lectures vol.1, p. 235





the third time? There were simply not enough subs to run
full-scale anti-SLOC campaign in addition to other
missions
!
P. 11 , prq .3 "ground forces with powerful 1 tank
component were no longer required by Russia". I'd like to
clarify — not ground forces with powerf ul component but
powerful tank component in ground forc es
.
P. 12 , prg .
5
Discussion on necessary number of





As I remember Russia cancelled not all
building program for ICBMs but only definite part of it
concerning production of MIRVed ICBMs.
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Enclosure (5)




Special Section on Incidents
17 July (Friday) : Warning on Bus Ride to Zagorsk.
See Enclosure (4) administrative section for lead-in com-
ments regarding the incident at the Smolensk train station and
the warning I received from Dmitriy.
I discussed the warning with a number of U.S. tour particip-
ants who were serving or retired intelligence officers (each
identified himself /herself to me as such and made no effort to
conceal this information) . They all agreed that we had been
warned and they advised me that our group was making it difficult
for the KGB/GRU to keep tabs on us since we were often going
places that were not on the programmed itinerary. I explained
that our agenda on this trip was not the same as the itinerary
and they replied that there were forces within the Russian Minis-
try of Defense that did not want to see this tour succeed and
that the itinerary was being manipulated to make is less produc-
tive than we wanted.
18 July (Saturday) : Zagorsk Restaurant incident.
See Enclosure (4) administrative section for lead-in com-
ments regarding the incident at the restaurant in Zagorsk.
LTC Dianne Smith, USA, had identified herself as U.S. Army
counterintelligence enroute from a current assignment in England
to the DIA. LTC Smith did not offer to file a report with the
militia and she never took any interest in the subsequent events.
After the incident with the "drunk," I asked a U.S. Army
civil servant who had identified himself to me as working for
Army intelligence and who was sitting next to me, what had tran-
spired when he talked to the perpetrator. He told me that the
individual was not drunk and that the incident had been staged to
reinforce the warning given to us yesterday. I was shocked and
asked him what did he think that we should do and if the student
was in trouble by attempting to file the report. He replied, no
that CPT Jim Jaworski, USA, would not be harmed and that a play
act would be allowed to continue with official reports filed and
then forgotten. He told me to allow it to happen and implied
strongly that he knew about things that were going on that neith-
er I knew about nor did John Sloan. I asked another tour partic-
ipant for advise, someone who had identified himself as having
previous Air Force counterintelligence experience and a retired




drunk who had been thrown out of the mafia and agreed that John
Sloan and Jim Jaworski should press charges.
After talking to the U.S. Assistant Naval Attache on the
telephone, I went back into restaurant and talked to U.S. Army
and Air Force civil service employees traveling with us. They
told me that they were very sorry I had acted as I had. I told
them that I was only concerned with the safety of my students. I
reiterated that we were merely a group of students and faculty.
19 July (Sunday) : Bus ride to Vladimir.
Following comments pertain to time during the bus ride to
Vladimir. That morning I was lobbied by some of our group to not
pull out our group early. During the telephone call with the
U.S. Assistant Naval Attache, I was told that some parties had
indicated that they would be very "disappointed" if we were to
depart early. This lead to a situation where although the vast
majority of students told me that they were afraid for their
safety and saw no reason to place themselves in jeopardy, some of
them also told me they were afraid for their careers if they did
not stay.
20 July (Monday) : Rostov seminar.
See Enclosure (4) for lead-in to this discussion on the
special seminar that was held in Rostov. See Enclosure (5) for a
report of substance discussed.
I did not tell anyone that I was going to request a seminar
in Rostov yet Colonel Valentine A. Rynov and LTC Pavel Dmitrio-
vich Alekseyev responded to my request "of course." John Sloan
quickly came over to us and told me that it had been already
arranged. I wondered how could it have already been arranged
since I had just asked for the special seminar, but I kept this
to myself.
During the dinner, there was much discussion about the
forthcoming seminar and John Sloan told us that it would be in
his suite. John had never had a suite before on the tour. The
hotel was odd as well. The students told me that they had seen
where the doors had to be cut open with welding torches since
they had been welded shut. It then became common knowledge that
this hotel had been opened just for our group. The hotel was in
terrible condition. Most of the light bulbs in the hotel were
missing and I could only find one electric plug on our floor that




At the evening seminar, there were a number of individuals
in attendance who never attended any of our previous sessions.
One of these individuals seemed to monopolize the conversation
and seemed irritated if anyone else asked a question. He also
occupied the center of the table directly facing the instructors.
No introductions were made, a significant departure from all
previous seminars.
The initial period of the seminar was concerned with the
passing out of documents by the Russian Frunze instructors and an
evaluation by one member of our group. It appeared that the
Russians wanted publishers and one of our gropup was agreeing to
act as intermediary. The meeting ended when the main player in
this seminar started packing up his notes and took the lead in








Associate Professor Jim Tritten QI (Fall) AY-93
Section 1: Tuesday & Thursday 0810-1000 Root 200D
Section 2: Tuesday & Thursday 1310-1500 Ingersoll 285
Military Strategy in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia
NS 3450 (4-0)
Final Version
Catalog Description : The course examines the international fac-
tors that condition military strategy and doctrine in Russia,
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. It focuses on contemporary
strategic concepts and strategy: conventional war-fighting
capabilities, strategy for nuclear war, roles played by the
fleets in military strategy, threat and net assessment, and arms
control. Emphasis is on the strategic and operational levels of
warfare. PREREQUISITE: NS 3252 and SECRET clearance.
Course Objectives : By the end of the course, the student will
demonstrate that s/he comprehends the structure and organization
of the Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) military,
military thought, and where the navy fits, can apply her/his
knowledge of the subject area by contrasting and describing
Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available) and U.S. /NATO mili-
tary and maritime concepts and facts, and by a detailed analysis
of one aspect of Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as available)
military strategy. The student is expected to understand the
differences between Western and Russian (Belarus and Ukrainian as
available) theories sufficiently to be able to demonstrate com-
prehension of differences that are often subject to "mirror
imaging" and to understand the role of each military service in
the context of military theory. The course is also designed to
lead the student into follow-on instruction and research.
Clearance Requirement : The course is basically taught at the
UNCLASSIFIED level to facilitate the taking of notes; however,
certain classified supplemental readings will be offered and
classified (up to SECRET) discussion is encouraged and will
routinely take place in the classroom. Students are encouraged
to read these supplemental materials and to participate in class-
room classified discussions. No classified material will be used
for any graded exercise or homework. Notes shall not be taken of
any classified classroom discussion unless the student has an
approved notebook for the safeguarding of classified material.





Grade : The final grade will be based upon three written assign-
ments, one project, and two written examinations. The general
weight assigned to each of these specific areas is as follows:





Any written project turned in late, without prior arrangement,
will result in a 5-point loss towards the student's final grade.
Any written assignment turned in late, without prior arrangement,
will result in a 1-point loss towards the student's final grade.
A grade of Incomplete (I) will be assigned until all instructor-
provided materials are returned. Once given, grades are not
subject to improvement by the completion of additional work. The
average grade for all faculty members in the National Security
Affairs Department has been directed to be a B+. Grades for this
class will generally adhere to this mandated average.
Written Assignments : Three UNCLASSIFIED one-page (double-spaced)
written assignments, worth a total of 15% of the overall grade,
will be required throughout the course. These are to be original
thought. What is expected is a logical development of your posi-
tion or thoughts. These written assignments do not have to be
typewritten as long as they are legible -- however experience
shows that students who turn in handwritten assignments tend to
write less than they would if they used the space allotted on a
sheet of typewritten paper -- hence generally earning lower
grades. Footnotes are not required nor desired. Do not attempt
to gain more room for writing by adopting abnormally small text
nor by using abnormally small margins (you will loose 1 point for
each paper that you do this) . Do not exceed one page. You do
not need a cover sheet with your name, etc. Write whole sen-
tences and not "bullets." Written assignments are due by COB on
the dates specified in the syllabus. Any assignment that is
late, without prior arrangement, will receive a one (1) point
deduction. The instructor will grade these assignments and return
them to the student in class.
The first assignment is an evaluation of a secondary-source
article on Russian, Belarus, Ukrainian, or Soviet military doc-
trine or strategy from any political-military journal during the
past nine months (since the demise of the USSR) . Do not select an
article that deals with military hardware or tactics. The student
should select what s/he considers the most interesting article
within this period and explain why s/he felt that way. Do not
explain what was in the article; rather analyze why it was inter-
esting and what you learned and why it is of interest to this
class. The first sentence in this paper should contain the name
of the article and journal it was published in, the date of
publication, and the name of the author(s). This assignment is




your essay, ask someone to read it and verify that you have
followed the instructions.
The second assignment is an argument of why Russia needs
intercontinental strategic nuclear forces instead simply elimi-
nating all such weapons. The students should make the strongest
argument that s/he can outlining the reasons why from the Russian
perspective. The instructor expects to see all of the arguments
made that are appropriate for Russia at this point in time, i.e.
any view that the student can defend will be accepted. Be sure to
use all the arguments that were discussed in class. Do not write
a paper on what type of forces are needed, but rather why they
are needed. This assignment is due by COB Friday, October 16.
The third assignment is to analyze some issue of what was
discussed at the special seminar on Tuesday, November 17, with
the students who visited Russia and the Ukraine in July and/or
the thesis students discussing recent changes in military policy,
doctrine, stratgegy, and force structure. Students are free to
select any subject that they like, as long as it is deals with
military doctrine or strategy. For the strategic planning
students that will miss this class, they should write a report on
how strategic nuclear strategy and/or targeting should/might
change based upon their experiences during the trip to JSTPS.
The student should analyze their individual issue with pros and
cons and their own opinions. This assignment is due by COB
Tuesday, November 24. Students who went to Russia should pre-
pare an outline of what they will talk about and present it to
the instructor one week prior to the seminar.
Projects : A type-written project or analysis of a book or mono-
graph (or in a few cases a collection of related essays) will
verify the students ability to apply her/his knowledge and demon-
strate their ability to write an essay on the subject material
from original source materials.
The book will be mutually agreed upon by the instructor and
the student. A list of books recommended is attached but if a
student would like to nominate additional titles (of original
source materials), this may be done. Do not be deceived by the
brevity or length of the varying choices: it is possible to write
a poor analysis of a short book because you might think (incor-
rectly) that there is less substance available.
Although more than one student may analyze the same book,
there are a number of reasons to avoid this option. First, the
instructor has only one copy of each book. The second student to
request a book will have to obtain it on his/her own. Experience
strongly suggests that you will be unable to recall a book in
time to meet the deadline. Secondly, if two students write on
the same book, it is likely that one paper will be viewed as
superior to the other. On the other hand, that may be a reason




The book/monograph should be read by the date in the class
schedule where that subject material is being discussed so that
the student is prepared to ask questions about it or make a 1-2
minute summary of what s/he thinks is the essence of the original
source materials. If the student elects to present a summary, it
will be ungraded. The student's objective, should s/he desire to
make a statement, is to learn from the instructor the context
and/or perspective of the book/monograph.
The analysis of a book, monograph, or short collection
should be no longer than four pages (double-spaced) without
footnotes (none are required) It should not be descriptive but
rather an evaluation of what are the main themes which the au-
thors (etc.) are attempting to communicate. Assume that the
professor has read the book or other material. If you must
describe it, do so in one (or two) paragraphs. The student
should not only read the book/monograph but s/he should attempt
to read reviews of the work (in Russian or Western sources) and
set the work and its author (s) into context. The first sentence
of the analysis should include the name of the book, the author,
and the date of publication. The final paragraph should summa-
rize the essence of the student's findings or the essence of the
book/monograph and contain a recommendation of who should read
it.
All projects or analyses are due by COB, Thursday, December
10, 1992. Any turned in late, without prior arrangement with the
instructor, will be subject to a 5 point penalty. Book analyses
will either be returned at the final examination or via guard
mail to SMC addresses. Books provided by the instructor may be
written in and/or highlighted. Books provided by the instructor
must be returned; until this is done, a grade of Incomplete (I)
will be assigned.
Examinations : A short in-class mid-term and comprehensive in-
class final examination will be given to verify comprehension of
minimal levels of factual knowledge in the subject area. Exams
will involve essay-type answers, f ill-in-the-blank, multiple
choice, and/or matching from tables. Items contained on the mid-
term will also be subject to review on the final. No classified
material will be on any exam. Exams will be open book but do not
require looking up the answer. The mid-term examination for each
section of this course will be similar but not identical. The
final examination will be identical for both sections. Examina-
tions will not be administered early or late but will only be
given during the scheduled examination times.
Special Project Option for Existing Specialists : Existing spe-
cialists will be given the opportunity to earn their grade via a
formal written seminar paper which will count for 60% of their
final grade. These formal written seminar papers are to be fully




formal one-page proposal presented to the instructor by October
6, 1992. The instructor will evaluate the proposal and return it
with approval and/or comments. All seminar papers are due by
close of business, Thursday, December 10, 1992. Any turned in
late, without prior arrangement with the instructor, will be
subject to a 5 point penalty. Specialists will complete the
normal three written assignments. Specialist students will not
have to take a mid-term examination but will be required to take
a modified final examination worth a total of 20% of the final
grade. These remainder of their final grade (5%) will be based
upon class participation. Existing specialists are expected to
make a significant contribution to the class in the form of
discussion to supplement the instructor's lecture.






Office Hours ; Root Hall 102 most hours (except lunch) that I am
not in the classroom. Please leave note on my door or in my
mailbox (next to Root Hall 103C) with your name and phone number
to arrange an appointment or leave message on my phone recorder
X2143. Under unusual circumstances, you may reach me at home at
626-3938.
Texts to be Purchased
1. Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War by
C.N. Donnelly (1988).
2. Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine by
R.L. Garthoff (1990)
.
Text on loan from instructor
(this book on loan should not be written in)
1. The Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed.
(1984) , extracts.
2. Military Strategy: Theory and Application Ed. by COL A.F.
Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
3. Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security
by Sergei Rogov, et. al. (June 1992) Center for Naval Analyses.
Texts provided by the instructor
which may be kept by the student
1. "Soviets Feared Battle for Berlin Might Have Pushed Allies
Toward Minsk," by Francis Tusa, Armed Forces Journal Internation-
al (February 1992)
.
2. "Warsaw Pact Planned 14-Day Push to Atlantic," by GEN-MAJ





3. "Evolutionary Problems in the former Soviet Armed Forces," by
Chris Donnelly, Survival (Autumn 1992)
.
4. "The Changing Role of Naval Forces: The Russian View of the
Persian Gulf War," by James J. Tritten (June 1992), forthcoming
article in December 1992 issue of The Journal of Soviet Military
Studies
.
5. "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of
War)," by A. A. Kokoshin & GEN V.N. Lobov, Moscow Znamya in Rus-
sian, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 170-182 ( JPRS-UMA-90-009 , April
13, 1990, pp. 15-24).
Recommended texts
1. Strategy, 2nd Ed., by General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich
Svechin (1927) East View Publications, 360 pp. incl. introductory
essays and reviews. One copy of this book is on reserve in the
library.
2. Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow by Benjamin
S. Lambeth (1992) RAND Corporation, 93 pp. Two copies are on re-
serve in the library.
Books for Analysis :
(listed in chronological order of publication date)
(student should attempt to obtain from library first)
(if necessary, instructor will loan copies)
Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics by VADM S.O. Makarov
1898, 300 pp. - emphasis of this report should be on comparison
of Imperial Russian Navy views on seapower to contemporary views
of Mahan, et. al.
Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers
of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
,
Vol. I, Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R.
Atlee (July 1941-November 1945) , 2nd Ed. 1975, by USSR Foreign
Ministry Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents,
403 pp. (small print - this book should be selected by a student
who is already well-versed in history so that s/he gains the
Russian perspective on events; not learns the events for the
first time)
.
Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers
of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
,
Vol. II, Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S.
Truman (August 1941-December 1945) , 2nd Ed. 1975, by USSR Foreign
Ministry Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents,
291 pp. (small print - this book should be selected by a student
who is already well-versed in history so that s/he gains the





The Soviet General Staff at War: 1941-1945 by S.M. Shtemenko,
1970, Progress Publishers, 389 pp. (medium print - recommended
for C3 specialist)
.
With the Red Fleet: The War Memoirs of Admiral Arseni Golovko Ed.
by Sir Aubrey Mansergh (1960), 239 pp. - historical review of
Northern Fleet during 2nd Great Patriotic War)
.
Submarine in Arctic Waters (Memoirs) by I. Kolyshkin (1966), 253
pp.
Military Strategy, 3rd Ed. by V.D. Sokolovskiy (1966) SRI trans-
lation, 494 pp. (medium print - extremely difficult book not
recommended for someone new to this field, 5 point bonus awarded
due to size and complexity - strongly recommended for someone who
wants in-depth knowledge)
.
Military Psychology by D. Volkogonov (1972), 408 pp.
The Initial Period of War by S.P. Ivanov (1974), Air Force trans-
lation, 1986, 311 pp. (large print - difficult book not recom-
mended for someone new to this field)
.
The Voroshilov Lectures : Materials from the Soviet General Staff
Academy, Vol. I - Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (1973-1975)
compiled by G.D. Wardak, NDU Press, 1989, 411 pp. (large print -
difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field -
bonus of 5 points awarded due to size and complexity - strongly
recommended for someone who wants in-depth knowledge)
.
The Voroshilov Lectures : Materials from the Soviet General Staff
Academy, Vol. II - Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (1973-1975)
compiled by G.D. Wardak, NDU Press, 1989, 222 pp. (large print -
difficult book not recommended for someone new to this field)
.
Camouflage by GEN-MAJ V.A. Matsulenko, et. al., (1976) U.S> Air
Force translation, 287 pp. (large print - recommended for ground
forces officer)
.
Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control by D.A. Ivanov
(1977) U.S. Air Force translation, 333 pp. (large print - recom-
mended for C3 specialist)
The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945 by M.N. Kozhevnikov (1977) U.S. Air Force
translation, 233 pp. (recommended for air force officer)
.
The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Devel-
opment by S.A. Tyushkevich (1978) U.S. Air Force translation, 508




The Sea Power of the State, 2nd Ed., Supplemented, by S.G. Gorsh-
kov (1979), JPRS L/9439, 12 Dec 80, 411 pp. (large print - recom-
mended for someone interested specifically in the Navy)
.
Tactical Reconnaissance by R.G. Simonyan & S.V. Grishin (1980)
U.S. Air Force translation, 199 pp. (large print - recommended
for ground forces officer)
.
Local War — History and the Present Day Ed. by GEN I. Ye. Shav-
rov (1980) JPRS L/10194 16 Dec 81.
Reminiscences and Reflections, by G.K. Zhukov (1982), Progress
Publishers 1985 translation, 454 pp. (recommended for Russian
specialist)
.
M .V . Frunze - Military Theorist by COL-GEN M.A. Gareev (1984)
JPRS-UMA-85-027-L, 7 Nov 85, 349 pp., or Pergamon-Brassey '
s
reprint (1988) 402 pp., (recommended for Russian specialist).
Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control by P.K. Altukhov, et.
al., (1984) JPRS-UMA-84-022-L, 15 Nov 84, 157 pp. (large print -
recommended for C3 specialist)
.
The History of Military Art by B.V. Panov, et. al., (1984) JPRS-
UMA-85-009-L, 21 Mar 85, 485 pp. (small print - bonus of 5 points
awarded due to size and complexity - strongly recommended for
someone who wants in-depth knowledge)
.
Problems of Military Theory in Soviet Scientific Reference Publi-
cations by M.M. Kiryan (1985), JPRS-UMA-013-L, 26 Sep 86, 116 pp.
(small print - difficult book not recommended for someone new to
this field)
Forward Detachments in Combat by F.D. Sverdlov (1985), JPRS-UMA-
87-014-L, 17 Sep 87, 160 pp. (large print - recommended for
ground forces officer)
.
History of Military Art Ed. by GEN-LT P. A. Zhilin (1986), JPRS-
UMA-87-004-L, 27 Mar 87, 328 pp. (small print - recommended for
specialists or someone writing a thesis in area - bonus of 5
points awarded due to size and complexity)
.
The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles Ed.
by GEN-COL F.F. Gayvoronskiy (1987), JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 Oct
89, 116 pp. (small print - recommended for someone who wants to
make Russian military theory their specialty)
.
Tactics by V.G. Reznichenko (1987) JPRS-UMA-88-008-L-I&II 29 Jun
88.
Development of Foreign Submarines and Their Tactics by L.P.
Khiyaynen (1987), JPRS-UMA-89-004-L, 24 Mar 89, 90 pp. (small




The Battalion Staff in Battle by COL Yu.M. Arutyunov (1988),
JPRS-UMA-89-015-L, 19 Dec 89, 60 pp. (small print - recommended
for ground forces officer)
.
The Motorized Rifle (Tank) Company in Battle by N.P. Moseyenko
(1988), JPRS-UMA-90-011-L, 27 Sep 90, 122 pp. (small print -
recommended for ground forces officer)
.
Submarine Tactics by V.A. Khboshch (1988) , JPRS-UMA-90-002-L, 28
Feb 90, 100 pp. (small print - recommended for submarine
officer)
.
Aviation in Local Wars by V.K. Babich (1988), JPRS-UMA-89-010-L,
2 Oct 89, 77 pp. (small print - recommended for tactical aviation
officer)
Peaceful Waters for the Global Ocean by G.M. Sturua (1988) , JPRS-
UMA-91-007-L, 6 Aug 91, 47 pp (small print - recommended for
someone interested in ocean policy or naval arms control)
.
Fundamentals of Military Economic Knowledge by Yu. Ye Vlasyevich
(1988), JPRS-UMA-91-003-L, 10 Apr 91, 105 pp. (small print -
recommended with logistician or economist)
.
Tank Armies in the Offensive by I.M. Ananyev (1988),
JPRS-UMA-020-L, 22 Nov 88, 193 pp. (small print - recommended for
ground warfare officer)
.
Electronic Warfare by A.I. Paliy (1989), JPRS-UMA-90-011-L, 6 Oct
89, 251 pp. (large print - recommended for officer experienced in
electronics warfare)
.
The Air Defense Battle by F.K. Neupokoyev (1989),
JPRS-UMA-90-007-L, 8 Jun 90, 209 pp. (large print - recommended
for someone interested in air defense)
New Thinking and Military Policy N.A. Chaldymov, Ed (1989), JPRS-
UMA-91-001-L, 148 pp. (small print - recommended for Russian
specialist)
.
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2nd Ed., V.V. Myas-
nikov, Ed. (1989), JPRS-UMA-90-010-L, 26 Sep 90, 310 pp. (large
print - recommended for someone interested in nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical warfare).
Development of Rear Services of Soviet Armed Forces, 1918-1988
V.N. Rodin, Ed, (1989) JPRS-UMA-90-004-L, 19 Apr 90, 147 pp.
(small print- recommended for logistician)
The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR [April




(1990), contained in International Affairs, Jan 90, 111 pp.
(small print - recommended for Russian area specialist)
.
Ship-Based Aircraft by V.F. Pavlenko (1990), JPRS-UMA-91-005-L, 8
Jul 91), 273 pp. (large print - recommended for naval aviator).
KGB: The Inside Story by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky
(1990), 776 pp. (large print - recommended for intelligence
student)
.
International Law and International Security: Military and Polit-
ical Dimensions Ed. by Paul Stephan & Boris Klimenko (1991) , 354
pp. (recommended for IO&N student)
Special Collections for Analysis
Collection of 11 articles and 2 collections of translations of
documents contained in Military History Journal in Jun/Jul/Aug 83
discussing the Battle of Kursk (1983), JPRS 84726, 10 Nov 83,
Mil. Aff. No. 1813; JPRS 84824, 25 Nov 83, Mil. Aff. No. 1816;
JPRS 84935, 13 Dec 83, Mil. Aff. No. 1820, approx. 100 pp. of
medium print. Two additional articles written explaining later
views on battle relative to debates of late 1980s. Analysis would
be an in-depth study of this battle. Also includes extract of
video The Unknown War: Battle of Kursk (1978) - 24 min. and
entries in encyclopedias.
Collection of translations from Soviet media highlighting Soviet
intelligence services. This collection fills 2\ large black
binders (already in chronological order) but contains many arti-
cles are of limited interest. Analysis would be to ascertain
what we have learned about the KGB and associated KGB para-mili-
tary functions from these open source reports. Small print -
recommended for intelligence specialist.
Collection of translations of articles from Izvestiya outlining
the events leading to and the results of the downing of KAL-007.
Contained in one overfilled small binder with small print. Analy-
sis would be on command and control or air defense aspects of
event. Recommended for Far East, air defense, or command and
control specialist. Student to use Western sources as well to
contrast reporting of events.
Collection of translations concerning the activities reported in
the Soviet press during and immediately after the August 1991
coup attempt. Analysis would be to understand the role of mili-
tary and intelligence services during the coup. Small print found
in one overfilled large black binder which is no longer in
chronological order. Recommended for Russian specialist.
Collection of translations on Soviet/Russian views of Persian
Gulf War. Contained in two large back binders with small print




of the war from the Soviet/Russian point of view. Recommended
for someone wanting to specialize in Persian Gulf war or future
of Russian armed forces.
Collection of translations about the Soviet military reforms of




Tuesday. September 29: COURSE INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
- Instructor pass out provided texts, loaned texts and provide
course overview.
- Pre-test.
- Videotapes: Nightline : General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army General Mikhail A.
Moiseyev, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Minister
of Defense (July 25, 1991) - 10 min.; War and the Soviet Union:
Background to Soviet Military Thinking - (1988) - 45 min.
- Students without clearances see their Cumcular Officer and
attempt to obtain one - bring certification from Security Manager
prior to next class.
Thursday, October 1: MILITARY THOUGHT & METHODOLOGY
- Read: "Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices 1 ' by John Col-
lins (1973), pp. 12-20, & "Clausewitz Condensed" by Patrick
Cronin (1985), pp. 84-93, in Military Strategy: Theory and Appli-
cation Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "The Vocabulary of the Soviet Military Theorist," pp. 74-
76, "Laws of War and Laws of Armed Conflict," pp. 94-97, "The
Soviet Military Services - Basic Structure," pp. 141-144, in The
Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "Introduction," pp. 13-14, and "The Structure of the
Soviet Armed Forces," pp. 145-149, in Red Banner: The Soviet
Military System in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly (1988).
- Read: "Foreword" & "Introduction," Deterrence and the Revolu-
tion in Soviet Military Doctrine by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp.
vii-viii, 1-5.
- Lecture on how to analyze Russian military writings, exercises,
& equipment, and how to think about military thought.
- Assignment of books for analysis (students may turn in choice
to instructor in form of written request prior to 0800.
- Students go to library and obtain books (check them out)
.
Tuesday. October 6: MILITARY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY
- Read: "Geography and Strategy" by W.N. Ciccolo (1973)
,
pp. 67-
81, and "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine" by C.N.
Donnelly, pp. 422-428, in Military Strategy: Theory and Applica-
tion Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "The Shape of the Land and the Shape of the Army," pp.
17-35, "The Roots of Russian Political and Military Tradition,"
pp. 36-51, maps on p. 61, "The Military as a Tool of Policy," pp.




in Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War by
C.N. Donnelly (1988).
- Read: "Deterrence and Prevention of War: American and Soviet
Perspectives," Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military
Doctrine by R.L. Garthoff (1990), pp. 6-28.
- Videotape: War and the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of War
(1988) - 45 min.
- Lecture on fundamental U.S. military doctrine, strategy to be
contrasted with Russian concepts.
- First written assignment due by COB this date.
Thursday. October 8: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY
- Read: "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," by Bernard Brodie
(1978)
,
pp. 284-292 in Military Strategy: Theory and Application
Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," Deter-
rence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine by R.L.
Garthoff (1990), pp. 34-37, 40-48; and "Prevention of Nuclear War
in Soviet Policy," pp. 49-93.
- Lecture on concepts of nuclear deterrence, strategy, & war
termination, from both U.S. and Soviet/Russian perspective.
Tuesday. October 13: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR & DEFENSIVE FORCES
- Read: "The Strategic Rocket Forces, pp. 144-151, "Troops of Air
Defense," pp. 159-164, "Long-Range Aviation," pp. 167-168, "Air
Defense," 232-234, "Troops of Civil Defense," pp. 262-265, The
Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "Civil Defense," Red Banner: The Soviet Military System
in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly (1988)
, pp. 163-169 and map on
p. 146.
- Suggested Reading: Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic
Forces Conflict Through the Late 1990s (U) , NIE 11-3/8-88 (Dec
88), 17 pp. (S-238,138).
- Lecture on Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear and defensive
forces and how they appear to be evolving in future.
Thursday. October 15: EARLY SOVIET MILITARY HISTORY
- Read: "Prologue: The Red Army," pp. 1-21, "Pre-World War II
Development of Soviet Military Science," pp. 77-78, The Armed
Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "The Forging of a Soviet Military Tradition," Red Banner:




- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," Deter-
rence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine by R.L.
Garthoff (1990), pp. 29-34.
- Lecture on early Soviet military history.
- Second written assignment due by COB, Friday, October 16.
Friday. October 16: OPTIONAL BROWN-BAG LUNCH
- Root 202D.
- Optional lunch discussion by students and instructor who visit-




will focus on overview, politics, economics, and general observa-
tions from the trip.
Tuesday. October 20 ; THE 2ND GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
- Read: "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-5," Red Banner: The
Soviet Military System in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly (1988),
pp. 78-86.
- Read: "The Great Patriotic War: 1941-1945, pp. 21-29, "Pre-
World War II Development of Soviet Military Science," pp. 78-79,
The Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed.
(1984) .
- Videotape: The Unknown War: War in the Air (extracts - 1978) -
18 min.
- Lecture on 2nd Great Patriotic War.
Wednesday. October 21 : OPTIONAL BROWN-BAG LUNCH
- Root 202.
- Optional lunch discussion by Russian Captain Vladimir D. Pan'-
ov, "Naval Cooperation in the Pacific."
Thursday. October 22 : STRATEGY ACCORDING TO SVECHIN
- Read: "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art
of War)," by A. A. Kokoshin and GEN V.N. Lobov, Moscow Znamya in
Russian, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 170-182 ( JPRS-UMA-90-009
,
April 13, 1990, pp. 15-24).
- Videotape: The Unknown War: Battle of Kursk (extracts - 1978) -
24 min.
- Lecture on the relevance of Svechin' s book Strategy to an
understanding of the Civil War, the 2nd Great Patriotic War, and
emerging military doctrine and strategy for the republics of the
former Soviet Union.
Tuesday. October 27: MILITARY SCIENCE
- Read: "The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine," pp. 65-
69, The Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed.
(1984)
.
- Read: "The Theory and Practice of Military Doctrine," pp. 101-
113 and "Soviet Military Art Today," pp. 213-219 in Red Banner:
The Soviet Military System in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly
(1988)
- Read: "Deterrence in Soviet Political-Military Policy," Deter-
rence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine by R.L.
Garthoff (1990), pp. 37-40.
- Read and bring to class handouts on military thought.
- Lecture on Soviet/Russian view of military science (see hand-
outs) .
Thursday. October 29 : REVIEW/MID-TERM EXAMINATION
- First hour will be course review.





Tuesday. November 3: HIGH COMMAND, GROUND, & AIR FORCES AND
OPERATIONAL ART.
- Read: "The Soviet High Command," pp. 105-129, "The Ground
Forces," pp. 151-159, "The Air Forces," 164-167, "Frontal Avia-
tion/Transport Aviation," 169-171, "Deployment of Soviet Military
Forces: TVDs, Military Districts, Fleets, Border Guards, and MVD
Troops," pp. 183-192, "Groups of Forces Abroad, pp. 213-224,
"Troops of the KGB and MVD," pp. 234-239, The Armed Forces of the
USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Read: "Arming the Soviet Military Machine," pp. 114-117,
"Running the Soviet Military Machine," pp. 135-145 & 149-161,
"Operational Art," pp. 219-225, "Allies and Alliances," pp. 233-
251 in Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War by
C.N. Donnelly (1988).
Read: "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," by
David Jablonsky (1987)
, pp. 52-63 in Military Strategy: Theory
and Application Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War
College.
Review mid-term examination.
- Lecture on combined arms and joint warfare, the operational-
level of warfare, and general purpose land and air forces in
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.
Thursday, November 5: GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
- Videotapes: War and the Soviet Union: The Current Structure of
the Soviet Armed Forces (1988) - approx. 4 5 min. ; The High Threat
Environment (1978) - 9 min.; Soviet Air Power (1987) - 50 min.
- Instructor on travel; class still meets to watch videotapes.
Tuesday. November 10 : NAVAL FORCES AND THE NWTVD
- Read: "Opening Era of Power Projection: 1974-1982," pp. 57-62,
"The Navy," pp. 171-178, "The Fleets," pp. 224-232, The Armed
Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984).
- Suggested Reading: Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Towards
the 21st Century (U) , NIE 11-15/89 (1989) (S-243-986)
.
- Videotape: "The Unknown War: War in the Arctic (extracts -
1978) - 27 min.
- Guest presentation during the first hour by Captain 1st Rank
Vladimir Pan'kov, Russian Navy.
Thursday. November 12: POST-WAR SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE &
STRATEGY THROUGH THE END OF THE BREZHNEV ERA
- Read: "Postwar Development of Soviet Military Doctrine and
Strategy," pp. 37-57, 63-65, "Military Science," pp. 79-93, 97-98
The Armed Forces of the USSR by H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed.
(1984) .
- Read: "1945-53 - The First Post-War Period," pp. 86-87 and "The
Face of Future Battle in Europe," pp. 252-284. Red Banner: The
Soviet Military System in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly (1988)
.
- Read: "Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts" by MSU
V.D. Sokolovskiy (1962), pp. 401-413 and "Military Strategy" by
MSU N.V. Ogarkov (1979), pp. 414-421, in Military Strategy:





- Lecture on Soviet military strategy from the end of the 2nd
Great Patriotic War through the mid-1980s.
Tuesday. November 17 : SPECIAL SEMINAR WITH STUDENTS WHO VISITED
RUSSIA & UKRAINE IN JULY
- First hour is a special seminar with 4 students who visited
Russia and the Ukraine this past July. Seminar will focus on
military strategy and not duplicate information from optional
brown-bag lunch.
- Second hour is a special seminar with 2 thesis students who
will discuss recent developments in Soviet and Russian military
policy, military doctrine, military strategy, and force struc-
ture.
- Instructor on travel.
Thursday. November 19 : SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE & STRATEGY IN THE
GORBACHEV ERA
- Read: "Gorbachev's New Thinking," pp. 94-148 and "What if
Deterrence Fails? Soviet Views on Waging and Ending War," pp.
149-185 in Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military
Doctrine by R.L. Garthoff (1990).
- Suggested Reading: Whither Gorbachev: Soviet Policy and Polit-
ics in the 1990s (U) NIE 11-18-87 (Nov 87) 47 pp. (S-232,013).
- Suggested Reading: Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev
Challenge (U) NIE 11-4-89 (Apr 89) 21 pp. (S-240,446).
- Lecture on 1985-1990 Soviet military strategy.
Tuesday. November 24 : EMERGING RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE, STRATE-
GY, AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- Read: Donnelly, "Evolutionary Problems in the former Soviet
Armed Forces," Survival, Autumn 1992, 15 pp.
- Read: Tusa, "Soviets Feared Battle for Berlin Might Have Pushed
Allies Toward Minsk," Armed Forces Journal International, Febru-
ary 1992, 1 p.; & Surikov, "Warsaw Pact Planned 14-Day Push to
Atlantic," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1992, 1
P.
- Read: Tritten, "The Changing Role of Naval Forces: The Russian
View of the Persian Gulf War," June 1992, 27 pp.
- Suggested Reading: Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from
Moscow by Ben Lambeth (1992) , 93 pp.
- Lecture on post-DESERT STORM and post-coup union/republic
emerging military doctrine & strategy.
-Third written assignment due by COB this date.
Thursday. November 25 : HOLIDAY
Tuesday. December 1: POSSIBLE MILITARY SCENARIOS TODAY
- Read: Rogov, et. al., Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and
International Security, 82 pp.
- Guest presentation by Pavel Felgengauer, Russian newspaper
correspondent for military affairs.




WTVD military scenarios for future and role of military forces of
Belarus and the Ukraine.
Thursday. December 3: THREAT AND NET ASSESSMENTS
- Read: "Analysing Operational Experience," Red Banner: The
Soviet Military System in Peace and War by C.N. Donnelly (1988)
,
pp. 224-232.
- Read: "Weighing the Balance," The Armed Forces of the USSR by
H.F. & W.F. Scott, 3rd Ed. (1984), pp. 396-404.
- Read: handouts on "Quantifying Military Terms."
- Lecture on assessments based upon scenarios developed in previ-
ous lecture.
- In-class problems on how to construct a ground forces net
assessment.
Tuesday. December 8: SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL
- Read: "Why Arms Control has Failed" by E.N. Luttwak (1978) &
"The Realities of Arms Control" by The Harvard Nuclear Studies
Group (1983)
, pp. 383-398 in Military Strategy: Theory and Appli-
cation Ed. by COL A.F. Lykke, Jr. (1989) U.S. Army War College.
- Lecture on nuclear and conventional arms control agreements
between the U.S. and USSR/Russia and Belarus and the Ukraine.
Thursday. December 10 : COURSE WRAP-UP/ SOFs
- Read: "Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy," Deterrence
and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine by R.L. Garthoff
(1990)
, pp. 186-201.
- Where is Russian and republic military strategy going?
- Review for exam.
- All projects or analyses due by close of business this date.
If late, they are subject to a five point penalty.
Thursday. December 17 : FINAL EXAMINATION
- Root Hall rooms 240 & 242, 1300-1500
- Open book - bring all required texts/materials to the test.
- Return all loaned materials to instructor's office.
cc: NS, NS/Gt, NS/Tk
CAPT Ed Smith, OP-922
LCDR Bruce Ingham, NIC-12
Dr. Kipp, FMSO








• General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin, Strategy, 2nd Ed.
1927, Eastview Pubs., 1992, 374 pp. $44.95 + $3.00 s/h.
• [available in entirely for first time in English.]
- [previously Scotts had provided extracts.]
- [need to read entire book to get full flavor.]
• [earlier citations by Kokoshin & Larionov, then Lobov, etc.
were indicative of major shift in what Soviet military was
thinking.
]
- [first detected in an end note vice major statement.]
- [book seen in Russian military offices this past summer.]
— [reforms of 1924-1925 were "most instructive" for
today.
]
- [special analytic introductions by Kokoshin & Larionov,
Lobov, Kipp.
]
• [not easy to read, lacking organization & conclusion.]
- Published form of a series of lectures at the General
Staff Academy.
- [similarity to Mahan.]
• [easier to understand if think about World War I or Russian
Civil War and Delbriick writings.]
• [does not follow embryonic Communist rhetoric/philosophical
construct of theory of war.]
- explains that he will not use notes or refer to others.
- states you cannot build an army except on basis of patri-
otism.
— [implies army based on class identity will fail.]
• [obviously causes major criticism of him even if he is bril-
liant in his analysis and recommendations.]
- [book contains reprints of three critical reviews from
1920s.
]
• [since Svechin is liquidated during the purges, his model of
direct criticism and not following party line is not one to
be followed for future strategists who want to say something
controversial.
]
- [use of historical or Western surrogates in future for
criticism or articles that do not follow "party" line.]
HOW TO STUDY MILITARY ART?
• starts here vice with substance.
• must include military history.
- argues that truths of history should remain untarnished.






- directly criticizes Red Army performance in Civil War.
study of classics has strong value.
- done best in seminars and discussions.
analysis of own operational-level exercises is essentially
worthless.
- impossible to test logistics & wartime conditions.
- worse at strategic level.
war games good only for education.
- Russians avoided hard questions in games.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN WAR & ARMED CONFLICT .
• war includes political/diplomatic, economics, and ideological
as well as armed conflict.
- [compare to similarity of traditional Soviet view of
war. ]
- exploit these weak points as well.
- military must represent needs of armed forces in consid-
eration of these other forms of warfare.
— [how to do this if only study armed conflict?]
• direction and coordination is by politics.
- including decision of political offensive or defensive.
- [although this is not new, he obviously felt that the
point needed to be made again.]
• therefore war and armed conflict are subordinate to politics.
- strategy cannot exist in a vacuum.
- politics affects strategy after war has commenced.
— [still an issue when Sokolovskiy wrote his book.]
- if you have bad politics, you will have a bad war.
- due to the nature of politics, compromise will permeate
the preparation for war [and ending of war?].
• purpose of war is to win a peace whose conditions are set by
state.
- political directions may change during a war.
— [review recent wars/campaigns.]
- purpose of armed conflict is to destroy hostile army.
— [similarity to Mahan.]
- wars are generally not terminated successfully by the use
of armed forces alone.
— diplomacy and politics needed in crafting the peace.
• political goals of war must be appropriate to one's war-
fighting capabilities.
- important to understand this prior to outbreak of hostil-
ities.
- [whose fault is it if the politicians do not understand
the limits of armed force?]
• impossible to end up with an apolitical army.




PREPARATION FOR WAR & ECONOMIC WARFARE
preparation before war ultimately pays for itself by lowering
the costs of actual war.
- [similarity to Mahan's view on War of 1812.]
- do not fall for trap of quantity in lieu of quality, even
if the state is poor.
- operational reserve forces near fronts do work.
- irregular forces will never substitute for regular army.
- do not waste large amounts on fortifications (some O.K.).




- [similarity to needs of today in reconstitution
scenario.
]
need an economic general staff as well.
- [how have nations worked around this?]
economic conflict may not coincide with armed conflict.
- [Desert Shield/Storm example.]
- economic conflict is double-edged sword,
long-term economic mobilization in stages.
- commence while armed forces remain on peacetime footing.
- cannot totally ignore civilian needs.
— [implies must plan for this as well.]
— [we used this argument for SLOC protection]
.
during the war, innovate and test directly on battlefield.
- [this comment is out of place in book.]
— [hidden agenda?]
ALLIANCES & DIPLOMACY .
• alliances only of value if complemented by military conven-
tion.
- ignores the value of allies who have other values.
— [Portugal and Iceland in past.]
— [Bahrain in more recent past.]
• small states often have relatively high numbers of armed
forces but no support or sustainability
.
- [this probably is of value today with armed forces of
former Soviet republics.]
• violence often employed to change neutrals into allies.
- [example?]
• object of diplomacy is to avoid armed conflict at unwanted
times.








preparation for war and management of operations.
strategy determines starting moments for operations and end
points.
role of the general staff.
strategic theory cannot exist for single services.
- [major issue in 1980s as well.]
not all good operators make good strategists.
- [true today and in U.S. forces?]
- [if true, then does this require a general staff?]
Red Army deficient in area of strategy.
- "initiative in the army can only exist on the basis of
extensive initiative in civilian society."
need truly national view to overcome local/regional desire to
defend territory at expense of victory in war as a whole,
politician must understand what is feasible and how politics
affects military situation.
- sometimes politics determines the sequence of operations
rather than strategy.
— [examples?]
strategist is a national or coalition quartermaster.
- allocation in space and time.
lines of communication most important task of strategist.
- retain most outstanding and reliable officers to direct
the rear during war.


























































Strategies of Destruction .
Description;
- quick wars with decisive battle against centers of gravi-
ty.
— encircle or entrapment.
- defeat the most important enemy first.
- not generally geographically oriented.
Examples;
- [Initial Central powers view of World War I.]
- [Desert Storm or initial Axis view of World War II.]
- [old NATO/WTO war on central front.]
- [new Bush strategy for crises.]
- preventive wars generally wars of destruction.
— [if Entente did not do this during Civil War, then




- requires extensive land boundaries crossed by good lines
of communications.
- requires significant superiority in forces.
— cheat secondary theaters to mass forces.
- requires opponent "whose political structure resembles a
giant with feet of clay."
— [Czarist Russia was like this.]
- requires smoothly functioning manpower system.





- minimal loss of material and life.
- less complex plan.
- war can be conducted only with existing stockpiles and
standing armies with operational reserves.
- defending side is forced to prepare for this type war if
attacker chooses destruction.
- if defender fails to prepare for destruction, can lead to
an easy victory.
- opponent with major class contradictions vulnerable to
quick destruction of his army.
— [Czarist Russia was like this.]
Drawbacks;
- does not work without overwhelming superiority.
- based upon offensive and ability to conduct two simulta-
neous operations (required for encirclement) which is
technically very difficult.
— [example of Russian war plans prior to World War I.]
- no strategic reserves.
— no back up if failure.
- narrows perspective of strategic thinking.
- does not work with all opponents [see attrition below].





- assumes that one starting position is enough to achieve
ultimate objective.
- if concentrate on 1st and 2nd echelons, opponents lines
of communications may be given a free ride.
[Implied recommendation;]
- [do not reguire destruction strategy for defense against
foreign intervention.]
Strategies of Attrition .
• Description;
- description all encompassing from bloodless maneuvers to
a series of major battles.
— [criticism for being all encompassing.]
- longer wars with many steps to ultimate victory.
— total mobilization occurs.
— must keep long-term goals in mind during operations.
- first secure rear and flanks prior to engaging opponent.
— national reserve is men/material not formed yet.
— strategic reserve is men/material not tied to opera-
tion.
— operational reserve is men/material tied to sector
but not yet committed.
- limited goals until final crisis does not mean that
overall goals of war are limited.
- may be more geographically oriented.
— struggle for positions from which to make attacks.
- economic and political efforts may continue well after
the culmination of armed conflict.
• Examples;
- [World War I as fought by Entente.]
- [World War II as fought by United Nations.]




- major dissimilarity between opponents, i.e. land and sea
power, leads to attrition (UK and Russia)
.
- large distances between opponents leads to attrition
(Japan and Russia)
.
- importance of lines of communication leads one to attri-
tion.
- military parity leads to attrition.
— [situation building towards today?]
- opponent with no class contradictions leads to attrition.
• Necessary conditions;
- reguires comprehensive war planning, total mobilization,
and militarization of society.
- strategic intensity of war? has shifted from 20th day to
several months due to logistics, economics, & politics.
— [does he really mean operations or war?]





- if state poorly prepared for land war, strategic intensi-
ty may be postponed 1-3 years.
— [reconstitution scenarios of today.]
- [inconsistency of time lines not important.]
Benefits;
- does not require major standing armed forces.
— [clearly this is where we are all headed.]
- opens perspective of strategic thinking.
- ability to engage greater menu of opponents.
- if opponent engages in destruction, own lines of communi-
cation may have a free ride.
- opponent with major class contradictions vulnerable to
slow destruction of his army.
- even went so far as to point out that Lenin advocated
policy of attrition (vice destruction) in 1920 booklet
Disorder of Leftism in Communism.
Drawbacks;
- requires support of people over extended period.
- requires time to build capability.
— if opponent prepares for destruction and you do not,
can lead to cataclysmic failure.
- requires industry and transportation infrastructure.
— [Russia did not have this either.]
- costs more.
-- [but costs spread out over time].
- constrains the opponent's actions less.
- concerns for defense of locally important areas can
divert attention from the major issues of the war.
Recommendations
;
- navies and air forces primarily weapons of economic
pressure.
— problems in executing economic warfare successfully.
- industrial locations might be major vulnerability (Sevas-
topol and Leningrad)
.
- military bases might be major vulnerability (Kronshtadt)
.





- envelopment or flank attack.
- does not agree that need to go on offensive immediately
• prerequisites.
- major forces and expenditure of effort.
- speed in sequential operations to avoid pauses between.
- operational surprise.
- tactical surprise nice to have.
- starting place as close to enemy as possible.





- if overextend self, can lead to adventurism.
— eventually you will wear self down and defender will
build up sufficient for a successful counterattack.
— must know when to end the offensive.
- sometimes cannot mass for major battle with all assets.
— [Soviet Navy dilemma.]
- simultaneous offensive operations rarely successful.
— since this is the basis for encirclement, these are
high risk.
— destruction strategists drawn to this method and do
not realize how difficult it is.
- small separate attacks may be more economical than one
big one.
Defensive Strategies (negative goals)
.
• methods.
- does not mean passive actions only.
— tactical counterattacks is the main idea.
- job of strategist is to find the time and place to shift
to positive goals.
- if not engaged in an offensive, military should imme-
diately adopt a defensive posture.
• claims that Clausewitz considered defense as the stronger
form of warfare without "perverting" the German army.
• prerequisites.
- expendable territory.
- time must be on side of defense for it to work.
- requires less expenditure of effort.
- requires quick concentration of effort at decisive point.
• problems.
- opponent maintaining status quo in class struggle may
require superior effort rather than less effort.
Maneuver Warfare .
• if both sides set positive goals, they maneuver, and battle
is series of meeting engagements.
• Soviet Union could afford withdrawal in western border areas
- operational and tactical scale.
• high command can only react three days after events happen.
• type of warfare required for most small countries.
Positional Warfare .






can pursue positive goals.
- apply pressure on enemy from position.
- switch from positional to maneuver.
— starting point for next attack.
can force the enemy to deploy disadvantageously.
high command can respond more quickly to events in this type
of warfare.
sometimes almost forced into this type warfare.
- coalition wars generally more positional.
— [true today? or during the Civil War?]
- important of lines of communication lead to positional
war.
- the normal mode of defense against invasion from the sea.
easy to get stuck in this (World War I)
.
Soviet Union needs to prepare for this type of warfare.
OPERATIONS .
• uninterrupted acts of war with theater-level goals.
- [experience of Russo-Japanese War of 1905 is basis of
concept of this level of warfare.]
- [Civil War also discussed in terms of separate theaters.]
• if understand basic strategy, will intuitively make correct
operational-level decisions.
• operational art is the highest level theory for single serv-
ice or for individual theater.
- [credited with creation of concept of operational art.]
- places troops in best tactical position.
TACTICS .
• individual battles.
• high command cannot be indifferent to battle tactics.
- [hence minor discussion included in book on strategy.]
• the correct tactics are those dictated by the strategy.
• only the high command can properly judge them.
• should not determine force structure.
- or strategy.
— Delbruck lessons of Germany in World War I.
WAR & CAMPAIGN PLANNING .
• province of the general staff during peacetime.
- [what Svechin calls war planning is what we now term
program planning.]
- [what Svechin calls operational planning is now what we
term war and/or campaign planning.]




probably should routinely do this against all possible ene-
mies.
- [similarity to Rainbow plans.]
need flexible plans with options to choose at time,
plans need to cover entire period of an extended war.
assessment of own forces needed to be based upon truth.
- need independent source of information.
— [Stavka representative idea.]
need to ask what is the nature of the forthcoming war?
- [similarity to what was later termed military doctrine.]
need to ask what is the nature of the opponent?
- grasps the basis of net assessments; "...grasp war as it
is perceived by the opposing side..."
- attacker must compare own present with defender's future
(since lines of communication better for defense)
.
- study of opponent not limited to military side.
- requires best and brightest officers!
— "intelligence primarily requires persons of the
highest qualifications in the economic, political,
historical and strategic sense, truly refined schol-
ars who have immersed themselves in the study of a
certain state. All the prewar general staffs suf-
fered from a lack of such people. Without them
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